International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics > Vol 4 > Issue 2

Use of Incentive-Based Management Systems to Limit Bycatch and Discarding

Sean Pascoe, CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research, Australia, sean.pascoe@csiro.au James Innes, CEMARE, University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom, james.innes@port.ac.uk Dan Holland, Gulf of Maine Research Institute, USA, dholland@gmri.org Mark Fina, North Pacific Fishery Management Council, USA, Mark.Fina@noaa.gov Olivier Thébaud, CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research, Australia, olivier.thebaud@csiro.au Ralph Townsend, Ministry of Fisheries, New Zealand, Ralph_Townsend@umit.maine.edu James Sanchirico, University of California at Davis, USA, jsanchirico@ucdavis.edu Ragnar Arnason, Department of Economics, University of Iceland, Iceland, ragnara@hi.is Chris Wilcox, CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research, Australia, chris.wilcox@csiro.au Trevor Hutton, CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research, Australia, trevor.hutton@csiro.au
 
Suggested Citation
Sean Pascoe, James Innes, Dan Holland, Mark Fina, Olivier Thébaud, Ralph Townsend, James Sanchirico, Ragnar Arnason, Chris Wilcox and Trevor Hutton (2010), "Use of Incentive-Based Management Systems to Limit Bycatch and Discarding", International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics: Vol. 4: No. 2, pp 123-161. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/101.00000032

Published: 09 Oct 2010
© 2010 S. Pascoe et al.
 
Subjects
Environmental Economics
 
Keywords
Q22Q27Q28D01
Incentive-based managementBycatchDiscardingMarine conservationFisheries management
 

Article Help

Share

Download article
In this article:
1 Introduction
2 Incentives to Discard in Commercial Fisheries
3 Potential Incentive-Based Systems to Reduce Bycatch and Discards
4 Financial Incentives
5 Assurance Bonds and Insurance
6 Quota Systems
7 Consumer-Driven Incentives to Avoid Bycatch: Market Access and Eco-labelling
8 Social Incentives
9 Summary and Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References

Abstract

In most fisheries, a number of species are unintentionally caught as bycatch while attempting to catch the targeted species. While much of the bycatch problem is technological in nature due to imperfect selectivity of the fishing gear, fisher behaviour also plays a major role. How, when and where fishers choose to fish can influence catch composition and thereby the quantity of bycatch. Behavioural changes can be encouraged through the development of an appropriate set of incentives — both economic and social — to avoid bycatch and reduce discarding. In this paper, a number of alternative incentive-based bycatch management systems are reviewed. The potential applicability of these systems to quota species, non-commercial species and threatened or conservation-dependent species (such as turtles, seals, dolphins) is reviewed, and examples of their application are presented. The review concludes that incentive-based approaches can reduce the level of bycatch and discarding in most fisheries.

DOI:10.1561/101.00000032