Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 6 > Issue 1

Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, UK, s.bandyopadhyay@bham.ac.uk Kalyan Chatterjee, Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, USA, kchatterjee@psu.edu Tomas Sjöström, Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, USA, tsjostrom@econ.rutgers.edu
 
Suggested Citation
Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Kalyan Chatterjee and Tomas Sjöström (2011), "Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 6: No. 1, pp 1-53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010043

Published: 23 Aug 2011
© 2011 S. Bandyopadhyay, K. Chatterjee and T. Sjöström
 
Subjects
Formal modelling,  Comparative politics,  Lawmaking,  Elections
 

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In this article:
The Model
Equilibrium Post-Election Coalition Formation
Ex Ante Bargaining
Viable Ex Ante Coalitions with Proportional Representation
Viable Ex Ante Coalitions with Plurality Voting
Ex Ante Bargaining with Many Periods
Strategic Voter Coordination
Conclusion
Appendix
References

Abstract

We study a game-theoretic model where three political parties (left, median and right) can form coalitions both before and after the election. Before the election, coalitions can commit to a seat-sharing arrangement, but not to a policy platform or a division of rents from office; coalition members are free to break up and join other coalitions after the election. Equilibrium pre-electoral coalitions are not necessarily made up of the most ideologically similar parties, and they form under proportional representation as well as plurality rule. They form not only to avoid splitting the vote, but also because seat-sharing arrangements will influence the post-election bargaining and coalition formation. The median party's share of the surplus in a two-party government is large if ideology is not very important, or if its ideological position is not very distant from the third (outside) party, so that it has a credible threat to switch coalition partners. On the other hand, if ideology is very important, and if the right and left parties are ideologically distant from each other so each is willing to give up a lot to prevent the other from joining a governing coalition, then the equilibrium outcome may be that the median party forms a one-party government.

DOI:10.1561/100.00010043