Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 4 > Issue 1

War Chests for Deterrence and Savings

Jay Goodliffe, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 25545, Associate Professor, Brigham Young University, USA, goodliffe@byu.edu
 
Suggested Citation
Jay Goodliffe (2007), "War Chests for Deterrence and Savings", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 4: No. 1, pp 129-150. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00007061

Published: 01 Mar 2007
© 2009 J. Goodliffe
 
Subjects
Campaigns
 

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Related Models
The Model
One Election Cycle
Two Election Cycles, No Uncertainty
Discussion and Empirical Predictions
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Abstract

I present a model of fund-raising in repeated elections where funds are raised to deter the entry of strong challengers, and to increase the probability of winning through campaign spending. The equilibrium relationship between war chests and incumbent strength is non-monotonic, because incumbents of moderate strength have an incentive to raise enough money to deter strong challengers and to save a large fraction of those funds for use in subsequent election, while stronger incumbents have less incentive to save. Thus, the savings behavior can mask the entry deterrence effect.

DOI:10.1561/100.00007061

Online Appendix | 100.00007061_app.zip (ZIP).

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/100.00007061_app