Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 3 > Issue 1

Deliberation Rules and Voting

Richard Van Weelden, Department of Economics, Yale University, USA,
 
Suggested Citation
Richard Van Weelden (2008), "Deliberation Rules and Voting", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 3: No. 1, pp 83-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00007062

Published: 30 Jan 2008
© 2008 R. Van Weelden
 
Subjects
Formal modelling,  Voting theory,  Legislatures
 

Article Help

Share

Download article
In this article:
Model
Results
Conclusion
References

Abstract

Most models of pre-vote deliberation assume that voters send messages simultaneously. In practice, however, communication is almost always sequential. This review shows that sequential communication makes it even more difficult to induce truthful communication. Specifically, I show that for any voting rule truthful communication can only be achieved if all voters will agree on the preferred outcome in any state.

DOI:10.1561/100.00007062