Review of Behavioral Economics > Vol 1 > Issue 3

Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System

M. Garrett Roth, Oberlin College, Department of Economics, mgarrettroth@gmail.com David Skarbek, King's College London, Department of Political Economy, United Kingdom, davidskarbek@gmail.com
 
Suggested Citation
M. Garrett Roth and David Skarbek (2014), "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System", Review of Behavioral Economics: Vol. 1: No. 3, pp 223-243. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/105.00000011

Published: 27 May 2014
© 2014 M. G. Roth and D. Skarbek
 
Subjects
Industrial Organization: Market Structure,  Industrial Organization: Transaction Cost Economics,  Industrial Organization: Theory of the Firm,  Law and Economics: Crime,  Strategic Alliances and Networks
 

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In this article:
1. Introduction
2. Prison Gangs Operate in a Community Responsibility System
3. Modeling the Organization of Prison Gangs
4. Conclusion
References

Abstract

Why do prison gangs exist? Despite the prominence of formal governance mechanisms, inmates also require self-governance institutions to facilitate illicit trade. This article examines how inmates enforce agreements in the illicit contraband trade and how they resolve social disputes. We first describe how the informal prison society operates as a community responsibility system. We then present a model of prison gang organization that accounts for both environmental factors and the endogenous actions of the prison administration, encapsulated in the "warden." We find that gangs organize based on exogenous characteristics. The "warden" diffuses gang influence by maintaining the oligopolistic structure, which limits contraband but allows for orderly private allocation of prison-provided goods and dispute resolution.

DOI:10.1561/105.00000011