Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 2 > Issue 1

Coalition Formation and Voting in Public Goods Games

Astrid Dannenberg, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Germany, dannenberg@zew.de
 
Suggested Citation
Astrid Dannenberg (2012), "Coalition Formation and Voting in Public Goods Games", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 2: No. 1, pp 83-105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000011

Published: 01 Jan 2012
© 2012 A. Dannenberg
 
Subjects
Game Theoretic Models/Cooperation/Noncooperation,  Voting,  Coalitions,  Public Goods/Global Public Goods/bads
 
Keywords
C92D02D71H41
Public goodsCoalition formationCooperationVoting
 

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In this article:
Introduction
Theoretical Background
Experimental Design
Experimental Results
Conclusions
Appendix
Instructions
Rules of the Game
Control Questions
References

Abstract

This study experimentally examines the voluntary formation of coalitions to provide a public good when the coalition members use different voting schemes to determine their commitment. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting public good provision level and social welfare. At first sight, in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that a change in the voting scheme implemented in a coalition does not significantly change the social welfare. However, changing the majority required to determine the coalition efforts alters the depth and breadth of cooperation; coalitions under the unanimity rule are relatively large and implement moderate effort levels while coalitions with majority voting implement high effort levels but attract only a few participants.

DOI:10.1561/102.00000011