Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 4 > Issue 2

The Green-Game: Accounting for Device Criticality in Resource Consolidation for Backbone IP Networks

Aruna Prem Bianzino, Department of Computer and Information Science, Linköping University, Sweden, aruna.bianzino@liu.se Jean-Louis Rougier, Institut Télécom/Télécom ParisTech, France, Claude Chaudet, Institut Télécom/Télécom ParisTech, France, Dario Rossi, Institut Télécom/Télécom ParisTech, France,
 
Suggested Citation
Aruna Prem Bianzino, Jean-Louis Rougier, Claude Chaudet and Dario Rossi (2014), "The Green-Game: Accounting for Device Criticality in Resource Consolidation for Backbone IP Networks", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 4: No. 2, pp 131-153. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000038

Published: 14 Jul 2014
© 2014 A. P. Bianzino, J.-L. Rougier, C. Chaudet, and D. Rossi
 
Subjects
Data networks,  Games (co-operative or not),  Environmental Economics:Climate Change
 
Keywords
Coalitional gamesShapley valueBackbone IP networks.
 

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In this article:
1. Introduction
2. The Optimization Problem Formulation
3. The Green-Game Definition
4. On the Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value
5. Results on a Real Network Scenario
6. Possible Extensions and Other Applications
7. Conclusions
References

Abstract

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.

The reduction of energy expenditure of communication networks represents a key issue for the research community. A promising technique acting in this direction is known as "resource consolidation". It consists in concentrating the workload of an infrastructure on a reduced set of devices, while switching off the others. Deciding on the set of devices that can be safely switched off requires an accurate evaluation of their criticality in the network. We define here a measure of criticality that takes into account not only the network topology, but also the traffic, and different possible network configurations. We model the scenario as a coalitional game. Shapley value ranking is efficiently used to drive the resource consolidation procedure. Numerical results, on real network scenarios, confirm the robustness and relevance of the proposed index in measuring criticality, yielding a good tradeoff between energy efficiency and network robustness, and outperforming other classical indexes.

DOI:10.1561/102.00000038

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