Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 3 > Issue 1–2

The Stability of Fishing Agreements with Entry: The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel

Hans Ellefsen, Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark, ellefsen@sam.sdu.dk
 
Suggested Citation
Hans Ellefsen (2013), "The Stability of Fishing Agreements with Entry: The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 3: No. 1–2, pp 67-95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000024

Published: 09 Jan 2013
© 2013 H. Ellefsen
 
Subjects
Game Theoretic Models/Cooperation/Noncooperation,  Climate Change,  Fisheries
 
Keywords
C70Q22
Northeast Atlantic mackerelCooperative gamesNon-cooperative gamesPartition functionStabilityClimate change
 

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In this article:
Introduction
Background
The Bioeconomic Model
The Game Theory Model
Application to the Mackerel Fishery
A Cooperative Solution
Sensitivity Analysis
Conclusion
References

Abstract

This paper investigates the stability of agreements for sharing fish stocks among coastal states when migrations patterns change — a heretofore largely unexplored topic. The case investigated is the agreement on sharing the mackerel stock (Scomber scombrus) in the North-east Atlantic Ocean. Since 2000, this stock has been shared by three coastal states. However, in 2007, the fish changed its migration pattern, entering the waters of a fourth state. This led to the collapse of the previous agreement in 2010, causing severe overfishing. The game of the new entrant is modeled using the partition function approach with strictly convex cost functions. The results indicate that the stability decreases with the new entrant but increases when the prices are heterogeneous. In addition, the larger players need to pay the most relatively to get the new entrant into the game.

DOI:10.1561/102.00000024