Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 3 > Issue 1–2

Stability of International Fisheries Agreements Using Precautionary Bioeconomic Harvesting Strategies

Mika Rahikainen, Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki, Finland, mika.rahikainen@helsinki.fi Marko Lindroos, Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki, Finland, Veijo Kaitala, Department of Biosciences, University of Helsinki, Finland,
 
Suggested Citation
Mika Rahikainen, Marko Lindroos and Veijo Kaitala (2013), "Stability of International Fisheries Agreements Using Precautionary Bioeconomic Harvesting Strategies", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 3: No. 1–2, pp 97-120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000025

Published: 09 Jan 2013
© 2013 M. Rahikainen, M. Lindroos and V. Kaitala
 
Subjects
Game Theoretic Models/Cooperation/Noncooperation,  Fisheries,  Agreements/Voluntary Agreements
 
Keywords
K32Q22Q57
Risk managementHarvest control rulePrecautionary approachGame theoryFisheries agreementNorth sea herring
 

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In this article:
Introduction
Fish Stock and the Current Management Scheme
The Model
Results
Discussion
References

Abstract

International agreements are necessary for exclusion of non-cooperative behavior. We parameterized an age-structured model for the North Sea herring fishery. The reference points of the current harvest control rule operationalize the precautionary approach. Applying the precautionary approach by the grand coalition adds the net present value of the fishery compared to another management approach, a fixed fishing mortality rate strategy. The fishing strategy and costs have a strong impact on the stability of the coalitions. Adopting a precautionary harvest control rule has potential to stabilize multilateral fishing agreements provided that fishing costs are not identical among countries. If they are identical, there will always be incentive for free riding.

DOI:10.1561/102.00000025