Strategic Behavior and the Environment

About this Journal

Institutional Prices Volume 4, 4 issues (2014)

Electronic Only:
$440 in the Americas
€440 in all other countries
Print Only:
Add $36/€36pph
Add $70/€70 +36pph

Individual Prices: Request
Strategic Behavior and the Environment

Print ISSN: 1944-012X
Online ISSN: 1944-0138


Ariel Dinar
University of California, Riverside, USA
Personal Homepage

Charles Mason
University of Wyoming, USA
Personal Homepage 

Aart de Zeeuw
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Personal Homepage 

Recently published:
Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts

Guest Editors: Stefano Moretti and Fioravante Patrone

For subscribers' access, see the articles listed under Volume 4, Issue 2

Volume 4, issue 4

Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem

We study unanimity bargaining among agents along a general river structure that is expressed by a geography matrix and who have access to limited local resources, cost functions that depend upon river inflow and own extraction, and quasi-linear preferences over water and money. Bargaining determin
Volume 4, issue 4

The Role of Emissions Trading and Permit Allocation in International Climate Agreements with Asymmetric Countries

This paper presents a model of international environmental agreements in which cooperation between asymmetric countries can arise through pure self-interest. It demonstrates how emissions trading creates economic surplus by exploiting asymmetries. This surplus can be distributed via the appropriat
Volume 4, issue 4

Land Development Restrictions and Preemptive Action - On the Benefits of Differentiated Regulation

We address the problem of preemptive land development to avoid future regulation. We demonstrate that differentiated treatment of landowners is generally essential to optimally deal with preemption. While differentiated policies improve welfare, they require the regulator to be informed about land
Volume 4, issue 4


Volume 4, issue 3

Some Effects of Asymmetries in a Common Pool Natural Resource Oligopoly

We consider a renewable resource being exploited in common by firms that compete both in the output market and in the exploitation of the resource. We show that the introduction of the slightest cost differentiation among the firms can have a drastic effect on the nature of the equilibria that may b...
Volume 4, issue 3

When Beliefs About Future Create Future — Exploitation of a Common Ecosystem from a New Perspective

In this paper, a model of an ecosystem influenced by a large human population is presented. It is modelled by a discrete time dynamic game with many players and a simple dynamics. The paper proposes a new way to look at the problems of exploitation of ecosystems by many users — using the author's co...
Volume 4, issue 3

Does It Pay to Play? How Bargaining Shapes Donor Participation in the Funding of Environmental Protection

Multilateral funding for global environmental protection, such as biodiversity conservation, requires donor participation. When are donors willing to participate? We examine a game-theoretic model of multilateral funding for environmental projects in developing countries. Donors must first decide wh...
Volume 4, issue 3

Optimal Commitment Under Uncertainty: Adjustment Rules for Climate Policy

This paper analyses the optimal type and degree of commitment to a future climate policy when damage costs from climate change are uncertain. Taking uncertainty into account, it is shown within the framework of a sequential game between firms and a regulator that commitment to an emission abatement
Volume 4, issue 2

ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.The special issue ICT-based strategies for environmental conflicts contains four peer-reviewed articles devoted to the analysis of multiagents decision problems arising from the exploitation of environmental
Volume 4, issue 2

Enabling Public Participation in Strategic Environmental Assessment: An Application of Multicriteria Analysis

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.Since the last decades Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has been recognized as a very important and rapidly growing area of research and application in the domain of sustainable development. It has be...
Volume 4, issue 2

The Green-Game: Accounting for Device Criticality in Resource Consolidation for Backbone IP Networks

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.The reduction of energy expenditure of communication networks represents a key issue for the research community. A promising technique acting in this direction is known as "resource consolidation". It consist...
Volume 4, issue 2

On the Role of Coalitional Network Games in Modelling the Social Dimension in Ecosystem Management

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.Although a large amount of data about the environmental exploitation of natural resources is now available for scientists, most of the computational approaches in the literature of ecosystem management have n...
Volume 4, issue 2

Energy-constrained Mean Field Games in Wireless Networks

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.In this paper, we study anti-jamming problems in energy-aware wireless networks using mean field stochastic games. We consider three types of users: jammers, primary users and secondary users. When active, ea...
Volume 4, issue 1

Do Increases in Risk Mitigate the Tragedy of the Commons?

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich [Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009], showing that a marginal increase of risk in the n...
Volume 4, issue 1

Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production generates pollution and public firms are less efficient than private ones. In a differential game we compare (i) the Markov-Perfect Nash equilibrium under social planning; (ii...
Volume 4, issue 1

Absorptive Capacity, R+D Spillovers, Emissions Taxes and R+D Subsidies

In this paper, we consider a duopoly competing on quantity, where firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish between efforts carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (inventive R&D) and efforts made to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of th...
Volume 4, issue 1

Pollution and Environmentalists' Participation in Emissions Trading Systems

In this paper, we show that the participation by an environmental group in a permit market does not necessarily result in more investment in abatement or even less pollution. There is a U-shaped relationship between the emission per unit of output and the extra weight given by the environmental grou...