Strategic Behavior and the Environment

About this Journal

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Strategic Behavior and the Environment

Print ISSN: 1944-012X
Online ISSN: 1944-0138

Editors-in-Chief:

Ariel Dinar
University of California, Riverside, USA
Personal Homepage

Charles Mason
University of Wyoming, USA
Personal Homepage 

Aart de Zeeuw
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Personal Homepage 

Forthcoming

Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts

The Green-Game: Accounting for Device Criticality in Resource Consolidation for Backbone IP Networks
by Aruna Prem Bianzino, Jean-Louis Rougier, Claude Chaudet and Dario Rossi

Enabling public participation in Strategic Environmental Assessment: an application of Multicriteria Analysis
by Marta Bottero, Valentina Ferretti, Giulio Mondini and Silvia Pomarico

Energy-constrained mean field games in wireless networks
by Hamidou Tembine

Volume 4, issue 1

Do Increases in Risk Mitigate the Tragedy of the Commons?

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich [Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009], showing that a marginal increase of risk in the n...
Volume 4, issue 1

Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production generates pollution and public firms are less efficient than private ones. In a differential game we compare (i) the Markov-Perfect Nash equilibrium under social planning; (ii...
Volume 4, issue 1

Absorptive Capacity, R+D Spillovers, Emissions Taxes and R+D Subsidies

In this paper, we consider a duopoly competing on quantity, where firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish between efforts carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (inventive R&D) and efforts made to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of th...
Volume 4, issue 1

Pollution and Environmentalists' Participation in Emissions Trading Systems

In this paper, we show that the participation by an environmental group in a permit market does not necessarily result in more investment in abatement or even less pollution. There is a U-shaped relationship between the emission per unit of output and the extra weight given by the environmental grou...