Strategic Behavior and the Environment

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Strategic Behavior and the Environment

Print ISSN: 1944-012X
Online ISSN: 1944-0138

Editors-in-Chief:

Ariel Dinar
University of California, Riverside, USA
Personal Homepage

Charles Mason
University of Wyoming, USA
Personal Homepage 

Aart de Zeeuw
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Personal Homepage 

Forthcoming

Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts

The Green-Game: Accounting for Device Criticality in Resource Consolidation for Backbone IP Networks
by Aruna Prem Bianzino, Jean-Louis Rougier, Claude Chaudet and Dario Rossi

Enabling public participation in Strategic Environmental Assessment: an application of Multicriteria Analysis
by Marta Bottero, Valentina Ferretti, Giulio Mondini and Silvia Pomarico

Energy-constrained mean field games in wireless networks
by Hamidou Tembine

Volume 3, issue 4

Don't Forget to Protect Abundant Resources

We examine an entry-deterrence model with multiple incumbents who strategically increase their individual appropriation in order to prevent entry. We show that entry deterrence yields a welfare improvement, relative to contexts of unthreatened entry, if firms exploit a relatively scarce resource. Wh...
Volume 3, issue 4

Possible Inefficiencies in a Duopoly Trading Emission Permits

We consider a duopolistic industry in which pollution is a by-product of production and firms are given emission permits that they can trade. The common wisdom is that allowing for trade in emission permits promotes efficiency. We demonstrate that this common wisdom cannot automatically be extended
Volume 3, issue 4

Enforcement Leverage with Fixed Inspection Capacity

We develop a targeting enforcement mechanism in the context of fixed inspection capacity due to budget constraint. A fixed number of firms are selected for inspection and those with the highest emissions are targeted with higher inspection probability. This structure induces dynamic rank-order tourn...
Volume 3, issue 4

A Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreement on Matching Rates: Can It Bring About an Efficient and Equitable Outcome?

We incorporate matching schemes into a model of transboundary environmental agreements and investigate their effectiveness using three-stage game models. In the first stage, each country decides whether to accede to the agreement. In the second stage, the signatories collectively choose a common mat...
Volume 3, issue 3

Incentives for Strategic Behavior in the Permit Market

In an international permit trading regime, the initial allocation of permits across countries determines the participating countries' trading position. Large permit trading countries on both sides of the market can exploit their market power in the permit market. We analyze how the competitive envir...
Volume 3, issue 3

Arrow–Fisher–Hanemann–Henry and Dixit–Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions

We extend the Arrow–Fisher–Hanemann–Henry (AFHH) and Dixit–Pindyck (DP) option values to a game situation. By reinterpreting the AFHH option value as a change in the surplus from conservation because of the prospect of future information, we deal with a conceptual difficulty associated with the AFHH...
Volume 3, issue 3

Can Rationing Rules for Common Resources Impact Self-insurance Decisions?

When users have ex-ante demands over a common resource and when resource size is not sufficient to cover all the individual demands, there is a need to establish a rationing rule. I test whether the choice of the rationing rule impacts the individual decision to self-insure, i.e., to invest in a sec...
Volume 3, issue 3

Corporate Environmentalism in Dynamic Oligopoly

This study investigates how an increase in the firms' environmental consciousness affects the environment and economic welfare in the presence of dynamic oligopolistic competition where firms' objective may include the society's damage from stock pollution as well as their profits. If all firms are
Volume 3, issue 1–2

Introduction to the Special Issue on Game Theory and Fisheries: Recent Issues

Volume 3, issue 1–2

Climate Change and the Benefits of Cooperation in Harvesting North-East Arctic Cod

In this paper, we simulate how an increase in the productivity of the North-East Arctic cod fishery affects Russian–Norwegian cooperation on fish stock management. We link the productivity increase to sea environmental conditions and climate change through a temperature-dependent, stock–recruitment
Volume 3, issue 1–2

Can Cooperative Management of Tuna Fisheries in the Western Pacific Solve the Growth Overfishing Problem?

Tuna fisheries in the western and central Pacific Ocean are important globally for both food and economic security. Yellowfin and bigeye tuna stocks in this region are declining, in part due to the juvenile bycatch of these species by the purse seine fishery using floating objects and fish aggregati...
Volume 3, issue 1–2

The Stability of Fishing Agreements with Entry: The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel

This paper investigates the stability of agreements for sharing fish stocks among coastal states when migrations patterns change — a heretofore largely unexplored topic. The case investigated is the agreement on sharing the mackerel stock (Scomber scombrus) in the North-east Atlantic Ocean. Since 20...
Volume 3, issue 1–2

Stability of International Fisheries Agreements Using Precautionary Bioeconomic Harvesting Strategies

International agreements are necessary for exclusion of non-cooperative behavior. We parameterized an age-structured model for the North Sea herring fishery. The reference points of the current harvest control rule operationalize the precautionary approach. Applying the precautionary approach by the...
Volume 3, issue 1–2

Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea — A Case of Trivial Cooperation?

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries...