Strategic Behavior and the Environment

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Strategic Behavior and the Environment

Print ISSN: 1944-012X
Online ISSN: 1944-0138

Editors-in-Chief:

Ariel Dinar
University of California, Riverside, USA
Personal Homepage

Charles Mason
University of Wyoming, USA
Personal Homepage 

Aart de Zeeuw
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Personal Homepage 

Recently published:
Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts

Guest Editors: Stefano Moretti and Fioravante Patrone

For subscribers' access, see the articles listed under Volume 4, Issue 2

Volume 4, issue 2

ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.The special issue ICT-based strategies for environmental conflicts contains four peer-reviewed articles devoted to the analysis of multiagents decision problems arising from the exploitation of environmental
Volume 4, issue 2

Enabling Public Participation in Strategic Environmental Assessment: An Application of Multicriteria Analysis

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.Since the last decades Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has been recognized as a very important and rapidly growing area of research and application in the domain of sustainable development. It has be...
Volume 4, issue 2

The Green-Game: Accounting for Device Criticality in Resource Consolidation for Backbone IP Networks

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.The reduction of energy expenditure of communication networks represents a key issue for the research community. A promising technique acting in this direction is known as "resource consolidation". It consist...
Volume 4, issue 2

On the Role of Coalitional Network Games in Modelling the Social Dimension in Ecosystem Management

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.Although a large amount of data about the environmental exploitation of natural resources is now available for scientists, most of the computational approaches in the literature of ecosystem management have n...
Volume 4, issue 2

Energy-constrained Mean Field Games in Wireless Networks

This article is part of a Special Issue on ICT-based Strategies for Environmental Conflicts.In this paper, we study anti-jamming problems in energy-aware wireless networks using mean field stochastic games. We consider three types of users: jammers, primary users and secondary users. When active, ea...
Volume 4, issue 1

Do Increases in Risk Mitigate the Tragedy of the Commons?

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich [Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009], showing that a marginal increase of risk in the n...
Volume 4, issue 1

Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production generates pollution and public firms are less efficient than private ones. In a differential game we compare (i) the Markov-Perfect Nash equilibrium under social planning; (ii...
Volume 4, issue 1

Absorptive Capacity, R+D Spillovers, Emissions Taxes and R+D Subsidies

In this paper, we consider a duopoly competing on quantity, where firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish between efforts carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (inventive R&D) and efforts made to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of th...
Volume 4, issue 1

Pollution and Environmentalists' Participation in Emissions Trading Systems

In this paper, we show that the participation by an environmental group in a permit market does not necessarily result in more investment in abatement or even less pollution. There is a U-shaped relationship between the emission per unit of output and the extra weight given by the environmental grou...