Information Theoretic Security
Foundations and Trends® in
Communications and Information Theory
Volume 5 Issue 4–5
DOI: 10.1561/0100000036
Information Theoretic Security
Yingbin Liang
University of Hawaii, Department of Electrical Engineering, Holmes Hall
483, 2540 Dole Street, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA, yingbinl@hawaii.edu
H. Vincent Poor
Princeton University, Department of Electrical Engineering, E-Quad,
Olden Street, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA, poor@princeton.edu
Shlomo Shamai (Shitz)
Technion Israel Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical
Engineering, Technion City, Haifa, 32000, Israel, sshlomo@ee.technion.ac.il
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Yingbin
Liang
and
H. Vincent
Poor
and
Shlomo
Shamai (Shitz)
(2009)
"Information Theoretic Security",
Foundations and Trends® in Communications and Information Theory: Vol. 5: No 4–5, pp 355-580.
http:/dx.doi.org/10.1561/0100000036
Abstract
The topic of information theoretic security is introduced and the principal results in this area are reviewed. The basic wire-tap
channel model is considered first, and then several specific types of wire-tap channels are considered, including Gaussian,
multi-input multi-output (MIMO), compound, and feedback wire-tap channels, as well as the wire-tap channel with side information.
Practical code design techniques to achieve secrecy for wire-tap channels are also introduced. The wire-tap formalism is then
extended to the basic channels of multi-user networks, including broadcast channels, multiple-access channels (MACs), interference
channels, relay channels and two-way channels. For all of these models, results on the fundamental communication limits under
secrecy constraints and corresponding coding schemes are reviewed. Furthermore, several related topics including key agreement
through common randomness, secure network coding, authentication, cross-layer design, and secure source coding are discussed.