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# Security Analysis and Formal Verification on Blockchain and its Applications

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# Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security

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## Contents

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<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1	Blockchain and its Applications . . . . .	3
1.2	The Need for Verification . . . . .	8
1.3	Outline . . . . .	9
<b>2</b>	<b>Problems of Focus</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1	Infrastructure Flaws . . . . .	12
2.2	Application Flaws . . . . .	19
<b>3</b>	<b>Formal Verification</b>	<b>34</b>
3.1	Formal Verification for Infrastructures . . . . .	35
3.2	Formal Verification for Applications . . . . .	44
<b>4</b>	<b>Security Analysis</b>	<b>58</b>
4.1	Security Analysis for Infrastructures . . . . .	58
4.2	Security Analysis for Applications . . . . .	68
<b>5</b>	<b>Persisting Challenges</b>	<b>88</b>
5.1	Unknown Flaw Families . . . . .	88
5.2	Limited Eco-system Support . . . . .	89
5.3	Guarantees v.s. Practicality . . . . .	90
5.4	Significant Usability Barriers . . . . .	90

<b>6</b>	<b>On the Horizon</b>	<b>92</b>
6.1	Efforts on Infrastructures . . . . .	92
6.2	Advanced Attack Prevention and Rescue . . . . .	93
6.3	ML-assisted Verification Methods . . . . .	93
6.4	Toward Broader and Deeper Blockchain Verification . . . . .	94
	<b>References</b>	<b>95</b>



# Security Analysis and Formal Verification on Blockchain and its Applications

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## ABSTRACT

Blockchains have become an integrated part of our finance infrastructures. Being monetary yet fully automated, blockchains and their applications are unanimously deemed impracticable before undergoing necessary verification. This monograph reviews the previous attempts at verifying two fundamental properties of blockchains: correctness (where flaws lead to unintentional damages) and security (where vulnerabilities incur attacks and losses). First, it summarizes

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and categorizes the correctness and security flaws encountered by real-world blockchains. Second, it systematizes the development of formal verification to address the flaws in blockchains, covering the aspects of models, specifications, and techniques. Third, it unveils the progress of security analysis for mitigating the flaws, unveiling the analysis principles being followed, the flaw oracles being devised, and the detection methods being used. Finally, it summarizes the challenges remaining to be addressed, followed by our vision of the trend in the near future. Throughout this monograph, we anticipate shedding light on future blockchain verification advances, especially in expanding its applicability, making specification generation easier, and discovering previously unknown vulnerabilities. By identifying gaps such as missing tools for infrastructure-level components and the difficulty of writing formal specifications, this work aims to motivate the development of more automated, intelligent, and practical verification frameworks.

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# 1

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## Introduction

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### 1.1 Blockchain and its Applications

#### 1.1.1 A Brief History

In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto's white paper, "*Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System*" (Nakamoto, 2008), was released to the public, proposing a solution enabled by peer-to-peer network for electronic cash payments without needing a trusted third party. This was the first time the concept of blockchain and the technology underlying Bitcoin (the first decentralized cryptocurrency) came to our attention.

Since the advent of Bitcoin, blockchain technology has evolved significantly. Ethereum, introduced by Vitalik Buterin in 2013 (Buterin *et al.*, 2013), expanded the capabilities of blockchain by enabling smart contracts, which are self-executing programs with agreement terms written into code. This development opened up unprecedented possibilities for decentralized applications across various sectors.

#### 1.1.2 Blockchain Technology

**Overview:** At its core, blockchain is a distributed database that maintains a continuously growing list of records, called *blocks*, which are


securely linked using cryptographic techniques. Each block contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block, a timestamp, and transaction data, making it virtually tamper-proof and resistant to modification. This structure ensures that once a block is added to the chain, the information it contains is immutable and can be trusted by all participants in the network.

Most blockchains today are supported by networks following a peer-to-peer (P2P) model (Buford *et al.*, 2009), where each node acts as a peer and can perform operations independently of central servers or authorities. Data on blockchains, especially the transactions, are distributed across nodes, ensuring each node can access the entire of it. **Block Operations:** The creation of blocks depends on the blockchain's *consensus mechanism* (Lashkari and Musilek, 2021). Blockchain consensus mechanisms are foundational protocols that allow network participants to agree on the current state of a distributed ledger, ensuring all transactions are accurate and preventing potential fraud. For illustrations, we introduce the two most popular consensus mechanisms and how blocks are created under them.

- **Proof of Work (PoW, Nakamoto, 2008):** In PoW blockchains like Bitcoin, a subset of nodes called *miners* compete to solve complex cryptographic puzzles (known as *mining*), and the first miner to solve the puzzle gets the right to add a new block consisting of transactions to the blockchain. *Full nodes*, a superset of miners, validate the new block and its transactions. If the block violates the rules of the blockchain network, it is rejected to prevent invalid transactions or fraudulent blocks from being added to the blockchain.
- **Proof of Stake (PoS, Smith, 2024):** In PoS blockchains like Tendermint-based Ethereum (Buchman, 2016), creating and validating blocks are handled by nodes called *validators*, which are required to stake a certain amount of their assets as collateral. Validators are selected to create a new block based on various factors, such as the size of their stake, random selection processes, and the length of time they have held the stake. Once chosen,

the validator can create a block with transactions and broadcast it to other nodes. If accepted by other validators, the block is added to the blockchain. To discourage validators from acting maliciously or negligently, PoS blockchains can penalize them by slashing a portion of their staked tokens if they attempt to approve fraudulent transactions or fail to remain online and functional.

**User Interactions:** Users in the wild can interact with blockchains through *transactions* (precisely, units of exchange on blockchain networks to enable the transfer of value and information between participants). To issue transactions, users usually need a *wallet*—a digital identity that allows users to manage their cryptocurrency or digital assets. With a wallet ready, a user can create a transaction by specifying the necessary information (e.g., transaction type, recipient’s address, transfer amount, etc.) and sign it with the private key associated with their wallet. A signed transaction is first submitted to a blockchain node and propagated across the peer-to-peer network. Miners or validators then select pending transactions from the network for execution and inclusion in a new block. Once a block is created, it is broadcast to the network for validation. If a majority of nodes accept the block as valid according to the consensus protocol, the block is appended to the blockchain. At this point, the transaction is considered finalized and immutable. An overview of the transaction life cycle is presented in Figure 1.1.



**Figure 1.1:** Transaction life cycle.

To incentivize the miners or validators to include a transaction, the users need to offer a *transaction fee*. Usually, higher fees can lead to faster processing, especially on congested networks. With different blockchains, transaction fees are collected using different mechanisms. On Bitcoin, transaction fees are calculated based on the transaction size in bytes, and users pay the fees implicitly with Bitcoins from their inputs to the transaction. On Ethereum, transaction fees are measured by the *gas* needed for completing the transaction. Specifically, each operation, from sending the transaction to executing the transaction, requires a predetermined amount of gas. The total gas, after completion of the transaction, will be paid from the user's wallet with Ether.

### 1.1.3 Blockchain Applications

Blockchain technology has enabled a wide range of applications across various industries. However, the diversity of applications escalated dramatically after smart contracts were invented.

**Before Smart Contracts:** Before the advent of smart contracts, blockchain technology was primarily known for its application as a decentralized ledger for cryptocurrencies, with Bitcoin being the pioneer. The most fundamental use of cryptocurrencies is to enable transfers between two user wallets without needing a trusted intermediary like a bank. A side use is to earn rewards for participating in the blockchain operations. For instance, Bitcoin miners receive rewards for each block mined, including a combination of newly minted bitcoins and transaction fees from all transactions included in the block.

Besides peer-to-peer transfers, early blockchains have enabled a few applications in other domains, including but not limited to:

- *proof of ownership of digital art and virtual properties;*
- *timestamping of documents to prove existence at a particular time;*
- *tracking the origin and journey of products in industries;*
- *voting systems with reduced fraud and enhanced transparency.*

*Clarification:* Some early applications, such as proof of ownership and product tracking, resemble later use cases like NFTs and supply chain

automation. However, smart contracts significantly enhanced these domains by enabling programmability and automation. For example, NFTs formalized ownership through standardized token interfaces, and supply chain systems now benefit from automatic updates and conditional payments via smart contracts. Thus, while the core ideas existed before, smart contracts expanded their scope, functionality, and adoption.

**After Smart Contracts:** Smart contracts, introduced by Ethereum, are self-executing programs with the terms of the agreement between participants being directly written into lines of code. These contracts automatically enforce and execute themselves when predefined conditions are met, providing a secure, transparent, and efficient way to facilitate and verify transactions without intermediaries.

Smart contracts are typically written in high-level programming languages crafted for blockchains, such as Solidity for Ethereum. Once finalized, a smart contract is usually compiled into bytecode, a low-level representation runnable in the blockchains' *virtual machine* (VM). A special transaction can be created to deploy the bytecode to a block. To execute a function defined in the smart contract, users send transactions directly to the smart contract's address with details such as function identifier and any parameters required by the function.

The programmability and automation provided by smart contracts have spurred a wide range of applications across various domains. Some representative categories include:

- **Decentralized Finance (DeFi):** Smart contracts have been used to create protocols that replicate existing financial services, enabling the DeFi ecosystem. In this ecosystem, we have witnessed *lending and borrowing platforms* where users loan cryptocurrencies and pay interest automatically, *stablecoins* where smart contracts maintain a peg to other assets like USD, *yield farming and liquidity mining* where users stake liquidity and earn rewards in the form of transaction fees or governance tokens.
- **Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs):** Smart contracts have enabled Automated Market Makers (AMMs) like Uniswap and SushiSwap to create liquidity pools that automatically execute

trades based on algorithms. Smart contracts have also created space where users can exchange tokens directly from their wallets, bypassing the need for centralized exchanges.

- **Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs):** Smart contracts have been adopted to verify the authenticity and ownership of digital assets, allowing artists and creators to sell unique digital art pieces directly to consumers. Similarly, in games, smart contracts can manage in-game assets that players can own, trade, or use across different gaming platforms.
- **Supply Chain Management:** Smart contracts can record the journey of a product through its supply chain, automatically updating at each stage when conditions are met to ensure transparency and authenticity. With smart contracts, payments can be automatically triggered when goods are delivered or milestones are met, reducing delays and removing the need for manual processing.

## 1.2 The Need for Verification

Compared to conventional computation platforms, blockchains offer the following set of unique properties, leading to their rapid development and tremendous deployment.

- **Decentralization:** A blockchain is maintained by a network of nodes, each holding a copy of the entire ledger. This decentralization enhances security and reduces the risk of data manipulation.
- **Transparency:** Transactions on a blockchain are visible to all participants in the network, providing a high level of transparency. This feature is particularly valuable in applications requiring accountability and auditability.
- **Immutability:** Once recorded on a blockchain, data cannot be altered or deleted. This immutability ensures the integrity and reliability of the data, making blockchain an ideal solution for record-keeping and verification purposes.
- **Security:** Blockchain employs advanced cryptographic techniques to secure transactions and control the creation of new units. The



consensus mechanisms used in blockchain networks further enhance security by making it computationally infeasible for malicious actors to alter the blockchain.

However, the properties shall never be taken for granted. The designs and implementations of blockchains and their applications can involve high complexities and subtleness. If not properly handled, they can introduce various flaws compromising those properties. As we will systematize in Section 2, we have witnessed numerous flaws in real-world blockchains and applications, spanning all aspects and components.

When the flaws are triggered, especially when exploited by adversaries, the four properties above can break, and assumptions about the safety of assets no longer hold. This often leads to financial damage at an astonishing level. In 2023 alone, the top ten attacks against blockchain flaws have led to asset losses totaling around \$1,146 million. These notorious attacks have shaken society's confidence in blockchains. For instance, the DAO hack against Ethereum in 2016 (Chen, 2019) not only incurred a \$60 million theft but, more importantly, led to a hard fork of the blockchain. This sparked a significant debate over the immutability of blockchains, threatening the foundations of blockchain technology. Thus, *verification of the core properties of blockchains and their applications is a must to ensure the development and sustainability of the entire ecosystem.*

### 1.3 Outline

In this monograph, we aim to present a review of the existing efforts on verification for mitigating flaws in blockchains and their applications. We differentiate these efforts into two big categories of *formal verification* and *security analysis* and discuss them separately. Unlike previous attempts that organize the literature based on how the methods work (modeling, specification, techniques, etc.), we take a problem-driven strategy: we organize the existing methods based on the flaws they focus on. Specifically, we elaborate on each family of major flaws, and under each flaw, we discuss the applicable formal verification and security analysis methods. This way, we deliver a clear understanding of what

problems have been addressed and what have not.

The follow-up sections of this review are organized as follows. In Section 2, we categorize and summarize the common flaws we have observed in the real world. In Section 3 and Section 4, we systematize the formal verification and security analysis methods to address those flaws. In Section 5, we discuss the remaining challenge faced by formal verification and security analysis, followed by sharing our opinions about the future in Section 6.

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