APPENDIX:

"Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of 'Inferior Offices,' and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy"

I. Justification of Formal Modeling Assumptions

Our formal model makes several important and debatable assumptions. Here we offer our justification for those assumptions

The most important assumptions we make concern which political actors are included in the model. By casting the president and Senate committee chair as the sole, active decision-makers in the model, we make several assumptions. First, we assume that actors on the Senate floor can be ignored:

> *Assumption #1. Senate floor actors—such as the median and filibuster pivot—do not influence the confirmation process.*

Assumption #1 rests on the empirical observation that less than 0.1% of all nominees fail on the Senate floor, whereas a large portion of nominees fail in committee (see Figure 1). That evidence casts doubt on the claim that presidents anticipate key Senators' preferences and select nominees that will pass floor votes: if presidents are strategically adept at selecting nominees to pass floor votes, why do they fail to take similar measures to ensure that their nominees pass in committee? We know of no satisfactory answer to this question. In fact, the past literature maintains that the Senate floor largely defers to the decisions of committees and the president (Deering 1987; Moe 1987). For these reasons, we contend that a parsimonious model excludes Senate floor actors.

The second assumption we make concerning the players involved in the model concerns the importance of the Senate committee chair, relative to other committee members:

> *Assumption #2. Committee members other than the chair do not influence the confirmation process.*

This assumption approximates reality, we contend, more closely than the assumption that, say, the median committee member influences the confirmation process. Scholars studying the partisan control of legislatures have agreed that top officials in the majority party allocate proposal, veto, and scheduling powers to their committee chairs in order to foster conformity within the party (Cox and McCubbins 2002; Tsebelis 2002; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Thus, committee chairs hold extensive agenda-setting control that they use to achieve their policy objectives (Evans 2001). Moreover, even in earlier periods when parties maintained weak control over legislative actors, committee chairs played a dominant role in directing the activity of their committees (Fenno 1973; Rohde and Aldrich 2001). Given the unanimous voice in which this literature trumpets the authority of committee chairs, our model reduces the decision-making of the broader committee to the strategy selection of the committee chair.

Our model includes a third actor—namely, the prospective bureaucratic appointment. We treat the bureaucrat as a passive actor who does not make any decisions:

Assumption #3. The bureaucrat does not make any strategic decisions.

In one respect, this assumption accurately captures the fact that prospective bureaucratic officials, during the appointment process, simply respond to the requests of presidents and Senate committees. However, an interesting direction for future research might be to consider how bureaucrats could craft those responses strategically.

The main function of the bureaucratic actor in our model is to implement a policy based on her ideal point. With respect to that ideology, we make the following assumption:

Assumption #4. The Senate committee chair has better information about the ideology of a prospective nominee than does the President.

Our model assumes that the president, relative to the relevant committee chair, faces an information disadvantage about a nominee. This assumption may seem strange—after all, the president is the actor who selects the nominee in the first place and, thus, would appear to be in a position to meticulously vet a prospective appointee. But, as it turns out, presidents lack the time and resources to scrutinize nominees thoroughly (Sullivan 2002; Pfiffner 2001), whereas Senate committee chairs can orchestrate—at their own discretion and without formal constraints—a lengthy, invasive inquiry for any nominee they wish to dissect. This disparity becomes evident when contrasting the tasks that presidents and Senate committee chairs face when screening prospective nominees.

Upon being elected, presidents receive tens of thousands of applications from aspiring appointees (Sullivan 2002). Presidents cannot themselves filter through these applications, so they hire full-time staff and adopt automated procedures to filter through applications (Sullivan 2002; Pfiffner 2001). Yet, even with those resources in place, the vast number of applications requires presidents to cut corners. In some instances, cutting corners is done in a sensible manner, as when the G.W. Bush administration adopted computer technologies that allowed them to search applications for salient nominee traits, instead of reading full applications (Sullivan 2002). In other instances, administrations take ludicrous measures, such as when the "the Clinton administration fell hopelessly behind, at one point in the transition, simply throwing out 3,000 applications sitting in its backlog in a frustrated effort to 'catch up'" (Sullivan 2002, 31). Whether sensible or otherwise, such measures indicate that presidential administrations can only glance at the backgrounds of prospective appointees if they wish to staff the executive branch rapidly—which is necessary given that agency activity grinds to a halt without the installation of a nominee (Korte 2011).

Senate committee chairs, on the other hand, screen candidates under more favorable conditions. First, committee chairs are tasked with only evaluating a small fraction of the voluminous set of candidates considered by presidential administrations. Each committee evaluates only those nominees that fall within their policy jurisdiction. Magnifying the advantages associated with this smaller workload, committee chairs enjoy a second perk—they do not face the time pressures encountered by the chief executive. As noted by Deering (1987, 112), "[f]rom Johnson to Reagan, the percentage of nominees cleared within three weeks declined dramatically, and the percentage cleared within eight weeks was cut in half." This extended consideration of nominees may result, in part, from the growing number of Senate-confirmed positions over the past decades, but it also seems to be a symptom of a more intensive committee process. Committees have "expand[ed] the amount of information requested of nominees, delegate[ed] specialized tasks to staff, and expand[ed] the number of hearings held to review nominations" (Deering 1987, 104). These activities, moreover, are relatively open-ended; committees have complete discretion over both the information they collect from nominees and the procedures they employ to collect that information. In fact, only a handful of committees have adopted set procedures to govern their internal management of nominee consideration (Deering 1987, 106-7). Presumably, this lack of formal procedures provides committees flexibility to intensify investigations at their own discretion and focus on any attribute of a nominee they find important. With this flexibility, committee investigations appear "less concerned with the professional credentials of the nominees and more concerned with their political credentials" (Deering 1987, 114). Indeed, a portion of nominees maintain that "the Senate reviews their policy views rather than simply their expertise and integrity" (Deering 1987,

114). By controlling these activities, Senate committee chairs can acquire considerably more information about the political ideologies of nominees than can presidents.

A much-publicized example of the relative information advantages of Senate committees can be seen in Barack Obama's 2009 withdrawn nomination of Tom Daschle to head the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).[1] Given President Obama's interest in pushing through health reform in his first term, the Obama administration placed great scrutiny on who would be nominated to head HHS. As a well-connected, former majority leader, Daschle looked like an ideal candidate and the administration began its own, internal investigation of Daschle. This investigation discovered that Daschle had failed to pay taxes in several instances and, accordingly, the Obama administration informed Daschle that he needed to file amended returns. More interestingly, however, the investigation did not appear to reveal that Daschle had consulted for UnitedHealth Group, a health insurance company. This information came to light while the Daschle nomination was in committee and it raised the possibility that Daschle had industry ties that fit awkwardly with the Obama administration's aims of health care reform. Thus, despite being one of the Obama administration's highest-profile nominees, Daschle's background only came to full light in committee and, when it did so, Daschle removed his nomination. Albeit perhaps the most salient example, Daschle was only one of several prominent nominees who had made it to committee before previously unknown information came to light. Daschle's nomination thus shows how the president, even when placing careful scrutiny on a

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[1] The description of the Daschle episode, in this paragraph, draws on New York Times (2009), Henry and Keck (2009), and Associated Press (2009).

nominee, lacks the detailed information that Senate committee chairs can acquire through their more-lengthy and intensive investigations.

The president's uncertainty about the ideal point of a prospective nominee, however, contrasts with the certainty she has about the relative policy influence of a Schedule C versus Senate-confirmed appointment. A nominee appointed to a Senate-confirmed position will implement policy more effectively than if appointed to a Schedule C post. That is, we make the following assumption:

> *Assumption #5. A Schedule C appointee is less effective at implementing policy than a*
> *Senate-confirmed appointee.*

This assumption follows past work by Lewis (2008, 2011), which recognizes the unequal policy influence of Senate-confirmed and Schedule C appointments. In a passage that captures our assumption lucidly, Lewis (2008, 71) explains that:

> Senate-confirmed appointees (PAS) are the most visible to Congress and the hardest for
> presidents to change; they also have the largest influence on policy. Senate-confirmed
> positions must be created in statute, and such appointees must be confirmed by the
> Senate; this means that Congress regularly considers these positions and who will occupy
> them. Schedule C positions, on the other hand, are the least visible to Congress since they
> are less likely to have direct authority over agencies or policy.

This crisp statement of Senate-confirmed appointments' greater policy influence, relative to Schedule C appointments, accords with past evidence.

For one, Senate-confirmed appointments generally reside at the top of an agency's formal hierarchy, whereas Schedule C appointees rest below those top-tier positions (Lewis 2008). Examining the salary differences between these two categories of appointees provides vivid

evidence of this relative status difference. Salaries, in the federal service, are determined by pay schedules and within-schedule ranks that are assigned according to occupational attributes: occupations with greater levels of influence and responsibility fall within higher schedules (e.g., the Executive Schedule as opposed to the General Schedule (GS)) and higher ranks (e.g. GS 15 versus GS 9). As a result, the vast differences in the distribution of salaries between Senate-confirmed appointees and Schedule C appointees, which we display in Figure 2, provides evidence of the marked differences in the formal authority afforded to each category of positions. The figure shows that the salaries of Senate-confirmed appointees are generally higher than the salaries of Schedule C appointees, thus indicating greater policy authority among the former bureaucrats.

Informal measures of policy influence also suggest that Senate-confirmed appointees hold greater policy influence. Stehr (1987) provides such evidence via a survey conducted to gauge policy influence during the Reagan administration. The survey allowed employees across a large number of agencies to express their perception of who held influence over their agencies' policy-relevant activities. The findings from the survey indicated that the influence of staff positions regularly filled by Schedule C appointments was less than the perceived authority of agency posts populated by Senate-confirmed appointments. The perception of policy influence between Senate-confirmed and Schedule C appointments therefore tracks the differences in formal influence enjoyed by those two categories of positions.

Given evidence of greater formal and informal policy influence among Senate-confirmed appointments, relative to Schedule C appointments, current studies continue to operate on the notion that public bureaucrats who receive Senate confirmation wield greater authority than non-

confirmed appointments (Lewis and Waterman 2013). Our formal model follows suit, by incorporating that idea as a core assumption.

That assumption also receives support from recent, anecdotal evidence concerning the absence of a Senate-confirmed director to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). Since November of 2009, the ATF has lacked a director. During this time, the ATF has failed to carry out laws passed by Congress and to draft new rules supporting policies put forward by the Obama administration. These failures have occurred despite the fact that the Obama administration continues to appoint individuals, under the banner of Schedule C, to the ATF. Thus, consistent with the observations of Lewis (2008, 2011) and Stehr (1987), Schedule C appointees have lacked the policy effectiveness needed to carry out policies put forward by the President and Congress.

Given that the breadth of the ATF's policy failures—which involve issues ranging from gun control to national security—have affected both parties, the absence of a Senate-confirmed director has led to outcries from all sides of the political spectrum (Brady Center 2010). These outcries segue into the sixth and final assumption we consider worthy of discussion:

Assumption #6. The failure of bureaucrats to implement a policy yields a cost to all politicians.

One might contend that policy losses that accrue to one politician likely constitute gains to another. At first glance, that zero-sum portrait of politics might make sense in some spheres of activity: if you get more pork delivered to your constituents than do I, then I lose and you win. The fact is, however, that assumption #6 does not apply in that situation. Rather, the appropriate way to think about the assumption would be to consider a situation in which Congress passes a bill in which your constituents will get more pork than mine, but the bureaucrat charged with

delivering the pork fails to do so. Thus, both your constituents and mine do not get the benefits created by the pork barrel program the legislature passed. Unless you and I will gain benefits by fixing this problem, as Fiorina (1985, 1991) classically proposed, then we will both incur a cost. The breadth of bureaucratic activity suggests that the failure of a bureaucratic agent to implement any policy creates harms for politicians. This is not to say that no politicians might gain from blocking the implementation of a policy proposal; such gains are likely to be enjoyed in many instances. We believe that the problems associated with "headless" agencies impose costs on politicians more often than they generate gains.

The above justifications, we believe, provide a firm foundation for the assumptions used in our formal model. In the next section of this appendix, we provide formal proofs of our analysis.

II. Formal Model Proofs

Proof of Lemma A: C's payoff from playing $c = Confirm$ is $-x$, while his payoff from playing $c = Return$ is $-K$. Hence, C plays *Confirm* iff: $U_C(c = Confirm) \geq U_C(c = \mathrm{Re}\,turn)$

$\Rightarrow -x_B \geq U_C - K \Rightarrow x_B \leq K.$

Proof of Lemma B: There are four cases to consider:

Case 1: $y_B \geq K + \varepsilon$. In this case, P's signal y_B guarantees that B's ideology is too conservative $(x_B \geq K)$ to be confirmed by the Senate in equilibrium. Hence, P's expected utility from playing $p = S$ is: $-K$, while P's expected utility from playing $p = N$ is: $-\alpha(1 - y_B + \varepsilon/2) - (1 - \alpha)K.$

Therefore, P plays $p \in N$ when: $U_P(p = N) \geq U_P(p = S) \Rightarrow -(1 - y_B + \varepsilon/2) \geq -K$

$\Rightarrow y_B \geq 1 + \varepsilon/2 - K$, which always holds in this case because $y_B \geq K + \varepsilon$ and $K > 1 - K$.

Case 2: $K \leq y_B < K + \varepsilon$. In this case, P's signal y_B implies a $\frac{1}{2}$ probability that $x_B \leq K$ and B would hence be confirmed by the Senate. Specifically, P's expected utility from playing $p = S$ is: $-\frac{1}{2}(1 - y_B + \varepsilon) - \frac{1}{2}K$, while P's expected utility from playing $p = N$ is:

$-\frac{\alpha}{2}(1 - y_B) - \frac{\alpha}{2}(1 - y_B + \varepsilon) - (1 - \alpha)K$. Therefore P plays $p = N$ when: $U_P(p = N) \geq U_P(p = S)$

$\Rightarrow -\frac{\alpha}{2}(1 - y_B) - \frac{\alpha}{2}(1 - y_B + \varepsilon) - (1 - \alpha)K \geq -\frac{1}{2}(1 - y_B + \varepsilon) - \frac{1}{2}K, \Rightarrow K \geq 1 - y_B - \varepsilon\left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{2\alpha - 1}\right)$, which

always holds in this case because $y_B \geq K > \frac{1}{2}$ and $\alpha > \frac{1}{2}$.

<u>Case 3:</u> $1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \le y_B < K$. In this case, P's signal y_B indicates that C will always confirm the

nominee B in equilibrium. Hence, P's expected utility from playing $p = S$ is:

$-\frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right)$, P's expected utility from playing $p = N$ is:

$-\frac{\alpha}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \frac{\alpha}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right) - \left(1 - \alpha\right)K$, and P's expected utility from playing $p = \phi$ is: $-K$.

Therefore, P prefers to play S over N because: $U_P\left(p = S\right) > U_P\left(p = N\right)$

$\Rightarrow -\frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right) > -\frac{\alpha}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right) - \frac{\alpha}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \left(1 - \alpha\right)K \Rightarrow y_B > 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$, which

holds in this case by construction. Furthermore, P prefers to play $p = S$ over $p = \phi$ because:

$U_P\left(p = S\right) > U_P\left(p = \phi\right) \Rightarrow -\frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right) > -K \Rightarrow y_B > 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$, which holds in this

case by construction.

<u>Case 4:</u> $y_B < 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$. In this case, P's signal y_B indicates that C will always the nominee B in

equilibrium. Hence, P's expected utility from playing $p = S$ is: $-\frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right)$, P's

expected utility from playing $p = N$ is: $-\frac{\alpha}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \frac{\alpha}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right) - \left(1 - \alpha\right)K$, and P's expected

utility from playing $p = \phi$ is: $-K$. Therefore, P prefers to play $p = \phi$ over $p = S$ because:

$U_P\left(p = \phi\right) > U_P\left(p = S\right) \Rightarrow -K > -\frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right) \Rightarrow y_B < 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$, which holds in this

case by construction. Furthermore, P prefers to play $p = \phi$ over $p = N$ because:

$U_P\left(p = \phi\right) > U_P\left(p = N\right) \Rightarrow -K > -\frac{\alpha}{2}\left(1 - y_B + \varepsilon\right) - \frac{\alpha}{2}\left(1 - y_B\right) - \left(1 - \alpha\right)K \Rightarrow y_B < 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$, which

holds in this case by construction.

Proof of Proposition 1: Via *Lemma B*, the President P nominates the Bureaucrat B to an office iff her signal y_B is such that: $y_B \leq 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}$. Such a signal implies that B's ideology, x_B, is bounded by:

$$x_B \leq \begin{cases} 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}, & \text{with } \frac{1}{2} \text{ probabilit y;} \\ 1 - K - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}, & \text{with } \frac{1}{2} \text{ probabilit y.} \end{cases}$$

Since x_B is initially drawn by Nature from the uniform distribution: $x_B \sim U[0,1]$, the expected ideology of a bureaucrat who has been nominated for an office is:

$$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[\frac{1}{1 - \left(1 - K - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right)} \cdot \int_{1-K-\frac{\varepsilon}{2}}^{1} x \cdot dx_B \right] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[\frac{1}{1 - \left(1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right)} \cdot \int_{1-K+\frac{\varepsilon}{2}}^{1} x \cdot dx_B \right] = 1 - \frac{K}{2},$$

which is strictly larger than $\frac{1}{2}$ because $K < 1$. Hence, presidential nominees for bureaucratic office are ideologically closer to the President $(x_P = 1)$ than to the Senate committee chair $(x_C = 0)$.

Proof of Proposition 2: Proposition 2 follows directly from *Lemma A*. C always confirms a nominee who is sufficiently close to C $(x_B \leq K)$ and never confirms a nominee who is more ideologically distant $(x_B > K)$.

Proof of Proposition 3: Via Lemma B, a presidential nomination to a non-confirmed position occurs when P receives a signal y_B such that: $y_B > K \Rightarrow x_B > \begin{cases} K, & \text{with } \frac{1}{2} \text{ probability;} \\ K - \varepsilon, & \text{with } \frac{1}{2} \text{ probability.} \end{cases}$ The expected ideology x_B of a nominee for a non-confirmed position is therefore:

$$E[x_B \mid y_B > K] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[\frac{1}{1 - (K - \varepsilon)} \cdot \int_{K-\varepsilon}^{1} x \cdot dx_B \right] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[\frac{1}{1 - K} \cdot \int_{K}^{1} x \cdot dx_B \right] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(1 + K - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right).$$

Via Lemma B, a presidential nomination to a Senate-confirmed position occurs when P receives

a signal y_B such that: $1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \leq y_B \leq K$ $\Rightarrow$ $\begin{cases} 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \leq y_B \leq K, & \text{with } \frac{1}{2} \text{ probabilit y;} \\ 1 - K - \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \leq y_B \leq K - \varepsilon, & \text{with } \frac{1}{2} \text{ probabilit y.} \end{cases}$ The

expected ideology x_B of a nominee for a non-confirmed position is therefore:

$$E\left[x_B \mid 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} < y_B \leq K\right] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[\frac{1}{K - \left(1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right)} \cdot \int_{1-K+\frac{\varepsilon}{2}}^{K} x \cdot dx_B\right] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left[\frac{1}{K - \varepsilon - \left(1 - K - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right)} \cdot \int_{1-K-\frac{\varepsilon}{2}}^{K-\varepsilon} x \cdot dx_B\right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\varepsilon}{4}.$$

Hence, the average appointee to a non-confirmed position is more right-wing than the

average appointee to a Senate-confirmed position: $E\left[x_B \mid y_B > K\right] > E\left[x_B \mid 1 - K + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} < y_B \leq K\right]$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(1 + K - \frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right) > \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\varepsilon}{4} \Rightarrow K > 0, \text{ which always holds.}$$

III. Validation and Comparisons with Other Ideal Point Estimation Methods

III.A. Internal Validation

The contribution data offer several ways to assess measure validity. Bonica (*N.d.*) in part relies on comparisons between ideal points of contributor-candidates—the set of individuals that both fundraise as a candidate and personally donate to other campaigns—to help establish internal validity of his ideology estimates. The contributor and candidate ideal points correlate very strongly, which is interpreted as evidence that two sets of ideal points reveal similar information.[2]

We perform a similar analysis here as a way to test the validity of our bureaucratic nominees' ideological scores. We first identified the set of nominees that have also run for elected office or served in Congress to test whether their ideal points recovered as contributors correspond with their ideal points as candidates and DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 2008). In total, we were able to identify 212 nominees that have campaigned for elected office and another 73 with DW-NOMINATE scores. We find that ideal point estimates derived from donating, fundraising, and congressional voting all map very closely onto each other. The contributor scores strongly correlate within and across party with candidate scores (r = 0.94 overall, 0.80 for Democrats, and 0.84 for Republicans) and with DW-NOMINATE scores (r = 0.94 overall, 0.75 for Democrats, and 0.71 for Republicans).

Despite their centrality in theoretical models of bureaucratic politics, serious attempts to measure the political ideologies of public bureaucrats have only emerged recently. In the remainder of this section, we present detailed comparisons of our estimates with previously

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[2] See Bonica (*nNd*.) for a complete treatment of ways to assess the measure validity of the CFscores.

reported bureaucratic ideal point estimates such as those produced by Bertelli and Grose (2011), Clinton et al. (2012), and Chen and Johnson (2011).

III.B. Comparisons with Existing Measures

III.B.1 Comparisons with Bertelli and Grose (2009, 2011).

Bertelli and Grose (2007, 2009, 2011) develop a method for estimating bureaucratic ideal points using the public pronouncements of top administrative officials. A stated advantage of their methodology is that it produces measures that are comparable across government branches. Specifically, Bertelli and Grose (2011) devise a coding scheme to categorize a vast number of public testimonies made by public bureaucrats between 1991 and 2004. They, then, use Bayesian methods to calculate ideal points from those coded, public statements.

**Figure A1. Bonica-Chen-Johnson versus Bertelli and Grose (2009, 2011)
for Cabinet Members**

Figure A1 compares our appointee ideological scores with the Bertelli and Grose (BG)

scores.[3] Our measure weakly correlates with the BG measure (r = 0.41, t=3.07). However, the

two sets of measures produce very different pictures of cabinet member ideology. Whereas BG

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[3] DW-NOMINATE scores are only available for appointees that have also served in Congress.

scores are distributed unimodally with substantial overlap between members of the Democratic and Republican parties, our estimates are bimodally distributed with far less partisan overlap. Heightened partisan polarization is a nearly universal feature of partisan elites. The absence of such divisions among executives would make them an exception that would be both notable and surprising given expectations from the literature.

Figure A2. Comparison of Cabinet Member's Bonica-Chen-Johnson scores with Bertelli and Grose (2009, 2011) and DW-NOMINATE scores

Figure A2 provides context to these discrepancies by showing the relative placement of cabinet appointees. To compare the utility of our estimates to those of Bertelli and Grose, we

follow Nixon (2004) and compare how our ideological estimates and BG scores correlate with the DW-NOMINATE scores[4] estimated for cabinet members who also served in Congress. The comparison demonstrates that our estimates have significant external validity. The relationship between BG scores and DW-NOMINATE is not statistically significant (r = 0.26, t = 0.88), whereas our estimates of cabinet members who served in Congress strongly correlate with those individuals DW-NOMINATE scores (r=0.92, t = 10.64).

III.B.2 Comparisons with Chen and Johnson (2012).

The notion of using campaign contributions to measure the political ideology of public bureaucrats dates back to earlier work (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Chen 2010; Chen and Johnson 2011). Thus, we consider how our current ideal points compare to the measures of bureaucratic ideology that Chen and Johnson (2011) derived from campaign contributions. The measures developed by Chen and Johnson draw on a wider range of public bureaucrats—including both low-level civil servants and upper-level political appointees—to create aggregate agency ideal points. Rather than construct aggregate measure of agency ideology using the Bonica-Chen-Johnson-based measures of appointee ideology, which would be required for a direct comparison, we assess the correlation between the Bonica-Chen-Johnson estimates of the prospective appointees in our current data set with Chen and Johnson's estimated aggregate ideal points of the agencies in which they work. Figure A3 presents that correlation visually. As the figure makes clear, our current ideal points nicely capture both partisan sorting in the Chen and Johnson data, and they suggest that a very modest correlation exists between the ideology of prospective appointees and the agency on the whole.

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[4] DW-NOMINATE scores are only available for appointees that have also served in Congress.

Figure A3: Comparison of Bonica-Chen-Johnson Appointees' Ideology Estimates with Chen and Johnson Agency-level Measures

Comparison of Appointee Ideology to
Chen and Johnson Agency–Level Ideology Estimates

III.B.3 Comparisons with Clinton *et al.* (2012)

An ambitious study by Clinton et al. (2012) is the most recent attempt to measure executive agency ideology. They administered a survey to thousands of Bush-era executives to gather information on those executives' policy preferences. The survey questionnaire included a series of policy questions carefully selected to match-up with specific Congressional roll call votes; these matches serve as bridging observations. They the utilize a recently developed roll

call scaling methodology designed to estimate ideal points for voters and legislators in a common space (Bafumi and Herron 2010; Jesse 2009, 2011; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2012).

As it is not possible to compare our individual level estimates directly with the Clinton et al. (2012) estimates, we rely on aggregate-level comparisons for each presidential administration's appointees. Figure A4 plots the distribution of executive appointees alongside Republican and Democratic members of Congress for each of the five most recent presidential administrations. This figure shows that the distribution of appointees' ideologies, under a Democratic president, rest to the left of the president's party in Congress. Under a Republican president, the ideological distribution of appointees lies to the right of the president's party in Congress. These distributions, which result from our ideal point estimates, show greater ideological extremism among appointees than is shown by the measures of Clinton et al. (2012). It is possible that our estimates better capture the increased politicization of the bureaucracy that scholars have noted in recent administrations (Moynihan and Roberts 2010). However, the difference may also reflect differing samples. While they report a respectable response rate of 33 percent, Clinton et al. (2012) note that high-ranking appointees were less likely to respond. As a result, their sample includes 181 political appointees, representing a small fraction of the total population of appointed officials.

Figure A4. Comparison of Bonica-Chen-Johnson estimates with Clinton et al. (2012)

III.C. Temporal Variation in Nominee Ideal Points

Given that the confirmation process occurs continually during a presidential administration, some might wonder whether or not nominee ideology varies with the day of a given administration. In Figure A5 we test that possibility. Each panel of the figure displays the ideal points of nominees, in the Clinton (upper row) and Bush administration (bottom row), as a function of the date of the administration's tenure in office. A lowess smoother is estimated on the data in each panel, with the smoother's span set to 0.2 in the left hand column and 0.05 in the right hand column. As Figure A5 makes clear, no prominent trend appears between nominee ideal points and the date of their submission to the Senate.

Figure A5. Nominee Ideal Point by Date of Administration

Note. Span of Lowess smoother in left column is 0.20; in the right column it is 0.05.

III.D. Variation in Ideology Due to Previous Office Holder

In our main analysis, we do not consider whether or not the ideology of a previous office holder influences the ideology of a subsequent office holder. To consider whether this happens, we studied the ideal points of cabinet officials across time and considered whether or not patterns of ideology or ideological extremism appeared. Figure A6 shows the ideal points, across time, of Cabinet secretaries. The figure suggests similarity, within parties, of Cabinet secretaries staffing the same post. As a result, we also performed regression analyses comparing the ideal points of cabinet officials and the ideal points of the last individual to hold that position. This approach led to comparisons both within and across agencies.

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Figure A6. Ideal Points for Cabinet Secretaries (1989-2010)

Figure A7. Cabinet Secretary Ideology as a Function of Previous Office Holder's Ideology

Figure A7 presents a matrix of plots depicting changes in ideal points from one cabinet official to the next official holding the same post. If the ideology of the previous office holder exerted influence on the subsequent office holder's ideology, we would expect to see a strong positive correlation between the prior and subsequent secretary. We do not find such a strong relationship; across all of the panels, the p-value associated with the slope coefficient exceeds $p=0.05$. In some figures a positive relationship appears, however; thus, the limited precision of

our estimates may result from the limited power of our test. An alternative possibility is that some positions lend themselves to extremists and others do not; thus, we would expect to see a strong negative correlation across administrations exhibiting opposing partisan affiliations. Although such a trend appears during the Bush to Obama administrations, it does not manifest during the turnover from Clinton to Bush. In sum, we find little evidence suggesting that the ideology or ideological extremism of the prior office holder affects the ideology of the subsequent office holder.

III.E. Patterns of Campaign Contributing Among Political Appointments

Although our data do not provide us the opportunity to assess the extent of such contribution behavior, they do allow us to partially address the strategic giving hypothesis by examining the contribution behavior of Senate confirmed appointments. For instance, a straightforward implication of the strategic giving hypothesis is that donations should pay off: contributors should have a higher chance of securing the political objectives that they seek— which, in this instance, means Senate confirmation.

We address this concern in Figure 6 in the main text which shows political contributions do not ease a nominee's path to confirmation. Figure A8 provides evidence that dovetails with those findings, while simultaneously showing that no clear trend in giving appears across agencies. The figure shows the correlation between campaign contributing and the success of a nominee. As evident in the figure, the correlation varies about zero for both Bill Clinton Era and George W. Bush Era nominees. Furthermore, across agencies we see no systematic variation in the correlation between campaign contributing and nominee success. Figure A9 displays the rates of contributing of successful nominees, by agency, for the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

administrations. The figure again shows no clear pattern in the campaign contributing of successful nominations across, respectively, administrations or agencies. In neither presidential administration did nominees exhibit a greater tendency to contribute to campaigns. Furthermore, no pattern of contributing seems to emerge across agencies.

Together, these findings provide tangential evidence suggesting that strategic giving does not figure into the behavior of nominees. Nominees exhibit no greater likelihood of success by contributing and their agency of prospective employment does not appear to shape their contribution behavior.

Figure A8. Does Contributing Correlate with Campaign Contribution Success?

Comparison Across Agencies of
Correlation between Contributing to Campaigns
and Senate Confirmation of Nominees

Legend:
● Clinton Administration Nominees
△ George W. Bush Administration Nominees

Figure A9. Rates of Nominee Campaign Contribution across Administration and Agencies

Comparison Across Agencies of
Campaign Contribution Rates
Among Senate–Confirmed Nominees

Legend:
- Clinton Administration Nominees
- George W. Bush Administration Nominees

Agency

Broadcasting Board of Governors
Corporation for National and Community Service
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of the Interior
Department of the Treasury
Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
Executive Office of the President
Inter–American Foundation
International Development Cooperation Agency
Judicial Branch (Judicial Nominees)
Legal Services Corporation
National Council on Disability
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
National Institute for Literacy
National Labor Relations Board
National Science Foundation
United States Institute of Peace
United States Postal Service

0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   100%

Proportion of Nominees
Who Have Made Campaign Contributions

IV. Data Processing

IV. A. Record-Linkage

We compiled a dataset of bureaucratic ideal points by searching the universe of contribution records using detailed listings—obtained from the Plum Book (see Lewis 2008) and whitehouse.gov—that report the names, organizational affiliations, and positions of appointees nominated or appointed by the president to federal bureaucratic posts. Specifically, we developed an official list of the names of bureaucratic appointees, and the agencies to which they were either nominated or appointed. We then expanded this list of agency names to include common abbreviations or truncations of the agency name.

With that list available, we searched our campaign contribution data for donors who listed one of the agencies, on our list, as their employer (note that rules of the Federal Election Commission require donors to list their employers). With this subset of observations identified, we manually read through the employer field in the data and eliminated false matches. Once the data were cleaned, we used automated record-linkage methods to match against state and federal contribution records using data from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) hosted at http://data.stanford.edu/dime/. We developed a heavily supervised probabilistic record-linkage algorithm that relied on information on names, location, occupation and employer. We fuzzy-matched names using the Jaro-Winkler algorithm to determine similarly and supplemented this by conditioning on information frequency of first and last names obtained from the U.S. Census website. The matching scheme also conditioned on self-reported occupation and employer. Potential matches in the contribution database were significantly up-weighted if they reported being employed by the agency to which they were eventually appointed and less if reported being employed by the federal government. The matching scheme

also accounted for whether a donor was employed in a field relevant to the target agency's task. For instance, a potential match for a nominee to the justice department would be slight up-weighted if they reported their occupation as an attorney.

Ultimately, a high percentage of presidential nominees are found in the contributor database. In an analysis of the Obama Administration's senate-confirmed appointees through 2011, we were able to identify 68 percent in the contribution database. Of those identified, they had, on average, made 19.7 contributions (the median number of contributions is 7) and that over 93 percent made their first contribution prior to the 2008 election cycle. Less than ten percent of those nominees identified in the database have made fewer than three contributions. In the main text, we solely include ideal point measurements of individuals who made more than one campaign contribution.

V. Robustness Checks for Regression Models Reported in Table 1

V. A. Robustness Checks for Table 1: Excluding Judges and Ambassadors

The regression models reported in Table 1 test Proposition 2, which states that the probability of a nominee's confirmation declines as a nominee's ideology deviates further from the ideology of the Senate committee chair. As a robustness check, we replicate the analysis excluded judges and ambassadors from the analysis as a robustness check. The results of that analysis are displayed in Appendix Table 1.

Table A1. Replication of Main Text Table 1 Excluding Judges and Ambassadors

	Pooled Data		Divided Government		Unified Government	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	1.36*	2.42*	0.74*	1.81*	1.42*	3.00*
	(0.16)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.45)	(0.27)	(0.73)
Distance to Chair	-0.48*	-0.47*	-0.21	-0.29*	0.14	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.26)
President Bush	-0.16	-0.32*	-0.12	-0.29	-0.21	
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.19)	
Commissioner		-0.34		-0.32		-0.49
		(0.33)		(0.44)		(0.70)
Attorney		0.16		-0.17		0.06
		(0.22)		(0.28)		(0.46)
Marshal		1.11*		0.67		7.09
		(0.44)		(0.48)		(31.51)
Secretary		0.48		0.01		1.04
		(0.34)		(0.43)		(0.69)
Under Secretary		0.78*		0.35		1.13
		(0.34)		(0.42)		(0.64)
Assistant Secretary		0.74*		0.56		0.64
		(0.22)		(0.29)		(0.42)
Director		0.06		-0.10		-0.28
		(0.18)		(0.24)		(0.36)
Administrator		0.22		-0.04		0.09
		(0.28)		(0.35)		(0.57)
Member		-0.53*		-0.51*		-0.42
		(0.18)		(0.24)		(0.37)
Professionalism		-0.55		-0.64		-1.20
		(0.43)		(0.55)		(0.86)
Technical		-0.26		1.50		-3.39
		(0.77)		(1.01)		(1.45)
Policy Agenda		-0.19		-0.03		-0.60
		(0.36)		(0.51)		(0.54)
Days In Office / 365		-0.12*		-0.08*		-0.20
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.15)
Presidential Approval		0.20		0.34		-0.57
		(0.25)		(0.31)		(1.33)
Agency Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Pseudo R^2	0.17	0.12	0.16	0.07	0.30	0.09
L.R.	274.05	152.80	145.31	52.29	223.96	28.95
Num. obs.	2338	1901	1232	1004	1106	513

Note: Agency indicators are excluded from Models 3 and 6 because some control variables are measured at the agency level. Model 6 does not include a indicator for President Bush because the complete set of controls do not become available until 1996, after Republicans regained control of the Senate in 1995. (*$p < 0.05$)

V. B. Robustness Checks for Table 1: Excluding Unimportant Positions

In addition to considering the robustness of our estimates to the exclusion of judges and ambassadors, we also considered whether unimportant positions might be driving our results. As a result, we linked the position titles in the Plum Book and the Congressional Record to our salary lists from the CPDF. Again, assuming that higher salaries denote greater importance and responsibility, we then subset our data to exclude any position for which an employee can make less than $100,000. That is, if a position was ever associated with a salary less than $100,000 we excluded it from the data set. After sub-setting the data in this way, we replicated our analyses from Table 1. The results of this replication can be found in Appendix Table A2.

Table A2. Replication of Main Text Table 1 Excluding Positions with Salaries of less than $100,000.

	Pooled Data		Divided Government		Unified Government	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	1.57*	2.37*	1.06*	1.78*	1.66*	2.93*
	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.42)	(0.23)	(0.71)
Distance to Chair	-0.47*	-0.46*	-0.24*	-0.26	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.25)
President Bush	-0.24*	-0.39*	-0.19	-0.41*	-0.39*	
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.17)	
Commissioner		-0.31		-0.26		-0.42
		(0.33)		(0.43)		(0.69)
Ambassador		1.18*		1.02*		1.39*
		(0.26)		(0.30)		(0.59)
Attorney		0.20		-0.09		0.13
		(0.21)		(0.26)		(0.45)
Marshal		1.18*		0.77		7.20
		(0.43)		(0.47)		(30.23)
Secretary		0.49		0.09		1.06
		(0.33)		(0.42)		(0.69)
Under Secretary		0.80*		0.41		1.11
		(0.33)		(0.41)		(0.64)
Assistant Secretary		0.86*		0.73*		0.77
		(0.23)		(0.29)		(0.43)
Director		0.07		-0.07		-0.30
		(0.18)		(0.23)		(0.36)
Administrator		0.28		0.06		0.19
		(0.28)		(0.35)		(0.56)
Member		-0.51*		-0.46*		-0.37
		(0.18)		(0.22)		(0.36)
Professionalism		-0.47		-0.56		-1.07
		(0.43)		(0.55)		(0.86)
Technical		-0.24		1.34		-3.06*
		(0.77)		(1.00)		(1.45)
Policy Agenda		-0.16		-0.10		-0.49
		(0.32)		(0.45)		(0.50)
Days In Office / 365		-0.12*		-0.08*		-0.23
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.14)
Presidential Approval		0.20		0.34		-0.80
		(0.25)		(0.30)		(1.28)
Agency Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Pseudo R^2	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.09	0.25	0.10
L.R.	291.28	183.11	128.79	72.21	225.06	36.46
Num. obs.	2943	2149	1596	1153	1375	573

Note: Agency indicators are excluded from Models 3 and 6 because some control variables are measured at the agency level. Model 6 does not include a indicator for President Bush because the complete set of controls do not become available until 1996, after Republicans regained control of the Senate in 1995. (*$p < 0.05$)

V. C. Robustness Checks for Table 1: Entire Sample

Table A3. Replication of Main Text Table 1 with Entire Sample included

	Pooled Data		Divided Government		Unified Government	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	1.55*	1.34*	1.12*	1.27*	1.74*	1.24*
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)
Distance to Chair	-0.41*	-0.40*	-0.30*	-0.35*	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)
President GWB	-0.19*	-0.20*	-0.12	-0.18	-0.32*	-0.29*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.14)
President GHWB	0.38*	0.35*	0.57*	0.47*		
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)		
President Obama	-0.21	-0.24*			-0.53*	-0.47*
	(0.11)	(0.11)			(0.15)	(0.14)
President Reagan	0.10	0.09	0.29	0.20		
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)		
Commissioner		0.10		-0.03		0.20
		(0.20)		(0.27)		(0.30)
Ambassador		1.24*		1.07*		1.55*
		(0.14)		(0.17)		(0.25)
Attorney		0.71*		0.48*		1.11*
		(0.12)		(0.15)		(0.21)
Marshal		1.42*		1.20*		1.85*
		(0.28)		(0.34)		(0.53)
Secretary		1.16*		0.86*		1.56*
		(0.26)		(0.34)		(0.44)
Under Secretary		1.04*		0.82*		1.31*
		(0.22)		(0.29)		(0.33)
Assistant Secretary		1.07*		0.98*		1.15*
		(0.14)		(0.18)		(0.21)
Director		0.21*		0.03		0.43*
		(0.10)		(0.13)		(0.16)
Administrator		0.75*		0.47*		1.21*
		(0.19)		(0.23)		(0.33)
Member		-0.27*		-0.32*		-0.24
		(0.08)		(0.11)		(0.13)
Agency Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Pseudo R^2	0.12	0.10	0.13	0.09	0.20	0.11
L.R.	465.20	353.18	276.40	186.99	326.95	171.24
Num. obs.	5503	5503	3042	3042	2461	2461

Note: All appointees, including those who made only one contribution, are included. Agency indicators are excluded from Models 3 and 6 because some control variables are measured at the agency level. (*$p < 0.05$).

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VI. Robustness Checks for Models Presented in Table 2

VI. A. Robustness Checks for Table 2: Excluding Judges and Ambassadors

The regression models reported in Table 2 in the main text test Proposition 3, which predicts that bureaucratic appointees to non-Senate-confirmed positions are more ideologically extreme than appointees to Senate-confirmed positions. To test that proposition, we regressed appointee ideal points against the same set of predictors from our model of confirmation success that we could match with the information we possessed about Schedule C appointments. Here, we replicated those analyses on data sets that excluded judges—mainly, administrative law judges—and ambassadors from the analysis as a robustness check. The results of that analysis are displayed in Appendix Table A4.

Table A4. Replication of Main Text Table 2 Excluding Judges & Ambassadors

	Clinton Administration			Bush Administration		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
(Intercept)	-0.66*	-0.34*	-0.55*	0.61*	-0.13	0.42*
	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.05)
Schedule C	-0.25*	-0.15*	-0.20*	0.19*	0.07*	0.17*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Commissioner			0.21			-0.54*
			(0.12)			(0.08)
Attorney			-0.17*			0.15*
			(0.08)			(0.05)
Marshal			-0.06			0.34*
			(0.12)			(0.07)
Secretary			-0.23*			0.18*
			(0.07)			(0.07)
Under Secretary			0.40			0.21*
			(0.41)			(0.09)
Assistant Secretary			-0.54			0.21*
			(0.57)			(0.06)
Director			-0.06			0.01
			(0.07)			(0.05)
Administrator			-0.17			0.17*
			(0.12)			(0.07)
Special.Assistant			-0.11			0.13*
			(0.08)			(0.05)
Member			0.17			-0.70*
			(0.33)			(0.33)
Professionalism			0.00			0.34*
			(0.19)			(0.12)
Technical			-0.17			0.38*
			(0.21)			(0.14)
Policy Agenda			-0.34*			0.06
			(0.12)			(0.07)
Agency Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
R^2	0.04	0.22	0.08	0.03	0.29	0.10
Num. obs.	1542	1542	727	1575	1575	1508

Note: Agency fixed effects are excluded from Models 3 and 6 because some of the control variables are measured at the agency level. (* $p < 0.05$)

VI. B. Replicating Table 2 Excluding Unimportant Positions

As with the replication of Table 1, we also examined the robustness of our findings in Table 2 to the exclusion of individuals filling unimportant positions. Again, we linked the position titles in the Plum Book and the Congressional Record to our salary lists from the CPDF. Again, assuming that higher salaries denote greater importance and responsibility, we then subset our data to exclude any position for which an employee can make less than $100,000. That is, if a position was ever associated with a salary less than $100,000 we excluded it from the data set. After sub-setting the data in this way, we replicated our analyses from Table 2. The results of this replication can be found in Appendix Table A5.

Table A5. OLS Regression Analysis of Schedule C Extremism Excluding Dogcatchers

	Clinton Administration			Bush Administration		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
(Intercept)	-0.75*	-0.40*	-0.39*	0.67*	-0.19	0.48*
	(0.02)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.06)
Schedule C	-0.12*	-0.11*	-0.25*	0.11*	0.06	0.13*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Commissioner			0.50*			-0.72*
			(0.23)			(0.13)
Ambassador			-0.89			0.06
			(0.55)			(0.10)
Attorney			-0.26*			0.14*
			(0.08)			(0.06)
Marshal			-0.16			0.30*
			(0.12)			(0.08)
Secretary			-0.31*			0.21*
			(0.07)			(0.08)
Under Secretary			-0.56			0.22*
			(0.55)			(0.06)
Assistant Secretary			0.30			0.19*
			(0.39)			(0.09)
Director			-0.10			0.01
			(0.07)			(0.06)
Administrator			-0.17			0.15
			(0.15)			(0.08)
Special Assistant			-0.77*			-0.13
			(0.32)			(0.10)
Member			0.08			-0.74*
			(0.32)			(0.31)
Professionalism			-0.11			0.18
			(0.26)			(0.16)
Technical			-0.23			0.37*
			(0.24)			(0.16)
Policy Agenda			-0.52*			0.05
			(0.14)			(0.09)
Agency Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
R^2	0.01	0.21	0.12	0.01	0.32	0.08
Num. obs.	988	988	508	1058	1058	1006

Note: Agency fixed effects are excluded from Models 3 and 6 because some of the control variables are measured at the agency level. (* $p < 0.05$)

VI. C. Replicating Table 2 With Entire Sample Included

Table A6. OLS Regression Analysis of Schedule C Extremism with Entire Sample

	Clinton Administration			Bush Administration		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
(Intercept)	-0.63[*]	-0.27[*]	-0.53[*]	0.52[*]	0.03	0.33[*]
	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.05)
Schedule C	-0.24[*]	-0.19[*]	-0.24[*]	0.27[*]	0.14[*]	0.25[*]
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Commissioner			0.14			-0.53[*]
			(0.12)			(0.08)
Ambassador			-0.88			-0.12
			(0.58)			(0.08)
Attorney			-0.17[*]			0.19[*]
			(0.07)			(0.05)
Marshal			-0.02			0.29[*]
			(0.10)			(0.07)
Secretary			-0.18[*]			0.16[*]
			(0.06)			(0.07)
Under Secretary			-0.58			0.20[*]
			(0.41)			(0.06)
Assistant Secretary			0.17			0.13
			(0.34)			(0.09)
Director			0.00			-0.01
			(0.06)			(0.04)
Administrator			-0.13			0.15[*]
			(0.10)			(0.06)
Special Assistant			-0.08			0.03
			(0.06)			(0.04)
Member			0.11			-0.61
			(0.34)			(0.37)
Professionalism			0.08			0.33[*]
			(0.17)			(0.11)
Technical			-0.19			0.43[*]
			(0.18)			(0.13)
Policy Agenda			-0.40[*]			0.18[*]
			(0.10)			(0.06)
Agency Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
R^2	0.04	0.16	0.07	0.04	0.23	0.08
Num. obs.	2210	2210	1001	2439	2439	2342

Note: All appointees, including those who made only one contribution, are included. Agency fixed effects are excluded from Models 3 and 6 because some of the control variables are measured at the agency level.([*] $p < 0.05$)

VII. Inclusion of Polarization Variable in Models Reported in Table 1

In the models presented in Table 1, the inclusion of a variable tracking polarization created severe multicollinearity. Polarization, after all, increases over the time span of our data as does the number of days a president has been in office. Thus, in this portion of the appendix, we report the result of analyses that replace the *Days in Office* variable with our measure of polarization. As is evident on the next page, these alternative model specifications do not change the substantive or statistical interpretation of our results. The immense size of the polarization coefficient, however, does suggest that some degree of multicollinearity might persist in the present model.

Table A7. Logistic Regression Analysis of Confirmation Success (controlling for Polarization)

	Pooled Data		Divided Government		Unified Government	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	1.61*	-10.78*	1.17*	-18.11*	1.64*	-24.70*
	(0.14)	(2.59)	(0.21)	(3.77)	(0.23)	(9.19)
Distance to Chair	-0.45*	-0.51*	-0.25*	-0.22	0.07	0.39
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.26)
President Bush	-0.30*	-2.57*	-0.24*	-3.04*	-0.48*	
	(0.09)	(0.44)	(0.11)	(0.53)	(0.17)	
Ambassador		1.00*		0.91*		1.50*
		(0.24)		(0.28)		(0.57)
Commissioner		-0.28		-0.26		-0.26
		(0.32)		(0.42)		(0.68)
Attorney		0.10		-0.15		0.10
		(0.20)		(0.25)		(0.44)
Marshal		1.27*		0.72		7.17
		(0.43)		(0.46)		(25.42)
Secretary		0.41		0.00		1.01
		(0.33)		(0.42)		(0.68)
Under Secretary		0.62		0.18		1.09
		(0.32)		(0.39)		(0.62)
Assistant Secretary		0.64*		0.52		0.56
		(0.21)		(0.27)		(0.39)
Director		-0.02		-0.09		-0.50
		(0.17)		(0.22)		(0.31)
Administrator		0.12		-0.21		0.33
		(0.26)		(0.32)		(0.55)
Member		-0.56*		-0.41*		-0.54
		(0.16)		(0.21)		(0.33)
Professionalism		-0.84*		-0.85		-1.26
		(0.41)		(0.53)		(0.79)
Technical		-0.36		1.44		-2.63*
		(0.74)		(0.99)		(1.33)
Policy Agenda		-0.07		-0.06		-0.24
		(0.29)		(0.43)		(0.46)
Days In Office / 365		-0.46*		-0.45*		-0.88*
		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.24)
Presidential Approval		0.15		1.09*		-1.85
		(0.23)		(0.31)		(1.21)
Polarization		11.01*		15.66*		19.62*
		(2.14)		(2.96)		(6.52)
Agency Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Pseudo R^2	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.12	0.28	0.16
L.R.	365.67	238.60	178.30	109.09	287.89	65.62
Num. obs.	3323	2387	1797	1269	1526	655

Note: Agency indicators are excluded from Models 3 and 6 because some control variables are measured at the agency level. Model 6 does not include an indicator for President Bush because the complete set of controls do not become available until 1996, after Republicans regained control of the Senate in 1995. (*$p < 0.0$).

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