

Online Appendix  
The Consequences of Broader Media Choice:  
Evidence from the Expansion of Fox News

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# Appendix

## A. Identifying Fox News Access Using ZIP Codes

DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) compiled data on Fox News availability for 9,837 “towns”—known technically as Census-Designated Places (CDP)—in 28 U.S. states. The data set is extensive but not comprehensive within these states, as towns with varying cable service within their boundaries or with various forms of missing data are excluded. This leads to the omission of some larger cities such as New York. One challenge is appropriately matching individual NAES respondents into these towns using the respondents’ ZIP codes, which is the most precise level of geographic identification available. We began with a complete listing of all 32,054 U.S. ZIP codes in 2000. For each, we identified whether the ZIP code’s centroid<sup>2</sup> fell within a CDP. For 8,731 ZIP codes accounting for 157.9 million residents, the centroid falls within the boundaries of an identified CDP, making the mapping from the ZIP code to the CDP straightforward. For the remaining 23,161 ZIP codes—home to 123.1 million residents in 2000—we identified the nearest CDP, and also calculated the distance from the ZIP code centroid to the nearest CDP boundary. In such cases, the ZIP code may still overlap substantially with the CDP, but its centroid falls outside the CDP’s boundaries.<sup>3</sup>

To link ZIP code centroids with the CDPs, which are the units for which we observe Fox News access, we standardized the text strings indicating each ZIP code’s name, and then sought identically named towns within the same state listed in the availability data set. Our preliminary matching successfully identified the ZIP codes corresponding to 5,539 of the 9,837 towns for which Fox News data are available. By turning to an alternate list of ZIP codes’ place names available through Geolytics, we were able to identify ZIP codes corresponding to 1,430 additional towns. We then conducted manual town-by-town searches, identifying 222 towns where an alternate town name is associated with a ZIP code in our listing.<sup>4</sup> In all, we identified ZIP codes for 7,111 of the CDPs observed in the original town-level data, or 72.3%. Moreover, the towns we were unable to match are disproportionately smaller ones. Our matching procedures can thus identify ZIP codes corresponding to towns that cast 32.2 million presidential votes in 2000. This constitutes 79.3% of those in the full set of towns used in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007).

## B. Replicating DellaVigna and Kaplan

To examine potential differences between the towns in our survey-based sample and the original sample of towns used by DellaVigna and Kaplan, we re-estimated their model with county fixed effects using only the 4,186 towns in which we have at least one survey respondent. Doing so recovers an estimated Fox News effect of 0.53 percentage points (clustered SE=0.30), a point estimate similar to the comparable estimate reported by DellaVigna and Kaplan (0.69,

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<sup>2</sup>The centroid is the point which is the weighted average of the ZIP code’s x and y coordinates.

<sup>3</sup>For example, for the 51.4% of the Republican identifiers and pure independents with a non-zero distance, the median distance to the nearest CDP is 1.19 miles. Even in these cases, measurement error is likely to be rare, as it requires both that the actual CDP is further from the ZIP code’s centroid and that the actual CDP differs in its Fox News availability. The core results differ little between respondents whose ZIP code centroid falls within a CDP and those whose ZIP code centroid does not.

<sup>4</sup>For instance, Amherst, New York is listed in the Fox News data set, but the ZIP codes within Amherst are labeled as “Buffalo, New York.”

SE=0.14). We also generated a re-weighted, aggregate-level data set, in which each town is weighted by the number of survey respondents in the NAES subset. Here again, the estimated effect (0.66 percentage points, SE=0.29) is similar to that reported by DellaVigna and Kaplan. There is thus little reason to suspect that the differences between our survey-based results and their town-based results stem from geographic differences in the two samples.

## C. Exogeneity and Placebo Testing

Fox News was not randomly assigned to some towns' cable systems; instead, it was provided as the result of commercial decisions by profit-seeking companies. Thus, our results hinge on the assumption that conditional on covariates, treatment assignment is ignorable, meaning that there is no other meaningful difference between towns with and without Fox. To test the validity of the ignorability assumption, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) conduct placebo tests, demonstrating that Fox News availability in 2000 has no "effect" on the changing Republican vote share between 1992 and 1996 or 1988 and 1992.<sup>5</sup> They also show that 2003 Fox News availability has no "effect" on the changed Republican vote share between 1996 and 2000. Here, we replicate these strategies with our individual-level data set, with the same outcomes.

Conditional on the 1996 percentage of the town voting for the Republican candidate and the other ZIP- and town-level covariates in our model, the 1992 Republican presidential vote share has an insignificant, negative relationship with Fox News availability.<sup>6</sup> Thus, Fox News availability in 2000 appears not to be acting as a proxy for pro-Republican shifts in voting patterns. Also, the effect of Fox News remains strong for the Republican and pure independent sample when conditioning on squared and cubed terms of the town-level percentage voting Republican in 1996.<sup>7</sup> This indicates that the results are not driven by various functions of underlying Republican support in the town.

Still more instructive is another placebo test, in which we estimate the influence of 2000 and 2003 Fox News availability simultaneously. Specifically, we re-ran our core model for pure independents, Republican leaners, and Republicans using 2003 Fox News availability alongside 2000 Fox News availability. In 2000, 23.5% of our Republican and pure independent respondents had access to Fox News. By 2003, that figure grew to 60.5%. If the effects we attribute above to Fox News availability are in fact selection effects, we might expect that 2003 Fox News availability will also predict Republican voting in 2000. But when we include Fox News availability in 2003 alongside 2000 availability and our other covariates, the 2003 availability coefficient is almost exactly zero. Using the same covariate profile as above, we calculate that for a weak Republican identifier, the "effect" of living in a town with Fox News availability in 2003 is -0.5 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval from -3.5 percentage points to 2.3 percentage points.<sup>8</sup> As the second line from the top of Figure 1A illustrates, 2003 Fox News availability is not at all predictive of respondents' 2000 vote choice, a fact which weighs against our results being a product of selection biases inherent in Fox's

<sup>5</sup>On the advantages of placebo tests for making causal inferences, see Sekhon (2009).

<sup>6</sup>The 1992 Republican vote share is not included in our baseline models, in part because this variable is only observed for 36% of respondents in the full data set. In this robustness check, the baseline data set includes 2,493 respondents in 17 states. The coefficient in a linear regression is -0.120, with a standard error of 0.324.

<sup>7</sup>The estimated Fox News coefficient from the full logistic regression is 0.207 with a standard error of 0.104.

<sup>8</sup>The actual effect of Fox News on Republicans and pure independents is larger than this placebo effect in 93% of simulations.




Figure 1: A. Estimated Effects of Fox News Access Among Republicans and Pure Independents. The dots indicate the average estimated effect of Fox News, while the thick lines indicate the effect’s standard deviation and the thin lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The first result is from the basic modeling strategy, providing a baseline. “MI” indicates the results from multiple imputation, while “FE” denotes a model with district-level fixed effects.

expansion strategy. Conditional on covariates, whatever selection processes took place between 2000 and 2003 were uncorrelated with 2000 vote intentions.

## D. Robustness Checks

This section summarizes several robustness checks, all of which confirm the core finding. For example, the results aren’t shaped by the missing data strategy. Listwise deletion removes a significant share of our observations, even for the subset of respondents who are not Democratic identifiers or leaners. To address potential biases induced by listwise deletion (King et al., 2001), we re-estimated the basic model after imputing missing data. The results, shown in the middle of Figure 1A, reinforce the core conclusion: Fox News access is conditionally correlated with Republican vote intentions. In fact, the estimated effect of 3.3 percentage points is strong, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.4 to 6.3 percentage points.

Prior research in political science shows that political partisanship is for the most part a

stable identity, one that might well shape responses to new information but that is unlikely to shift rapidly in the face of new information (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Miller, 1999; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Cohen, 2003; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Layman et al., 2010). Our core models assume that partisanship is exogenous, an assumption that merits scrutiny. To this end, we re-estimated our basic model for the full data set without controlling for partisanship, and recovered a positive but insignificant result that approaches zero.<sup>9</sup> This result makes sense given the differential responses to Fox News across partisan groups. When we omitted indicator variables for partisanship from the sub-sample of Republicans and pure independents, our substantive conclusions were unchanged.<sup>10</sup>

To address the concern about the endogeneity of partisanship, we also estimated a variant of our basic model on the full sample with respondents’ partisanship as the dependent variable. Fox News access is a negative, borderline significant predictor of Republican partisanship, with a coefficient of -0.011 and a standard error of 0.007. There is no evidence that Fox News availability is producing more Republicans, and given research on the selective assimilation of information (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Lodge and Taber, 2013), it seems implausible that it is producing more Democrats. As with the placebo tests, this result indicates that the relationship between Fox availability and 2000 Republican voting is not a spurious consequence of an endogenous influence on partisan identification. Nor does it stem from unobserved Republican or conservative tendencies in communities with Fox News—the core pattern we report does not appear to be driven by selection effects.

We also test whether our results are sensitive to our choice of dependent variable. Specifically, our primary method of measuring support for the Republican presidential candidate considers the 228 Republicans or pure independents intending a vote for another candidate and the 433 not intending to vote for president as missing. It does likewise with the 1,217 respondents who don’t know whom they support. In an additional robustness check, we estimated the effect re-specifying the dependent variable such that those who supported a third-party candidate, didn’t plan to vote, or didn’t know whom they supported were classified as not supporting Bush rather than being dropped from the analysis. In this model, the point estimate for the Fox News effect is almost identical, at 2.6 percentage points, with a slightly smaller standard error.

## E. Testing Model Dependence with Matching

Another potential concern is model dependence. In observational studies, decisions about how to adjust for potential confounding variables can be critical. As noted above, in the years after its introduction, Fox News was not evenly distributed across towns: it was more likely to be found in larger towns with more cable channels (see also Hainmueller, 2012). Here, we describe the results of various changes to the model specification, none of which affects the substantive conclusions. We also employ matching as a pre-processing step which can reduce the dependence of the results on specific modeling choices (Ho et al., 2007). Specifically, we match to identify those Republican identifiers, Republican leaners, and pure Independents in towns with Fox News who are most similar to those in towns without Fox News. The resulting

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<sup>9</sup>Specifically, the logistic regression coefficient for Fox News access changes from 0.061 (SE=0.072) when conditioning on partisanship to 0.008 (SE=0.052) when not.

<sup>10</sup>Here, the logistic regression coefficient changes almost imperceptibly, from 0.186 (SE=0.098) when conditioning on partisanship to 0.181 (SE=0.090) when not.

data set of 2,624 matched respondents shows markedly better covariate balance, especially on measures of town size that were previously imbalanced and that were correlated with Fox’s expansion strategy.

As a robustness check, we first removed the individual-level variables from our core model, and recovered a highly similar estimated effect for Fox News access on Republicans and independents ( $\beta = 0.020$ ,  $SE = 0.012$ ). We subsequently ran models without any town-level measures related to the towns’ cable systems ( $\beta = 0.020$ ,  $SE = 0.009$ ), without any town-level covariates at all ( $\beta = 0.015$ ,  $SE = 0.009$ ), with only state fixed effects ( $\beta = 0.015$ ,  $SE = 0.009$ ), and with no covariates at all ( $\beta = 0.017$ ,  $SE = 0.009$ ). Although we find the “all else equal” or ignorability assumption more credible in our fully specified model, the results are in no way sensitive to that preference.

Both the original DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) article and the re-analysis reported by Hainmueller (2012) provide evidence of model dependence related to variables such as cable market size. Specifically, the original aggregate-level results are dependent on the inclusion of covariates such as measures of the size of the local cable market and the number of available channels (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007, 1207). The estimated effects hinge on the use of population-based weights as well (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007, 1232), and they become nearly zero when using the entropy rebalancing procedure outlined by Hainmueller (2012). Our data set shows evidence of imbalance on town size as well. In our full data set for Republicans and pure independents, 45.0% of those with Fox News access lived in communities in the largest decile in terms of overall population. For those without Fox News access, the comparable figure is 17.1%.<sup>11</sup>

Here, we follow Ho et al. (2007) by using matching as a pre-processing step to improve overlap on population size and other key covariates. Acknowledging the limitations of propensity score matching (King et al., 2011), as well as the computational demands of having 7,548 fully observed Republican or pure independent respondents prior to the election,<sup>12</sup> we employ a hybrid technique of exact matching on key covariates and Mahalanobis matching on others (King et al., 2011). Specifically, given the importance of this covariate in prior analyses, we exactly match treated respondents to others whose towns are in the same quintile for the number of channels. We also exactly match respondents to others whose town is in the same octile for total population, reducing the bias reported just above. We then use the Mahalanobis distance measure to match respondents on two other place-based characteristics: the town’s 1996 share voting for the Republican presidential candidate and the total number of potential cable subscribers in the town.

The matching procedure proves highly effective. For the 62 covariates used in our basic model, Table 2A reports the original balance with the full data set of all Republicans and pure independents as well as the balance when retaining only the 2,624 matched respondents. The first two columns report the means for each variable for the full data set, first for towns with and then without Fox News availability. In the third column, we provide one measure of imbalance by dividing the absolute difference between the variable’s means in the full data set by the variable’s standard deviation, estimated in towns without Fox News. The table has been

<sup>11</sup>These deciles are defined with respect to the population of towns, not the population of survey respondents.

<sup>12</sup>These analyses side-step the distinction between vote intentions and vote decisions by excluding respondents after November 2000. Including those respondents increases the pool of potential observations to 8,714. Effects estimated through matching in this larger sample are indistinguishable from those reported below, with the median Z-score for the Fox News effect across 50 matched samples equaling 1.52.

sorted by this third column, so the variable with the largest difference between respondents in towns with and without Fox News is listed first. The 1.683 in the top row indicates that in the overall sample, there is a very pronounced imbalance on this variable. Prior to matching, 37.2% of towns with Fox News fall into the highest decile in terms of their number of available channels, while only 4.1% of towns without Fox News do the same. The biggest imbalances are typically for place-level variables, not individual-level variables.

The fourth and fifth columns provide the means for the matched data set, with the sixth column providing the standardized difference between the means as calculated above. For instance, we see that the imbalance in the top decile for the number of channels declines markedly after matching. Now, 25.8% of respondents in towns with Fox News and 17.5% of respondents in towns without Fox News fall in the highest decile for the number of available channels. Balance also improves with respect to the logged population measures, the percent urban, and various other measures, providing further evidence that the matched data set has reduced the data to respondents in more comparable communities. For only 18 of the 62 independent variables used in the main model do we see declines in balance, and those declines are typically small. In sum, the matching procedure has reduced the number of observations in the data set by 65%, and in doing so it has focused our attention on the subset of respondents whose towns are most similar but for their Fox News availability. The resulting data set shows markedly better covariate balance, especially on measures of town size that were previously imbalanced and that were correlated with Fox’s expansion strategy.

The matching-based results reinforce our conclusion: Republicans, Republican leaners, and pure independents are more supportive of George W. Bush when living in towns with access to Fox News. In the matched data, the difference between the treated and control units is 4.1 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval from -0.9 to 9.9 percentage points.<sup>13</sup> This effect is illustrated at the bottom of Figure 1A, and the associated two-sided p-value is 0.09.<sup>14</sup>

One of the differences between the primary models reported in the paper and those in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) relate to the handling of fixed effects. On account of the distribution of Fox News availability across counties and Congressional Districts, the models above include fixed effects at the state level rather than the county or Congressional District level. With the matched data set, we thus also estimated a second model including indicator variables for residents in the 68 Congressional Districts with at least 15 respondents represented in the matched data set. This model produces an estimated Fox News effect of 2.8, with a wider 95% confidence interval from -1.5 to 9.9 percentage points. The corresponding two-sided p-value is 0.20. The estimated effect proves generally robust to model specification as well as to data reduction, albeit with increased uncertainty.

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<sup>13</sup>The treatment effect is estimated using the same model specification as that above, although to eliminate the threat of quasi-complete separation, we create a single fixed effect for all respondents living in the handful of states with fewer than 20 respondents in the matched data set.

<sup>14</sup>The one-to-one matching without replacement induces a role for chance in the algorithm, as the matching solution depends on the order in which observations are matched. We thus confirmed that the results are not sensitive to the specific matching solution chosen by re-running the same matching procedure 50 times and estimating the coefficient of interest. By chance, the results reported here fall just above the 50th percentile across these 50 simulations, so they are by no means outliers. The median z-score for the Fox News coefficient across the simulations is 1.68; for the model reported here, it is 1.69.

## F. Other Sources of Heterogeneity

Informed by decades of theorizing and empirical results on partisan reinforcement, our analysis emphasizes partisanship as a source of heterogeneity in the effect of Fox News access. But it is plausible that the effect might depend on other characteristics of the citizen, the community, or the time period, even among Republican-aligned and non-aligned citizens. For example, does the Fox News effect appear primarily among respondents with higher political knowledge (e.g. Chong and Druckman, 2007), whose pre-existing cognitive schema might be better equipped to incorporate the new messages? Or does it appear among those with middle levels of political knowledge (Zaller, 1992), who might be sufficiently attentive to its messages and yet still open to persuasion? We might also expect the effect to shift over the course of the campaign, as candidates' persuasive attempts increase and as voters pay increasing attention to the upcoming election (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Gelman and King, 1993). It is plausible as well that the effects might be more pronounced in less Republican communities, where local social life might provide fewer messages that reinforce Republican partisanship. To the extent that Fox News provides an ideological slant similar to that available on talk radio, perhaps those who listen to talk radio will be less influenced. Given the construction of the data set, to ensure that there is not a problem connecting ZIP codes to census-designated places, we also need to test if the effects of Fox News access vary depending on whether the respondent's ZIP code centroid falls within a census-designated place.

Table 3A reports the results of 33 new models which augment the basic model by adding multiplicative interactions and, where necessary, the corresponding lower-order terms one at a time. These covariates include everything from respondents' self-reported ideology, interest in politics, and identification as born-again Christians to southern residence, residence in a heavily Republican town, the number of months prior to or after the November general election, and many others. The first and second columns summarize the interacted covariate by providing its minimum and maximum, while the third, fourth, and fifth columns report the interaction term's coefficient, standard error, and Z-statistic. Due to different levels of missingness, the final column reports the number of observations for which this interacted variable is available. For example, the first row of the table indicates that respondents who report an interest in government are less likely to show a positive effect of Fox News access, with an interaction coefficient of -0.654 (SE=0.227).

The general pattern is of a stable treatment effect. In most cases, the effect of Fox News access does not change in a demonstrable way as the potential moderators shift. The interaction effect for respondents whose ZIP code centroid is inside the CDP is nearly zero and is insignificant ( $Z=-0.219$ ), meaning that the estimated effect hardly differs between those whose ZIP code centroids are within a CDP and those whose ZIP code centroids are not. The interaction effects with the number of months until the election, whether the interview took place in the three months leading up to the election, or whether it took place after the election are all weak and insignificant as well.<sup>15</sup> Respondents who moved to their present address within the last six months do not show a smaller treatment effect. Fox News access in 1998 does not have an especially strong interactive effect, and it has a negative point estimate, making cumulative Fox News effects over multiple years unlikely. This finding also further undercuts alternative explanations based on selection bias, since Fox News was decidedly not starting in

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<sup>15</sup>We confirmed this by removing the 1,025 respondents interviewed after the election. Among this group, the coefficient for Fox News access is 0.150 with a standard error of 0.103.



those communities that were most predisposed to its message. While it is interesting to consider how Fox News access interacts with other information sources, respondents who listen to talk radio do not show a stronger or weaker effect either. And the influence of Fox access appears no stronger or weaker in towns with many cable channels. Any p-value adjustment for multiple comparisons would reinforce the conclusion of treatment effect stability, as it would raise the threshold for declaring any sub-group differences statistically significant.

The only noteworthy positive interactions are that more conservative respondents, southern respondents, and those living in larger towns experience somewhat stronger treatment effects. The increased effect on conservatives is quite consistent with the broader evidence in this paper that Fox access primarily plays a reinforcing role. On the negative side, those who are in military households, those who report an interest in government, those who frequently discuss politics at work, and those who are registered to vote all appear to have weaker treatment effects. These results—and especially that for voter registration—suggest that Fox News access might be more influential among a less politically engaged subset of potential Republican and independent voters.

## G. Other Consequences of Fox News Access

Our focus has been on the conditional relationship between Fox News availability and citizens' vote intentions. But the Annenberg data provide us with a variety of other potential dependent variables, from political knowledge and media consumption to other political attitudes and behaviors. For the most part, these effects are null, even without a correction for multiple comparisons. Using the same basic model for either the full data set or the non-Democratic subset, we find no strong effects of Fox News availability on political knowledge,<sup>16</sup> newspaper readership, listening to talk radio, watching other cable news channels, or talking about politics with coworkers or friends and family. Among the non-Democratic subset, we do detect a few noteworthy effects: GOP nominee George W. Bush scores more favorably on a 100-point feeling thermometer among those with Fox News access ( $\beta = 1.58, SE = 0.71$ ), and Democratic nominee Al Gore scores somewhat less favorably ( $\beta = -1.32, SE = 0.86$ ). Additionally, non-Democratic respondents in towns with Fox News access are more likely to advocate for their candidate, a statistically strong and provocative finding that we estimated using logistic regression ( $\beta = 0.37, SE = 0.14$ ). In sum, Fox News access makes comparable non-Democrats more favorable toward the GOP nominee, and appears to have the opposite effect for the Democratic nominee. It also makes non-Democrats 45% more likely to advocate for their presidential candidate, a fact which is reminiscent of the two-step information flow posited by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955).

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<sup>16</sup>When specifying the dependent variable as a composite score from the survey's political knowledge battery, the overall coefficient is -0.0037 with a standard error of 0.0061.

Variable	$\beta$	SE	Variable	$\beta$	SE	Variable	$\beta$	SE
Intercept	-1.645	0.999	College	-0.451	0.178	Pop. D9	-0.615	0.275
Fox News Access	0.061	0.072	Some Grad	-0.670	0.219	Pop. D10	-0.544	0.276
Weak Democrat	1.524	0.109	Grad Degree	-0.744	0.183	# Ch. D2	0.122	0.117
Lean Democrat	1.590	0.108	Female	-0.193	0.047	# Ch. D3	0.050	0.130
Pure Ind.	3.097	0.108	% GOP 1996	1.308	0.312	# Ch. D4	0.090	0.126
Lean GOP	4.738	0.114	No Cable '00	-0.071	0.070	# Ch. D5	0.059	0.127
Weak GOP	4.616	0.111	Pop. '00	-0.070	0.024	# Ch. D6	0.009	0.117
Strong GOP	6.242	0.143	% HS '00	-0.489	0.927	# Ch. D7	-0.006	0.124
Lg. Pop. '00	0.087	0.147	% HS+ '00	-0.431	0.983	# Ch. D8	-0.121	0.137
Lg. Pop. '90	-0.109	0.142	% College '00	0.070	0.982	# Ch. D9	0.152	0.133
Pop. '00 Sq.	-0.265	0.209	% Male '90	-1.697	1.398	# Ch. D10	0.087	0.139
Pop. '00 Cubed	0.001	0.001	% Black '90	0.208	1.064	NH	-0.487	0.271
Born Again	0.590	0.054	% Hisp. '90	0.485	1.235	VT	0.004	0.341
Married	0.079	0.051	% Emp. '90	0.489	0.690	MA	-0.079	0.210
Union	-0.239	0.060	% Unemp. '90	0.013	1.229	RI	-0.501	0.307
ZIP Hsh. Income	0.000	0.003	% Married '90	-0.189	0.690	CT	-0.441	0.240
ZIP % BA	-1.044	0.443	Income '90	-0.001	0.051	NY	-0.183	0.202
ZIP % Black	0.081	0.313	% Urban '90	-0.130	0.147	NJ	-0.102	0.223
ZIP % Same House	0.006	0.429	Pop. '00	0.084	0.026	PA	-0.453	0.203
ZIP Dens. '00	-28.06	21.49	% HS '00	1.141	1.092	OH	-0.293	0.196
ZIP % Hisp.	-0.472	0.497	% HS+ '00	1.270	1.105	MI	-0.220	0.201
Black	-0.978	0.125	% College '00	0.226	1.091	WI	-0.235	0.205
Asian Am.	-0.129	0.171	% Male '00	-0.176	1.378	MN	-0.435	0.210
Hispanic	0.023	0.101	% Black '00	0.167	1.030	IA	-0.716	0.230
Inc. \$10K-\$15K	0.055	0.130	% Hisp. '00	0.386	1.044	MO	-0.216	0.271
Inc. \$15K-\$25K	0.109	0.118	% Emp. '00	-0.986	0.725	ND	-0.003	0.486
Inc. \$25K-\$35K	0.073	0.118	% Unemp. '00	0.377	1.075	VA	-0.147	0.235
Inc. \$35K-\$50K	0.181	0.118	% Married '00	0.199	0.730	SC	-0.176	0.275
Inc. \$50K-\$75K	0.376	0.120	Income '00	0.010	0.037	TN	-0.876	0.266
Inc. \$75K-\$100K	0.190	0.131	% Urban '00	0.248	0.164	AL	0.001	0.305
Inc. \$100K-\$150K	0.238	0.145	Pop. D2	-0.286	0.276	AR	-0.177	0.319
Inc. >\$150K	0.308	0.162	Pop. D3	-0.482	0.265	MT	0.083	0.376
Some HS	-0.372	0.187	Pop. D4	-0.532	0.264	ID	0.012	0.359
HS Graduate	-0.249	0.169	Pop. D5	-0.423	0.267	WY	0.318	0.389
Tech./Vocational	-0.454	0.207	Pop. D6	-0.569	0.268	UT	-0.191	0.357
Some College	-0.429	0.175	Pop. D7	-0.461	0.271	CA	-0.444	0.222
Associate's	-0.348	0.183	Pop. D8	-0.613	0.271			

Table 1: A. Logistic Regression Predicting a Respondent's Intention to Vote for GOP Candidate George W. Bush in 2000. Unless otherwise indicated, place-level variables denote the census-designated place. "D" indicates deciles. "Ch." indicates channels. The coefficients for the town's population squared and cubed and for the ZIP's median income have been multiplied by 1,000. 16,767 degrees of freedom.

Variable	Mean, Full with Fox	Mean, Full no Fox	Std. Diff. Full	Mean Matched with Fox	Mean Matched No Fox	Std. Diff. Matched
# Ch. D10	0.372	0.041	1.679	0.258	0.175	0.221
Pop. D10	0.450	0.171	0.743	0.407	0.229	0.422
# Ch. D9	0.184	0.058	0.535	0.155	0.252	0.223
# Ch. D8	0.164	0.052	0.506	0.216	0.162	0.149
# Ch. D2	0.004	0.155	0.418	0.005	0.006	0.010
# Ch. D6	0.058	0.177	0.313	0.078	0.136	0.171
% Urban '90	0.812	0.681	0.311	0.787	0.727	0.151
# Ch. D3	0.009	0.097	0.298	0.012	0.003	0.166
# Ch. D4	0.015	0.103	0.290	0.020	0.028	0.051
# Ch. D5	0.026	0.100	0.246	0.035	0.027	0.052
Lg. Pop. '90	7.656	7.261	0.231	7.447	7.397	0.032
College '90	0.219	0.195	0.207	0.214	0.207	0.054
Pop. D8	0.103	0.175	0.191	0.085	0.151	0.183
Married '90	0.572	0.589	0.190	0.576	0.584	0.090
No Cable '00	1.073	1.153	0.175	1.050	1.115	0.180
HS '90	0.313	0.328	0.167	0.321	0.324	0.039
ZIP % w/ BA	0.264	0.242	0.161	0.259	0.253	0.040
ZIP % Same House	0.556	0.570	0.157	0.564	0.578	0.164
Pop. D2	0.007	0.033	0.142	0.009	0.014	0.039
% Male '90	0.482	0.485	0.133	0.482	0.483	0.055
Pop. D3	0.025	0.052	0.121	0.030	0.018	0.099
Pop. D5	0.048	0.079	0.115	0.059	0.079	0.071
% Black '90	0.073	0.060	0.115	0.073	0.050	0.262
Pop. D4	0.045	0.071	0.103	0.056	0.050	0.032
Pop. D9	0.150	0.190	0.100	0.152	0.245	0.218
Pop. D7	0.085	0.116	0.096	0.101	0.103	0.008
# Ch. D7	0.167	0.136	0.090	0.219	0.202	0.042
% HS+ '90	0.250	0.244	0.088	0.245	0.239	0.106
Pop. '90	7.343	6.065	0.074	6.528	4.528	0.282
ZIP Density '00	0.001	0.001	0.073	0.001	0.001	0.052
Income '90	2.924	2.837	0.071	2.933	2.962	0.023
ZIP Income '00	47071.367	46098.792	0.061	46897.113	46804.676	0.006
Pop. D6	0.083	0.101	0.060	0.096	0.109	0.042

Variable	Mean, Full with Fox	Mean, Full no Fox	Std. Diff. Full	Mean Matched with Fox	Mean Matched No Fox	Std. Diff. Matched
% Emp. '90	0.603	0.608	0.059	0.599	0.613	0.175
Female	0.515	0.487	0.058	0.530	0.476	0.110
Born Again	0.345	0.369	0.050	0.353	0.330	0.049
Hispanic	0.054	0.045	0.044	0.048	0.049	0.004
% Voting GOP '90	0.410	0.405	0.039	0.409	0.408	0.011
Married	0.605	0.623	0.038	0.606	0.612	0.013
ZIP % Hisp. '00	0.074	0.070	0.033	0.063	0.065	0.011
Education	0.535	0.526	0.032	0.531	0.538	0.024
Party ID (1 =GOP)	0.782	0.777	0.032	0.782	0.782	0.002
% Hisp. '90	0.047	0.045	0.030	0.041	0.043	0.027
Income	0.533	0.525	0.030	0.525	0.537	0.046
Union	0.160	0.171	0.029	0.169	0.190	0.052
ZIP % Black '00	0.066	0.063	0.028	0.065	0.054	0.109
Black	0.019	0.022	0.024	0.018	0.018	0.000
Asian Am.	0.012	0.014	0.012	0.012	0.014	0.019
% Unemp. '90	0.061	0.061	0.008	0.062	0.059	0.107

Table 2: A. Balance for the Full, Matched Data Sets of Republicans, Republican Leaners, and Pure Independents. The full data set includes 7,548 respondents, while the matched data set has 2,624 respondents. For measures that exist in both 1990 and 2000, only 1990 are shown. “D” indicates deciles, while “CH” indicates channels. The standardized difference is calculated by dividing the difference between each group’s mean by the control group’s standard deviation.

Interacted Variable	Min	Max	$\beta$	SE	Z Value	N
Interest in Gov't	0.000	1.000	-0.654	0.227	-2.885	8602
Military	0.000	1.000	-0.388	0.154	-2.521	8617
Registered to Vote	0.000	1.000	-0.303	0.184	-1.653	8570
Talk at Work	0.000	1.000	-0.495	0.337	-1.470	7445
Internet Use	0.000	1.000	-0.221	0.165	-1.343	8613
Region: West	0.000	1.000	-0.238	0.207	-1.151	8618
Fox News Access '98	0.000	1.000	-0.623	0.618	-1.008	6180
Disagree at Work	0.000	1.000	-0.300	0.319	-0.940	7753
Region: Midwest	0.000	1.000	-0.118	0.168	-0.701	8617
Pol. Knowledge, Folded	-0.233	0.280	-0.309	0.498	-0.619	8117
ZIP Name Matches	0.000	1.000	-0.100	0.221	-0.452	8617
Time: Months to Election	-2.000	11.000	-0.011	0.024	-0.441	8617
Read Newspaper	0.000	1.000	-0.063	0.183	-0.346	8606
Lg. Pop. '90	-0.916	11.974	-0.017	0.049	-0.337	8618
Watch Other Cable News	0.000	1.000	-0.057	0.191	-0.297	8597
Moved Recently	0.000	1.000	-0.079	0.271	-0.291	8617
Attention to News	0.000	1.000	-0.049	0.218	-0.226	8175
Centroid w/i CDP	0.000	1.000	-0.035	0.158	-0.219	8617
Talk Radio	0.000	1.000	-0.046	0.229	-0.199	8596
Union	0.000	1.000	-0.017	0.192	-0.089	8618
Talk with Family	-0.305	0.695	-0.009	0.264	-0.034	7447
Pol. Knowledge/Interest	-0.625	0.375	-0.003	0.292	-0.009	8617
Time: During Campaign	0.000	1.000	0.001	0.150	0.007	8617
Pol. Knowledge	-0.534	0.466	0.008	0.262	0.030	8117
Time: After Campaign	0.000	1.000	0.089	0.236	0.376	8617
Born Again	0.000	1.000	0.078	0.171	0.456	8618
Care Who Wins	-0.629	0.371	0.071	0.152	0.465	8541
Disagree with Family/Friends	-0.246	0.754	0.150	0.285	0.527	7756
Number of Cable Channels	0.000	11.000	0.046	0.076	0.615	8617
% Voting GOP '96	-0.380	0.449	0.465	0.684	0.679	8618
Conservative Ideology	-0.500	0.500	0.593	0.384	1.542	8405
Total Pop. '00	0.009	289.958	0.005	0.003	1.575	8617
Region: South	0.000	1.000	0.559	0.295	1.898	8617

Table 3: A. Interactions with Fox News Availability. Each row of this table reports a separate interaction term ( $\beta$ ) between the listed variable and 2000 Fox News access. This interaction is included alongside our standard covariates and estimated for Republicans, Republican leaners, and pure independents.

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