



Supplemental Appendix - Additional Empirical Results

This figure replicates Figure 1 in the main paper but only considers the fundraising of incumbent state legislators and excludes challengers and open seat races.

Nevertheless, we see a similar pattern: in the aggregate cross sectional data, female legislators raise less than their male counterparts on average. Among incumbents, this has been true since 1998.



The following figure replicates Figure 2 in the main text. However, the y-axis is logged and the entire distribution of the data is displayed (rather than averages based on 1/10th of a percentage point bins).



The following two figures show the estimated effect of female incumbency on fundraising from PACs and party organizations. These two figures correspond with columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 of the main text. As reported in those tables, there does not appear to be a significant difference in fundraising by male and female candidates following a very close election. This is especially true among party contributions. Male winners do appear to raise more from PACs, however, as shown in Table 1, the difference fails to achieve traditional levels of statistical significance.







Figure 6 in the main text demonstrates that upon winning, female candidates go on to face future elections that are much less expensive than their male counterparts. One potential reason for this decrease in overall district spending may be because women are less likely to face challengers after gaining a seat in the legislature. To test this, we conduct the same regression discontinuity design as before, but rather than looking at the money raised in the next election, we investigate the probability that the barely-winning candidate faces a challenger in the next election. However, it appears that this is not the case. The following figure illustrates this. While barely-winning females are slightly less likely than barely-winning men to face a challenger in the next election cycle, the difference is small and statistically insignificant. Moreover, the probability for both genders is much higher than average given that the previous election was so close.







Similarly, we investigate whether female barely-winning candidates are more or less likely to win their next elections. Given that they raise significantly less money in the following election cycle, this may disadvantage them in the next election cycle. However, given that they appear to raise the same amount proportionately as their challenger, there may be no electoral effects. We find that the latter explanation appear to be the case. As shown in the figure below, there appears to be no difference around the cutpoint as to whether the barely winning candidate is successful in the following election.



Testing for Sorting Around the Cutpoint

An assumption of the regression discontinuity design is that observations that are close to and on either side of the cutpoint (in this case, 50% female vote share) are not able to precisely sort themselves to either side of the cutpoint. For example, if certain candidates were able to affect their location on either side of the cutpoint, then assignment to the treatment condition (a female candidate winning) would not be as-if-randomly assigned. Lee discusses this assumption at length and specifies that for RDD results are unbiased, it must be the case that pre-treatment variables be continuous around the cutpoint (Lee, 2008). To test this, we present a variety of figures that show the forcing variable (female vote share in election t) on the x-axis and several pre-treatment covariates on the y-axis. We then estimate a local regression on either side of the cutpoint. Any evidence of a discontinuity in the pre-treatment variables around the cutpoint would give cause for concern that the RDD estimates presented in the paper would be biased. The top left panel shows the probability that a female candidate ran in the previous election in the district. The top right panel investigates the total amount of spending that occurred in the district in the prior election cycle. The bottom left panel shows the Democratic vote share in the district in the previous election cycle. Finally, the bottom right panel shows the probability that the female candidate running in election t is the incumbent in the district. In each of the four cases, there is no evidence of sorting around the cutpoint. Instead, we see a continuous function across the value of the cutpoint, supporting the assumption that sorting is not taking place and that assignment to the treatment condition is as-if-random.

Figure 1A



Bandwidth Choice

To show that the choice of bandwidth does not affect the estimates, we present several figures that display the effect size under a number of bandwidth choices. Each point along the x-axis of the figures represents a 1/4 of a percentage point increase in the size of the bandwidth. Bandwidths near zero include very little data and are thus quite noisy. As the bandwidth increase, more elections are added to the data, decreasing the variance of the estimate. However, the larger the bandwidth, the further one moves away from truly close elections in which the outcome is as-if randomly determined. Thus, the choice of bandwidth is a tradeoff between variance (small bandwidths with little data) and bias (larger bandwidths that include less-close elections). To account for this, we present a variety of bandwidths – one for every 1/4 of a percentage point.

Figure A2 corresponds to the first column of Table 1 in the text and shows the effect of a male winner on the total amount of money raised by the candidate in the following election cycle. We see that generally, the effect size is positive and does not change dramatically with the choice of bandwidth size.

Figure A2




Figure A3 corresponds to the second column of Table 1 in the text and shows the effect of a male winner on fundraising among individual donations. Again, the effect remains positive, indicating that a male winner raises more money from individual donors than a female winner. This is the case under a number of different bandwidth choices and aligns with the results presented in the main text of the paper.

Figure A3




Figure A4 corresponds to the third column of Table 1 in the text and shows the effect of a male winner on fundraising among PAC donations in the following election cycle. We see similar results to those discussed in the paper. The effect size is positive, but fails to achieve statistical significance in most cases. Moreover, the effect size is substantially smaller than the effect of a male winner among individual donors.

Figure A4




Figure A5 corresponds to the fourth column of Table 1 in the text and shows the effect of a male winner on fundraising from male donors in the following election cycle.

Figure A5




Figure A6 corresponds to the fifth column of Table 1 in the text and shows the effect of a male winner on fundraising from male donors in the following election cycle.

Figure A6




Figure A7 corresponds to the sixth column of Table 1 in the text and shows the effect of a male winner on fundraising from female donors in the following election cycle. In this case, we see that the effect remains close to zero and statistically indistinguishable from zero throughout the choice of bandwidth.

Figure A7

