

Table A.4: Relevant Literature

Article	Cases	Type of study	Findings
Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen 2012	Sub-Saharan Africa	Observational	Egotropic retrospection insignificant
Canton and Jorrat 2002	Argentina	Observational	Pocketbook evaluations predict presidential approval in 1999, but not 1995.
Duch 2001	Hungary and Poland	Observational	Personal retrospection not correlated with support for incumbent in either country.
Gomez and Wilson 2001	United States	Observational	Pocketbook evaluations predict vote for “high-sophistication” voters only
Harper 2000	Lithuania, Hungary and Bulgaria	Observational	Neither sociotropic nor pocketbook evaluations predict attitudes toward parties
Kinder and Kiewiet 1981	United States	Observational	No personal financial concerns predict vote choice
Lau et al 1990	United States	Survey experiment	When question ordering is accounted for, no pocketbook effect
Lee and Glasure 2012	South Korea	Observational	Egotropic retrospection insignificant.
Lewis-Beck 1998	European countries	Observational	Egotropic retrospection insignificant.
Lewis-Beck Nadeau 2000	France	Observational	Egotropic retrospection insignificant.
Nannestad and Paldam 1995,1997	Denmark	Observational	Large, significant pocketbook effects
Norris and Mattes 2003	Sub-Saharan Africa	Observational	“Economic satisfaction” correlated with presidential approval in 3 of 12 countries
Oganesyan 2015	Latin American and African countries	Observational	Egotropic effects weak or insignificant relative to sociotropic
Renno and Gramacho 2010	Brazil and Chile	Observational	Pocketbook evaluations significant in Brazil, but not Chile
Singer 2013	Developing countries	Observational	Strong pocketbook effect in Europe smaller effect in Latin America
Singer and Carlin 2013	Latin America	Observational	Except in the least developed countries, vote predicted by sociotropic not pocketbook, evaluations.
Youde 2005	Ghana	Observational	Class not correlated with vote choice.

Table A.5: Correlates of perceived government sponsorship

Variable	Round 4		Round 5	
	Gov. Sponsor	Other Sponsor	Gov. Sponsor	Other Sponsor
Respondent characteristics				
Age	36.62	35.82	37.40	36.88
Education (1-10 scale)	2.97	3.89	3.12	4.05
% Rural	65.28	54.54	65.76	54.16
% Female	50.36	44.30	50.91	45.25
Radio News (1-5 Scale)	3.01	3.22	2.79	2.91
Survey Conditions				
Suspicious of the survey (1-3 Scale)	1.29	1.24	1.28	1.25
Difficulty with the survey(1-5 scale)	.47	.36	.42	.35
Interest in the survey (1-3 scale)	1.22	1.19	1.21	1.18
% Bystanders watching	15.17	13.96	13.93	12.01
Personal, local and national wealth				
% Private tap	31.17	40.66	40.03	52.00
% Electricity	53.62	59.45	59.44	66.48
GDP per capita (in US\$thousands)	39.17	36.95	41.61	42.40
Official tax rate	0.32	0.33	0.32	0.31

All differences are significant at $p < 0.05$.

Table A.6: Correlates of access to private tap

	Piped Water	
	Round 4	Round 5
Electric lines in EA	0.671*** (0.047)	0.778*** (0.035)
Paved Roads in EA	0.297*** (0.038)	0.343*** (0.029)
Piped water in EA	0.807*** (0.043)	0.391*** (0.027)
Age	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Female	0.097** (0.033)	0.171*** (0.025)
Employed	0.264*** (0.043)	0.266*** (0.028)
Reads a newspaper	0.618*** (0.0372)	0.624*** (0.028)
Uses a computer daily	1.181*** (0.086)	1.193*** (0.067)
Rural	-0.857*** (0.040)	-0.902*** (0.031)
Constant	-2.003*** (0.189)	-1.559*** (0.185)
<i>N</i>	26858	43706

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.7: Additional Variables for Table 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Egotropic retrospection	Egotropic retrospection	Egotropic retrospection
		<i>No private tap</i>	<i>Private tap</i>
Electric lines in EA	-0.026 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.122* (0.051)
Paved roads in EA	-0.012 (0.023)	-0.036 (0.028)	0.018 (0.035)
Piped water in EA	0.020 (0.027)	0.001 (0.030)	0.097* (0.047)
Age	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Female	-0.022 (0.014)	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.022)
Education	0.031*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.052*** (0.007)
Listen to news	0.026*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.027** (0.010)
Rural	-0.085*** (0.025)	-0.101** (0.031)	-0.039 (0.037)
Resp. suspicious	0.0001 (0.016)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.027)
Resp. had difficulty	0.031** (0.011)	0.027* (0.013)	0.057** (0.019)
Resp. interested	-0.031 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.049 (0.031)
Bystanders watching	0.024 (0.020)	0.012 (0.025)	0.044 (0.035)
GDP per capita	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.0018*** (0.0004)	0.002*** (0.0004)
Constant	3.330*** (0.066)	3.432*** (0.098)	3.238*** (0.119)
<i>N</i>	19767	12787	6980

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Dependent variable is self-reported egotropic retrospection. All models include crossed random effects at the village and enumerator level.

Table A.8: Additional Variables for Table 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Egotropic retrospection	Egotropic retrospection <i>No private tap</i>	Egotropic retrospection <i>Private tap</i>
Education	0.005** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.010*** (0.003)
Electric lines in EA	0.051* (0.024)	0.023 (0.028)	0.044 (0.037)
Paved roads in EA	0.006 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.026)	0.040 (0.028)
Piped water in EA	-0.012 (0.017)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.043 (0.022)
Age	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Female	-0.024* (0.011)	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.049** (0.017)
Listens to news	0.016*** (0.004)	0.015** (0.006)	0.015* (0.007)
Resp. suspicious	-0.017 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.024 (0.021)
Resp. had difficulty	-0.028** (0.010)	-0.042*** (0.013)	-0.016 (0.014)
Resp. interested	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.023)	0.007 (0.025)
Rural	-0.054** (0.019)	-0.071** (0.026)	-0.033 (0.026)
Bystanders watching	-0.014 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.028)
GDP per capita	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Constant	3.123*** (0.048)	3.199*** (0.069)	3.086*** (0.075)
<i>N</i>	29385	17440	11945

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Dependent variable is self-reported egotropic retrospection. All models include crossed random effects at the village and enumerator level.

Table A.9: Additional variables for table 3

	Round 4		Round 5	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
National Economy	0.253*** (0.014)	0.253*** (0.014)	0.250*** (0.013)	0.249*** (0.013)
Sociotropic retrospection	0.0933*** (0.021)	0.094*** (0.021)	0.175*** (0.020)	0.176*** (0.020)
Co-ethnic with incumbent	0.480*** (0.040)	0.480*** (0.040)	0.752*** (0.038)	0.751*** (0.038)
Rural	0.193*** (0.044)	0.193*** (0.044)	0.223*** (0.041)	0.224*** (0.041)
Age	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Female	0.055 (0.034)	0.054 (0.034)	0.143*** (0.031)	0.141*** (0.031)
Education	-0.064*** (0.010)	-0.065*** (0.010)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.012** (0.004)
Private tap	-0.180*** (0.044)	-0.181*** (0.044)	-0.284*** (0.039)	-0.285*** (0.038)
Electric lines in EA	-0.102* (0.049)	-0.101* (0.049)	-0.098* (0.044)	-0.096* (0.044)
Piped water in EA	-0.052 (0.049)	-0.054 (0.049)	0.007 (0.031)	0.007 (0.031)
Resp. Suspicious	-0.138*** (0.035)	-0.138*** (0.035)	0.102** (0.038)	0.103** (0.038)
Resp. had difficulty	-0.073** (0.025)	-0.073** (0.025)	-0.057* (0.025)	-0.058* (0.025)
Resp. interested	-0.124** (0.043)	-0.124** (0.043)	0.116* (0.049)	0.115* (0.049)
Bystanders watching	-0.016 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.049)	0.070 (0.048)	0.068 (0.048)
GDP per capita	0.009 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Constant	-1.787*** (0.330)	-1.965*** (0.339)	-2.115*** (0.255)	-2.289*** (0.262)
<i>N</i>	18585	18585	21629	21629

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Dependent variable is reported support for incumbent party. All models include country-level random effects.

Table A.10: Effect of Egotropic Retrospection on Vote Choice, conditional on Tax Rate

	Round 4 data		Round 5 data	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Egotropic retrospection	0.042 [†] (0.022)	0.101 [†] (0.060)	0.034 (0.024)	0.128* (0.050)
Effective tax rate	0.013 (0.044)	0.022 (0.045)	-0.077 (0.066)	0.198 (0.144)
Egotropic * tax rate		-0.003 (0.003)		-0.091* (0.043)
National economy	0.253*** (0.014)	0.253*** (0.014)	0.235*** (0.015)	0.234*** (0.015)
Sociotropic retrospection	0.0933*** (0.021)	0.0935*** (0.021)	0.160*** (0.023)	0.160*** (0.023)
Coethnic with incumbent	0.480*** (0.040)	0.481*** (0.040)	0.735*** (0.043)	0.736*** (0.043)
Rural	0.193*** (0.044)	0.194*** (0.044)	0.199*** (0.044)	0.201*** (0.044)
Age	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Female	0.0547 (0.035)	0.0548 (0.035)	0.153*** (0.035)	0.153*** (0.035)
Education	-0.064*** (0.010)	-0.065*** (0.010)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.014** (0.005)
Government sponsor	0.337*** (0.038)	0.336*** (0.038)	0.382*** (0.037)	0.382*** (0.037)
Private tap	-0.180*** (0.044)	-0.179*** (0.044)	-0.300*** (0.043)	-0.298*** (0.043)
Electricity in EA	-0.102* (0.049)	-0.100* (0.049)	-0.0485 (0.049)	-0.0478 (0.049)
Piped water in EA	-0.052 (0.049)	-0.053 (0.049)	0.024 (0.034)	0.025 (0.034)
Resp. suspicious	-0.138*** (0.035)	-0.138*** (0.035)	0.078 (0.043)	0.078 (0.043)
Resp. had difficulty	-0.073** (0.025)	-0.073** (0.025)	-0.040 (0.028)	-0.041 (0.028)
Resp. interested	-0.124** (0.043)	-0.125** (0.043)	0.143** (0.055)	0.142* (0.055)
Bystanders watching	-0.016 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.049)	0.043 (0.054)	0.041 (0.054)
GDP per capita	0.008 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Constant	-2.009* (0.847)	-2.196* (0.867)	-1.941*** (0.280)	-2.226*** (0.310)
<i>N</i>	18585	18585	17321	17321

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The dependent variable is reported support for incumbent party. All models include country-level random effects.

Table A.10 presents a supplementary analysis that interacts pocketbook evaluations with perceived tax rate to predict vote choice. Since those who do not expect taxation have no reason to misreport their consumption, the responses of those who perceive no credible risk of taxation should be unbiased. The results, which show a positive correlation between income and vote choice among those who report zero taxation, are consistent with expectations, and with the results in Tables 3 and A.9. However, the interaction only reaches standard levels of significance for Model 4; this may result from greater error in reported tax rates.