

The Politician's Province:

Supplemental Appendix

We first (re-)introduce some notation which will be used throughout this Online Appendix. Denote $V_t^J(a_t, i_t; d_{t-1}, i_{t-1}, \tau_{t-1}, K)$ the expected payoff (continuation value) of player $J \in \{L, R, V\}$ at the beginning of period t when $K \in \{L, R\}$ is in office and inherits de jure authority $d_{t-1} \in \{0, 1\}$ (recall $d_0 = 0$ and $d_t = 1$ if $d_{t-1} = 1$ or $a_t = 1$) and following the previous period action. Recall as well that the function $q_2(i_2; d_2, i_1, \tau_1)$ is equal to 0 when (i) $d_2 = 1$ (politician has de jure authority), (ii) $i_2 = 0$ (there is no intervention), or (iii) $i_2 = i_1 \neq 0$ and $\tau_1 = 0$ (politician has de facto authority over i_2). The function $q(\cdot)$ is equal to q in all other cases. Finally, denote $F(\epsilon)$ the CDF of the Uniform distribution on $[-1/2\psi, 1/2\psi]$.

B Equilibrium definition two-period model

The players' strategies form a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:

1) In the second period, taking his inherited de jure authority (d_1) as given, the officeholder chooses a strategy such as to maximize his continuation value:

$$(a_2(J), i_2(J)) \in \arg \max_{(a_2, i_2) \in \{0, 1\} \times \{-1, 0, 1\}} V_2^J(a_2, i_2; d_1, i_1, \tau_1, J)$$

2) The voter reelects politician R ($e = 1$) if and only if for all first-period strategy (i.e., $\forall (a_1, i_1) \in \{0, 1\} \times \{-1, 0, 1\}$):

$$V_2^V(a_2(R), i_2(R); d_1, i_1, \tau_1, R) + \epsilon_2^R \geq V_2^V(a_2(L), i_2(L); d_1, i_1, \tau_1, L)$$

3) In the first period, politician R chooses a strategy to maximize his expected utility:

$$(a_1(R), i_1(R)) \in \arg \max_{(a_1, i_1) \in \{0,1\} \times \{-1,0,1\}} \left\{ \begin{aligned} &V_1^R(a_1, i_1; 0, 0, 0, R) \\ &+ Pr(\epsilon_2^R \geq \Delta_2) V_2^R(a_2(R), i_2(R); d_1, i_1, \tau_1, R) \\ &+ Pr(\epsilon_2^R < \Delta_2) V_2^R(a_2(L), i_2(L); d_1, i_1, \tau_1, L) \end{aligned} \right\}$$

with $\Delta_2 = V_2^V(a_2(L), i_2(L); d_1, i_1, \tau_1, L) - V_2^V(a_2(R), i_2(R); d_1, i_1, \tau_1, R)$.

C Proofs of extensions (Section)

In this appendix, we prove the results of our extensions. The first subsection concerns the three-period game. Proofs for the cases with no status quo bias and of relinquishing authority can be found in Appendices C.2 and C.3 respectively.

C.1 Three-period game

We now extend the setting to a three-period game. At the end of periods 1 and 2, the voter decides whether to reelect the office-holder. The game ends without election at the end of period 3. The voter's electoral decisions in period $t \in \{2, 3\}$ is denoted by $e_t \in \{0, 1\}$, with $e_t = 1$ corresponding to electing the politician from party R at the end of period $t - 1$. We also denote $\tau_t \in \{0, 1\}$, $t \in \{1, 2\}$, the occurrence of a successful court challenge in period t .

In period 1, politician R is in office, decides whether to acquire de jure authority over \mathcal{P} , and to intervene in \mathcal{P} . At the end of period 1, the voter observes politician R 's actions, whether a court challenge occurred, her payoff, and the next period valence shock ϵ_2^R drawn from the Uniform distribution $U[\frac{-1}{2\psi}, \frac{1}{2\psi}]$. The voter decides to (re)elect politician R ($e_2 = 1$) or replace him with his challenger politician L . In period 2, the timing is the same as above. At the end of period 2, the voter observes valence shocks which affects her third period payoff: $\epsilon_3^R = e_2 \times \epsilon$ (so $\epsilon_3^R = 0$ if politician R is not reelected at the end of period 1) and $\epsilon_3^L = (1 - e_2) \times \epsilon$, with ϵ drawn from the Uniform distribution $U[\frac{-1}{2\psi}, \frac{1}{2\psi}]$ (without loss of

generality, the results go through if the valence shock always affects the voter's evaluation of politicians from party R). The voter decides to reelect the politician in office or a challenger from the opposite party, denoted politician $R2$ if $e_2 = 0$ or $L2$ if $e_2 = 1$.¹ As in the baseline model, the voter's per period utility is (2) and politician's per-period utility function is characterized by (1).

The transmission of de jure authority works as before: $d_0 = 0$ and $d_t = 1$ if $d_{t-1} = 1$ or $a_t = 1$. De jure authority is broad and protects any policy choice in \mathcal{P} from a successful court challenge. In contrast, de facto authority is always narrow. In period 2, an unauthorized intervention is immune from a court challenge only if the office-holder chose the same unauthorized policy intervention as in period 1 and there was no court challenge in period 1. As such, the function $q_2(i_2; d_2, i_1, \tau_1)$ introduced above remains the same.²

In period 3, an unauthorized intervention is immune from a court challenge, only if it has previously survived a court challenge. To summarize the transmission of de facto authority in period 3, define the function $q_3(i_3; d_3, i_1, i_2, \tau_1, \tau_2) \in \{0, q\}$. $q_3(i_3; \cdot) = 0$ if and only if: (i) the office-holder has de jure authority ($d_3 = 1$), (ii) does not intervene ($i_3 = 0$), (iii) intervenes at a policy over which the office-holder has de facto authority ($i_1 \neq 0$, $i_3 = i_1$, $\tau_1 = 0$ or $i_2 \neq 0$, $i_3 = i_2$, $\tau_2 = 0$). The probability of a successful court challenge $q_3(i_3; \cdot)$ takes value q in all other cases.

In what follows, we still use the notation $V_t^J(a_t, i_t; d_{t-1}, i_{t-1}, \tau_{t-1}, K)$ (imposing $i_0 = 0$) to denote the continuation value of politician $J \in \{L, R, L2, R2\}$ at the beginning of period $t \in \{1, 2\}$ when $K \in \{L, R\}$ is in office and inherits de jure authority $d_{t-1} \in \{0, 1\}$. Notice that $V_2^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R)$ is characterized in Equation 3. $V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R)$ is characterized in Equation 4. Furthermore, $V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R)$ when policy preferences dominate is given by (8).

¹This implies that if politician R loses the election at the end of period 1, he cannot stand for election at the end of period 2.

²Recall $q_2(i_2; d_2, i_1, \tau)$ is equal to 0 if $d_2 = 1$ or $i_2 = 0$ or $i_2 = i_1 \neq 0$ and $\tau_1 = 0$, and is equal to q otherwise.

Observe that Lemmas A.1 and A.2 can be extended to this context, a politician intervenes in period 3 if and only if he inherits de jure authority ($d_3 = 1$) or de facto authority over his preferred policy ($q_3(1; \cdot) = 0$ for R and $q_3(-1; \cdot) = 0$ for L).

We now show that under certain parameter values politician R acquires de jure authority at the first opportunity. To limit the sheer number of cases, as indicated in the text we assume that $c > 3/2\lambda$ (so the status quo bias holds in full) and $q > \frac{\frac{3}{2}\lambda}{\frac{3}{2}\lambda + k}$. This assumption implies that R prefers to acquire de jure authority in period 1 or intervenes without authorization only if the voter is sufficiently conservative $\min\{\eta^{**}, \eta^*\} > 0$ (Proposition 1). A second consequence of our assumption on q is that politician L chooses no intervention in period 2 for all $\eta \geq 0$ if he does not inherit de jure or de facto authority over -1 (since $\eta^* > 0$, by symmetry around 0, L intervenes—acquires authority or intervenes without authorization—in \mathcal{P} if and only if $\eta \leq \max\{-\eta^*, -\eta^{**}\} < 0$). Politician R 's behavior in office in period 2 when he does not inherit de jure or de facto authority is characterized by Proposition 1. The subsequent Lemmas characterize the office-holder's behavior in other cases.

Lemma C.1. *Suppose $\lambda \geq 1/11$. There exists a threshold $\eta^{2**} \in (\eta^{**}, 1]$ such that if R has de facto authority over policy 1 ($a_1 = 0$, $i_1 = 1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$), when in office in period 2, R does not acquire authority ($a_2 = 0$, $i_2 = 1$) if and only if the electorate's right-wing bias is relatively low ($\eta \in [0, \eta^{2**})$) and acquires de jure authority ($a_2 = 1$, $i_2 = 1$) if and only if the electorate's right-wing bias is relatively high ($\eta \geq \eta^{2**}$).*

Proof. Intervention at 1 and no intervention yield the same probability of reelection ($\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta$) since $L2$ never intervenes in \mathcal{P} in period 3. Hence, R strictly prefers intervening (now with authorization) at policy 1 than no intervention since he gets a higher period 2 payoff. His expected utility from (authorized) intervention at 1 is then:

$$V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) = 1 + \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right)(1 + \lambda) \quad (\text{C.1})$$

If R chooses to intervene at -1 without authorization, he faces the risk of a court challenge. If the court challenge is successful, only R can intervene in period 3 and he is reelected

with probability $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta)$. If the court challenge is unsuccessful, both politicians R and L intervene at their preferred policy in period 3 so R is reelected with probability $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta)$. His expected utility is then:

$$\begin{aligned} V_2^R(0, -1; 0, 1, 0, R) = & 1 - qk - (1 - q)\lambda + q \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) \\ & + (1 - q) \left(\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta \right) \lambda \right) \end{aligned} \quad (C.2)$$

We obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) - V_2^R(0, -1; 0, 1, 0, R) = & (2 - q)\lambda + qk + (1 - q) \left(\left(\frac{1}{2} - 3\psi\eta \right) \lambda - \eta\psi \right) \\ & > (3 - 2q)\lambda - \frac{1 - q}{4}(\lambda + 1) \end{aligned}$$

Where the inequality comes from $qk > (1 - q)\lambda$, $\eta < 1$ and $\psi < 1/4$. Notice that $\Delta(q) = (3 - 2q)\lambda - \frac{1 - q}{4}(\lambda + 1)$ is linear in q so $\Delta(q) \geq \min\{\Delta(0), \Delta(1)\}$. Since $\Delta(1) = \lambda > 0$ and $\Delta(0) = \frac{11\lambda - 1}{4} \geq 0$ under the assumption $\lambda \geq 1/11$. Since $q > 0$, R never intervenes without authorization at L 's preferred policy.

Finally, if R chooses to acquire de jure authority over \mathcal{P} , his opponent can also intervene if elected in period 3 so R is reelected with probability $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta)$. His expected utility is then:

$$V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) = 1 + \lambda - c + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta \right) \lambda \quad (C.3)$$

Comparing Equation C.1 and Equation C.3, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} & V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) - V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) \\ = & c + \left(\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \right) (1 + \lambda) + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta \right) \lambda \\ = & c - \psi\eta(1 + \lambda) + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta \right) \lambda \end{aligned} \quad (C.4)$$

$V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) - V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 1, 0, R)$ is strictly decreasing with η . Furthermore, it satisfies $V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) - V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) > 0$ at $\eta = 0$. Hence, there exists a unique solution $\check{\eta}^j > 0$ such that $V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) - V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) > 0$ for all $\eta < \check{\eta}^j$. Defining $\eta^{2**} = \min\{\check{\eta}^j, 1\}$, we obtain that Politician R chooses $a_2 = 1$ and $i_2 = 1$ if and only if $\eta \geq \eta^{2**}$.

To finish the proof, we need to show that $\eta^{2**} > \eta^{**}$. From the proof of Proposition 1, $V_2^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R) \leq V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R)$ and $V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) \leq V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R)$ are equivalent respectively to (after rearranging)

$$c - 2\psi\eta(1 + \lambda) + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta\right) \lambda - \frac{3}{2}\lambda \leq 0 \quad (\text{C.5})$$

$$c - (1 + q)\psi\eta(1 + \lambda) + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta\right) \lambda - q(k + \lambda) - \frac{q}{2}\lambda \leq 0 \quad (\text{C.6})$$

Direct inspection reveals that Equation C.4 implies both Equation C.5 and Equation C.6. Hence, $\check{\eta}^j > \eta^{**}$ and the claim follows. \square

In what follows, we assume (without loss of generality given the text of Proposition 2) that $\lambda \geq 1/11$.

Lemma C.2. *If the office-holder has de facto authority over policy 1 ($a_1 = 0$, $i_1 = 1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$), politician L if in office in period 2 prefers not to intervene ($a_2 = 0$, $i_2 = 0$) for all $\eta \geq 0$.*

Proof. It can be checked that L strictly prefers no intervention to intervening (now with authorization) at policy 1 since he gets a higher period 2 payoff and his reelection probability is $(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta)$ in both cases since he does not intervene in \mathcal{P} in period 3. His expected utility from no intervention is then:

$$V_2^L(0, 0; 0, 1, 0, L) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right) \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta\right) \quad (\text{C.7})$$

When L intervenes without authorization at his preferred policy (-1) , he is reelected with probability $(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta)$ after a successful court challenge (as only $R2$ intervenes in \mathcal{P} in period 3) and with probability $(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta)$ after no successful court challenge (since both politicians

intervene at their preferred policy if in office in period 3). His expected utility is then:

$$\begin{aligned} V_2^L(0, -1; 0, 1, 0, L) = & 1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + q \left(- \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \right) \\ & + (1 - q) \left(- \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) \right) \end{aligned} \quad (C.8)$$

After de jure authority acquisition, L 's expected utility is (as all office-holders intervene in \mathcal{P} in period 3):

$$V_2^L(1, -1; 0, 1, 0, L) = 1 + \lambda - c - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) \quad (C.9)$$

Comparing (C.7) and (C.8), we obtain (after rearranging):

$$\begin{aligned} & V_2^L(0, 0; 0, 1, 0, L) - V_2^L(0, -1; 0, 1, 0, L) \\ = & qk - (1 - q)\lambda + (1 - q) \left(\psi\eta(\lambda + 1) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \end{aligned} \quad (C.10)$$

$V_2^L(0, 0; 0, 1, 0, L) - V_2^L(0, -1; 0, 1, 0, L)$ is strictly increasing in η and at $\eta = 0$, $V_2^L(0, 0; 0, 1, 0, L) - V_2^L(0, -1; 0, 1, 0, L) = qk - \frac{3}{2}(1 - q)\lambda > 0$ given our assumption on q . Hence, L strictly prefers no intervention to unauthorized intervention at -1 for $\eta \geq 0$.

Comparing (C.7) and (C.9), we obtain (after rearranging):

$$\begin{aligned} & V_2^L(0, 0; 0, 1, 0, L) - V_2^L(1, -1; 0, 1, 0, L) \\ = & c - \lambda + \psi\eta(\lambda + 1) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) \lambda \end{aligned} \quad (C.11)$$

$V_2^L(0, 0; 0, 1, 0, L) - V_2^L(1, -1; 0, 1, 0, L)$ is strictly increasing in η and at $\eta = 0$, $V_2^L(0, 0; 0, 1, 0, L) - V_2^L(1, -1; 0, 1, 0, L) = c - \frac{3}{2}\lambda \geq 0$ under our assumption on c . Hence, L prefers no intervention to de jure authority acquisition for $\eta \geq 0$ (strictly if $\eta > 0$). \square

Lemma C.3. *If the office-holder has de facto authority over policy -1 ($a_1 = 0$, $i_1 = -1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$), politician L if in office in period 2 intervenes at his preferred policy -1 ($a_2 = 0$, $i_2 = -1$) for all $\eta \geq 0$.*

Proof. By a similar reasoning as Lemma C.1, L prefers (authorized) intervention at -1 to no intervention. Given $\eta \geq 0$, if R can intervene in \mathcal{P} in period 3, it can only decrease the probability that L is reelected since $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta) \leq (\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta)$. Hence, L never intervenes without authorization at R 's preferred policy or acquires de jure authority since it reduces his second period payoff and electoral prospect. \square

Using Lemmas C.1-C.3, Proposition 1, and the reasoning above, we can characterize politicians R and L 's policy choice if in office in period 2 as a function of period 1 choice and whether a successful court challenge occurred. It can be checked that a politician always intervenes at his preferred policy when he has de jure authority over \mathcal{P} . Table 1 characterizes second period choice when $a_1 = 0$ and $c \geq 3\lambda/2$.

Candidate	$i_1 = 1, \tau_1 = 0$	$i_1 = 0$ or $\tau_1 = 1$	$i_1 = -1, \tau_1 = 0$
R	$a_2 = 1, i_2 = 1$	$a_2 = 1, i_2 = 1$	
L	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = 0$	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = 0$	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = -1$

(a) $\eta \geq \eta^{2**}$

Candidate	$i_1 = 1, \tau_1 = 0$	$i_1 = 0$ or $\tau_1 = 1$	$i_1 = -1, \tau_1 = 0$
R	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = 1$	$a_2 = 1, i_2 = 1$	
L	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = 0$	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = 0$	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = -1$

(b) $\eta \in [\eta^{**}, \eta^{2**})$

Candidate	$i_1 = 1, \tau_1 = 0$	$i_1 = 0$ or $\tau_1 = 1$	$i_1 = -1, \tau_1 = 0$
R	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = 1$	$a_2 = 0, i_2 \in \{0, 1\}$	
L	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = 0$	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = 0$	$a_2 = 0, i_2 = -1$

(c) $\eta \in [0, \eta^{**})$

Table 1: Period 2 equilibrium choice

Notice that we do not characterize R 's behavior after $a_1 = 0, i_1 = -1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$. In Lemma C.9, we show that for λ sufficiently high, the strategy $a_1 = 0, i_1 = -1$ is dominated by some other first-period choice.

Lemmas C.4-C.7 characterize R 's reelection probability as a function of his first-period choice and popular expectation η . Recall that we always assume $c \geq 3\lambda/2$ and $\lambda \geq 1/11$.

Lemma C.4. *Suppose $\eta \in [\eta^{2**}, 1]$. At the end of period 1, politician R 's reelection probability is*

1. $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) \eta\right)$ after no intervention ($i_1 = 0$) and unauthorized intervention followed by a successful court challenge ($i_1 \neq 0$, $\tau_1 = 1$);
2. $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \left(2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right)\right) \eta\right)$ after unauthorized intervention at his preferred policy and no court challenge ($a_1 = 0$, $i_1 = 1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$);
3. $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right)$ after de jure authority acquisition.

Proof. Point 1. If at the beginning of period 2, politician R is in office and does not have authority over \mathcal{P} ($d_1 = 0$), he acquires de jure authority over the domain in period 2. Using the result above, after no intervention or unauthorized intervention followed by a successful court challenge in period 1, the voter's expected policy payoff if she reelects politician R is: $\eta + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) \eta + (1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right))(-\eta)$. If she elects politician L instead, her expected policy payoff is 0. Therefore, the voter reelects politician R if and only if: $\epsilon_2^R \geq -2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) \eta$. Politician R 's reelection probability is thus $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) \eta\right)$.

Point 2. If politician R intervenes without authorization at his preferred policy and there is no court challenge, he acquires de jure authority in period 2 (see Table 1a). The voter's expected policy payoff from reelecting R is then: $\eta + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) \eta + (1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right))(-\eta)$. If the voter elects L instead, he does not intervene in \mathcal{P} and only R 2 if elected (with probability $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right)$) intervenes in \mathcal{P} in period 3. Her expected policy payoff from electing L is then: $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right) \eta$. R 's reelection probability is then: $\frac{1}{2} + \psi \left(2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right)\right) \eta$.

Point 3. If politician R acquires de jure authority in period 1, then $d_t = 1$, $t \geq 1$. The politician in office in period $t \in \{2, 3\}$ implements his preferred policy. The voter's expected policy payoff when politician R is in office in period 2 is thus: $\eta + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) \eta + (1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right))(-\eta)$. When politician L is in office in period 2, it is: $(-\eta) + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) \eta + (1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right))(-\eta)$ (at the end of period 2, politician L is reelected if and only if $\epsilon_2^L \geq 2\eta$ or

with probability $1 - (\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta)$. Therefore, politician R 's reelection probability at the end of period 1 is $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta)$. \square

Lemma C.5. *Suppose $\eta \in [\eta^{**}, \eta^{2**})$. At the end of period 1, politician R 's reelection probability is*

1. $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta) \eta)$ after no intervention ($i_1 = 0$) and unauthorized intervention followed by a successful court challenge ($i_1 \neq 0$, $\tau_1 = 1$);
2. $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta)$ after unauthorized intervention at his preferred policy and no court challenge ($a_1 = 0$, $i_1 = 1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$);
3. $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta)$ after de jure authority acquisition.

Proof. *Point 1.* Same reasoning as for point 1 in Lemma C.4.

Point 2. After unauthorized intervention at his preferred policy and no successful court challenge, politician R if reelected intervenes (with authorization) at his preferred policy. The voter's expected policy payoff from reelecting R is then $\eta + (\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta) \eta$. As L does not intervene in \mathcal{P} if elected, the voter's expected payoff from electing L is $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta) \eta$ since R if elected (probability $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta)$) intervenes at 1 in period 3. R 's reelection probability is then: $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta)$.

Point 3. Same reasoning as for point 3 in Lemma C.4. \square

Lemma C.6. *Suppose $\eta \in [\eta^*, \eta^{**})$ (possibly an empty interval). At the end of period 1, politician R 's reelection probability is*

1. $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi(1 - q)(1 + (\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta)) \eta)$ after no intervention ($i_1 = 0$) and unauthorized intervention followed by a successful court challenge ($i_1 \neq 0$, $\tau_1 = 1$);
2. $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta)$ after unauthorized intervention at his preferred policy and no court challenge ($a_1 = 0$, $i_1 = 1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$);
3. $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta)$ after de jure authority acquisition.

Proof. Point 1. After no intervention or a successful court challenge, Politician R intervenes without authorization at 1 if reelected. Therefore, using the usual reasoning, the voter's expected policy payoff is: $q \times 0 + (1 - q) \left(\eta + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \eta \right)$. If L is elected, he does not intervene in \mathcal{P} so the voter's expected policy payoff is 0. Therefore, politician R 's reelection probability is $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi(1 - q) \left(1 + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \eta \right) \right)$.

Point 2. Same reasoning as for point 2 in Lemma C.5.

Point 3. Same reasoning as for point 3 in Lemma C.4. □

Lemma C.7. *Suppose $0 \leq \eta < \min\{\eta^*, \eta^{**}\}$. At the end of period 1, politician R 's reelection probability is*

1. $1/2$ after no intervention ($i_1 = 0$) and unauthorized intervention followed by a successful court challenge ($i_1 \neq 0, \tau_1 = 1$);
2. $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right)$ after unauthorized intervention at his preferred policy and no court challenge ($a_1 = 0, i_1 = 1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$);
3. $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right)$ after de jure authority acquisition.

Proof. Point 1. After no intervention or a successful court challenge, Politician R does not intervene in period 2. Therefore, the voter's expected policy payoff is: 0 whether R or L is in office in period 2. Therefore, politician R 's reelection probability is $1/2$.

Point 2. Same reasoning as for point 2 in Lemma C.5.

Point 3. Same reasoning as for point 3 in Lemma C.4. □

The next two Lemmas refine the possible first-period equilibrium choices. To alleviate notation, I denote $P(\eta)$ (resp. $Q(\eta)$) the probability politician R is re-elected after a successful court challenge (resp. after unauthorized intervention at 1 and no successful court challenge) as defined in Lemmas C.4-C.7.

Lemma C.8. *Suppose $\eta \geq \eta^{2**}$. Politician R always prefers no intervention ($a_1 = i_1 = 0$) to unauthorized intervention at his preferred policy in period 1.*

Proof. After unauthorized intervention at 1 (followed or not by a successful court challenge) or no intervention, politician R if reelected chooses to acquire de jure authority in period 2 (Lemma C.1). As such, unauthorized intervention at 1 is preferred to no intervention only if it increases the probability that R is reelected (since $q > \lambda/(\lambda + k)$, unauthorized intervention decreases politician R 's first-period payoff). By Lemma C.4, this condition is never satisfied. \square

Lemma C.9. *There exists $\alpha < 36/55$ such that for $\lambda \geq \alpha$ and $\eta \geq 0$, politician R never intervenes without authorization at L 's preferred policy in period 1.*

Proof. Slightly abusing notation (see Appendix B), denote $a_2^*(a_1, i_1, \tau_1, K), i_2^*(a_1, i_1, \tau_1, K)$ the second-period equilibrium choice of politician $K \in \{L, R\}$ when in office as a function of the first-period actions. From Table 1, $a_2^*(a_1, i_1, \tau_1, L) = i_2^*(a_1, i_1, \tau_1, L) = 0$ whenever L does not have de jure or de facto authority over his preferred policy -1 . Notice that by Lemma C.1,

$$V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) = 1 + \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right)(1 + \lambda) \leq V_2^R(a_2^*(0, 1, 0, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 0, R); 0, 1, 0, R)$$

We consider different cases depending on politician R 's second-period choice following $a_1 = 0$, $i_1 = -1$, and $\tau_1 = 0$.

Case 1: $a_2^*(0, -1, 0, R) = 0$ and $i_2^*(0, -1, 0, R) = -1$. It can be checked that politician R is reelected with probability $1/2$ at the end of period 1 after no successful court challenge. Recall that $P(\eta)$ is the probability candidate R is reelected after a successful court challenge. Since politician R cannot run again if he loses the election in period 1, his expected first-period payoff is:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R) = & 1 - (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R); 0, -1, 1, R) \\ & + (1 - q)\left(\frac{1}{2} - \lambda - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta\right)\lambda + \frac{\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right)}{2}\right) \end{aligned}$$

Recall that $Q(\eta)$ the probability R is reelected after unauthorized intervention at 1 and no successful court challenge. If R instead intervenes without authorization at his preferred policy 1, his expected first-period payoff is:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) &= 1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R); 0, 1, 1, R) \\ &\quad + (1 - q) \left(Q(\eta)V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) + (1 - Q(\eta)) \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \\ &\geq 1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R); 0, 1, 1, R) \\ &\quad + (1 - q) (Q(\eta)V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R)) \end{aligned}$$

By Lemmas C.4-C.7, $Q(\eta) \geq 1/2$ so we obtain: $Q(\eta)V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) > \frac{1}{2} - \lambda - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta\right) \lambda + \frac{(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta)}{2}$ and $V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) > V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R)$, which proves the claim for case 1.

Case 2: $a_2^*(0, -1, 0, R) = 1$ and $i_2^*(0, -1, 0, R) = 1$. R 's reelection probability at the end of period 1 after a successful court challenge is $P(\eta)$ described in Lemmas C.4-C.7. Using a similar reasoning as in the aforementioned Lemmas, it can be checked that his reelection probability after no successful court challenge is:

$$H(\eta) := \min \left\{ \frac{1}{2} + \psi \left(\frac{5}{2} + 3\psi\eta \right) \eta, 1 \right\} \quad (\text{C.12})$$

Politician R 's expected payoff from unauthorized intervention at -1 is then:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R) &= 1 - (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R); 0, -1, 1, R) \\ &\quad + (1 - q) \left[H(\eta) \left(1 + \lambda - c + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \right. \\ &\quad \left. - (1 - H(\eta)) \left(\lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C.13})$$

Suppose $\eta \geq \eta^{**}$ so $(a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R)) = (a_2^*(0, 0, 0, R), i_2^*(0, 0, 0, R)) = (1, 1)$ by Proposition 1. This implies $P(\eta) = \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \eta \right)$. In this case, politician R 's

expected utility after no intervention in period 1 is:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R) = & 1 + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \eta \right) \left[1 + \lambda - c \right. \\
& \left. + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) \lambda \right] \quad (C.14)
\end{aligned}$$

Comparing (C.13) and (C.14) and noting $H(\eta) \leq 1$ yields:

$$\begin{aligned}
& V_1^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R) \\
& \geq qk + (1 - q)\lambda - (1 - q) \left(H(\eta) - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \eta \right) \right) \left(1 + \lambda - c \right. \\
& \quad \left. + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta \right) \lambda \right) \\
& > qk + (1 - q)\lambda - (1 - q) \left(\frac{3}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \psi\eta \left(2 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda \right) \\
& > 2(1 - q)\lambda - \frac{5}{16}(1 - q) \left(2 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda \right)
\end{aligned}$$

The second inequality comes from the definition of $H(\eta)$ (see (C.12)), $0 < (\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta) < (\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta) < 1$, and $c \geq 3\lambda/2$. The last inequality comes from $qk > (1 - q)\lambda$ and $(\frac{3}{2} - \psi\eta) \psi\eta < 5/16$ (since $(3/2 - x)x$ is strictly increasing for $x \in [0, 3/4]$ and $\psi\eta < 1/4$). The last inequality implies that there exists $\alpha_{\eta \geq \eta^{**}}^1 < 20/59$ such that if $\lambda > \alpha_{\eta \geq \eta^{**}}^1$, then $V_1^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R) > V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R)$ for all $\eta \geq \eta^{**}$.

Suppose $\eta \leq \eta^{**}$ so $(a_2^*(0, 1, 0, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 0, R)) = (0, 1)$ by Lemma C.1. Observe that this case combines two subcases: (i) $\eta \in [\eta^*, \eta^{**}]$ where $(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R)) = (0, 1)$ and $\eta \in [0, \min\{\eta^*, \eta^{**}\}]$ where $(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R)) = (0, 0)$. This is without loss of generality as the following makes clear. Further, recall that $(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R)) = (a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R))$ since in both cases R does not have de facto or de jure authority over any policy.

Using Lemmas C.4-C.7, politician R 's first-period payoff when he intervenes at his preferred

policy is then:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) = & 1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R); 0, 1, 1, R) \\
& + (1 - q) \left(\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{C.15}$$

Comparing (C.13) and (C.15) and using $V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) > V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 1, 0, R)$ as well as $\left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta\right) \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta\right) \lambda > 0$ yields:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R)}{1 - q} \\
& > 2\lambda - \left(H(\eta) - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \right) \left(1 + \lambda - c \right. \\
& \quad \left. + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \\
& > 2\lambda - \left(\frac{3}{2} + 3\psi\eta \right) \psi\eta \left(2 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda \right) \\
& > 2\lambda - \frac{9}{16} \left(2 + \frac{1}{2}\lambda \right)
\end{aligned}$$

The second inequality follows from a similar reasoning as above. The last inequality is obtained using $\psi < 1/4$ and $\eta \leq 1$. This last inequality implies that there exists $\alpha_{\eta \leq \eta^{**}}^1 < 36/55$ such that if $\lambda/B > \alpha_{\eta \leq \eta^{**}}^1$, then $V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) > V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R)$ for all $\eta \in (0, \eta^{**}]$. Putting all the results together, there exists $\hat{\alpha}^1 = \max\{\alpha_{\eta \leq \eta^{**}}^1, \alpha_{\eta \geq \eta^{**}}^1\} < 36/55$ such that when $\lambda > \hat{\alpha}^1$, Politician R never chooses $a_1 = 0$ and $i_1 = -1$ in case 2.

Case 3: $a_2^*(0, -1, 0, R) = 0$ and $i_2^*(0, -1, 0, R) = 1$. Using a similar reasoning as in Lemmas C.4-C.7, it can be checked that R 's reelection probability after unauthorized intervention at L 's preferred policy in period 1 and no successful court challenge is:

$$T(\eta) := \frac{1}{2} + \psi \left(1 + (1 - q) \left(1 + 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \right) \right) \eta$$

Politician R 's expected payoff from unauthorized intervention at -1 is then:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R) = & 1 - (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R); 0, -1, 1, R) \\
& + (1 - q) \left[T(\eta) \left(1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + q \left(\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \right. \right. \\
& + (1 - q) \left(\left(\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \right) \\
& \left. \left. - (1 - T(\eta)) \left(\lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \right] \\
< & 1 - (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R); 0, -1, 1, R) \\
& + (1 - q)T(\eta) \left(1 + \left(\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{C.16}$$

The inequality uses $(1 - q)\lambda < qk$, $T(\eta) \leq 1$ and $q \geq 0$.

We compare this payoff with politician R 's expected payoff from unauthorized intervention at his preferred policy: $V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R)$. Using Lemmas C.4-C.7, recall that $Q(\eta)$ is the probability that R is elected after unauthorized intervention at his preferred policy and no successful court challenge. Since R either intervenes at his preferred policy after no successful court challenge or acquires de jure authority and $(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R)) = (a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R))$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) \geq & 1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R); 0, -1, 1, R) \\
& + (1 - q) \left[Q(\eta) \left(1 + \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) \right) + (1 - Q(\eta)) \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{C.17}$$

Comparing (C.16) and (C.17) and using $Q(\eta) \geq 1/2$ and $T(\eta) \leq 1$ yield:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R)}{1 - q} \\
& > 2\lambda + \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) (1 + 2\lambda) \right) - \left(1 + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) + 4\psi\eta\lambda \right) \\
& = 3(1 - \psi\eta)\lambda - \left(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{3}{2}\psi\eta \right) \\
& \geq \frac{9}{4}\lambda - \frac{9}{8}
\end{aligned}$$

The last inequality follows from $\psi\eta \leq 1/4$. Hence, there exists $\bar{\alpha}^1 < \frac{1}{2}$ such that if $\lambda > \bar{\alpha}^1$, R never intervenes without authorization at L 's preferred policy in this case.

Case 4: $a_2^*(0, -1, 0, R) = 0$ and $i_2^*(0, -1, 0, R) = 0$. Using a similar reasoning as in Lemmas C.4-C.7, it can be checked that R 's reelection probability after unauthorized intervention at L 's preferred policy in period 1 and no successful court challenge is:

$$R(\eta) := \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right)$$

Politician R 's expected payoff from unauthorized intervention at -1 is then:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R) = & 1 - (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R); 0, -1, 1, R) \\
& + (1 - q) \left[R(\eta) \left(1 + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \right. \\
& \left. - (1 - R(\eta)) \left(\lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right) \right] \tag{C.18}
\end{aligned}$$

After unauthorized intervention at 1, politician R 's expected utility satisfies using Lemma C.1:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) \geq & 1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + qP(\eta)V_2^R(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R); 0, 1, 1, R) \\
& + (1 - q) \left(Q(\eta) \left(1 + \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) (1 + \lambda) \right) + (1 - Q(\eta)) \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \lambda \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{C.19}$$

Comparing (C.18) and (C.19) and recalling that equilibrium choices satisfy $(a_2^*(0, 1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, 1, 1, R)) = (a_2^*(0, -1, 1, R), i_2^*(0, -1, 1, R))$, it can be checked that $V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) > V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R)$ whenever $Q(\eta) \geq R(\eta)$. By Lemmas C.4-C.7, it can be checked that this is always the case when $\eta \leq \eta^{2**}$. So we focus on the case when $\eta > \eta^{2**}$. We then obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R)}{1 - q} \\
& \geq \lambda \left(2 + Q(\eta) + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) + (1 - R(\eta)) + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi\eta \right) \right) \\
& \quad + (Q(\eta) - R(\eta)) \left(1 + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) \right)
\end{aligned}$$

Recall that, by Lemma C.4, $Q(\eta) = \frac{1}{2} + \psi \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 3\eta \right) \eta$ for $\eta > \eta^{2**}$. Hence, the difference $R(\eta) - Q(\eta) = \left(\frac{1}{2} - 3\psi\eta \right) \psi\eta$ reaches a maximum at $\psi\eta = 1/12$ so $R(\eta) - Q(\eta) \leq \frac{1}{48}$. In addition given $\psi\eta < 1/4$, $\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta \right) < 3/4$. Combining all these results, we obtain:

$$\frac{V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, -1; 0, 0, 0, R)}{1 - q} > \left(4 - \frac{1}{48} \right) \lambda - \frac{1}{48} \frac{7}{4}$$

Hence there exists $\hat{\alpha}^1 < \frac{7}{764}$ such that if $\lambda > \hat{\alpha}^1$, then politician R never chooses unauthorized intervention at -1 in period 1 in case 4.

To conclude the proof, simply define $\alpha = \max\{\hat{\alpha}^1, \bar{\alpha}^1, \hat{\alpha}^1\} < 36/55$. □

Proof of Proposition 2

Point 1. The result follows directly from Lemma C.9.

Point 2. First, note that politician R 's expected payoff from de jure authority acquisition is:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) &= 1 + \lambda - c + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) V_2^R(0, 1; 1, 1, 0, R) \\
&\quad + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta\right) V_2^R(0, 1; 1, 1, 0, L) \\
&= 1 + \lambda - c + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta\right) \lambda \\
&\quad + \left(2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) - 1\right) \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right)^2 \lambda
\end{aligned} \tag{C.20}$$

Politician R is reelected with probability $(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta)$ at the end of periods 1 and 2. The politician from the opposite party is elected with probability $(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta)$. All politicians implement their preferred policy since they have de jure authority over \mathcal{P} .

We can now compare R 's expected payoffs from authority acquisition and no intervention in period 1 for $\eta \geq \eta^{**}$. Politician R 's reelection probability is given by Lemmas C.4 and C.5. His expected payoff after no intervention is:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R) &= 1 + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right)\eta\right) V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) \\
&= 1 + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right)\eta\right) \left(1 + \lambda - c + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) (1 + \lambda) \right. \\
&\quad \left. - \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2\psi\eta\right) \lambda\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{C.21}$$

When politician R is reelected, he acquires de jure authority in period 2. When politician L is elected, he chooses no intervention since $\eta \geq \eta^{**}$ and no politician intervenes in \mathcal{P} in period 3.

To alleviate notation, denote

$$M(\eta) := \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \eta \right)$$

$$N(\eta) := \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right).$$

Comparing Equation C.20 and Equation C.21 yields:

$$V_1^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R) = N(\eta)^2 - 1 + (2N(\eta) - 1)\lambda$$

$$+ (1 - M(\eta))(1 + \lambda - c + N(\eta) + (2N(\eta) - 1)\lambda) \equiv \Delta_1(\eta)$$

The derivative with respect to η is:

$$\Delta_1'(\eta) = 2N'(\eta)N(\eta) + N'(\eta)(1 - M(\eta)) - M'(\eta)(1 + N(\eta))$$

$$+ \lambda(2N'(\eta) + 2N'(\eta)(1 - M(\eta)) - M'(\eta)(2N(\eta) - 1)) + M'(\eta)(c - \lambda)$$

Given $N(\eta) > M(\eta)$, $N'(\eta) > M'(\eta)$ (since $\psi < 1/4$ and $\eta \leq 1$), and $c > \lambda$, we obtain $\Delta_1'(\eta) > 0$ for all $\eta \geq \eta^{**}$. We now show that $\Delta_1(\eta^{**}) > 0$. To see this, observe that since $\eta^{**} \geq \eta_0^{**}$, we obtain $1 + \lambda - c + N(\eta^{**}) + (2N(\eta^{**}) - 1)\lambda \geq \frac{3}{2}$ (Proposition 1). Hence,

$$\Delta_1(\eta^{**}) \geq N(\eta^{**})^2 - 1 + (2N(\eta^{**}) - 1)\lambda + (1 - M(\eta^{**}))\frac{3}{2}$$

Consider the function $\widehat{\Delta}_1(\eta) := N(\eta)^2 - 1 + (2N(\eta) - 1)\lambda + (1 - M(\eta))\frac{3}{2}$ defined over the interval $[0, 1]$. We obtain: $\widehat{\Delta}_1'(\eta) = 2N(\eta)N'(\eta) - \frac{3}{2}M'(\eta) + 2N'(\eta)\lambda$. Since $M'(\eta) = \psi + \psi^2 8\eta$ and $2N'(\eta)N(\eta) = 2\psi + \psi^2 8\eta$, $\widehat{\Delta}_1'(\eta) > 0$. Since $\widehat{\Delta}_1(0) = 0$ and $\eta^{**} > 0$, $\widehat{\Delta}_1(\eta^{**}) > 0$ and $\Delta_1(\eta^{**}) > 0$. Hence for all $\eta \in [\eta^{**}, 1]$, politician R prefers authority acquisition to no intervention in period 1.

Point 3. First, observe that since the voter prefers no intervention to unauthorized intervention for all $\eta \geq \eta^{2**}$, we can exclusively focus on the case $\eta \in [\eta^{**}, \eta^{2**}]$. Politician R 's

re-election probability is given by Lemma C.5 and his expected payoff from unauthorized intervention at 1 is:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) &= 1 + q \left(-k + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \eta \right) V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) \right) \\
&\quad + (1 - q) \left(\lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta \right) V_2^R(0, 1; 0, 1, 0, R) \right) \\
&= 1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + q \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \eta \right) V_2^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) \\
&\quad + (1 - q) \left[\left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta \right) \left(1 + \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta \right) (1 + \lambda) \right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi \eta \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta \right) \lambda \right] \tag{C.22}
\end{aligned}$$

If there is a successful court challenge, politician R if re-elected acquires de jure authority in period 2. If there is no successful court challenge, the office-holder acquires de facto authority over policy 1. Politician L or $L2$ never intervenes in \mathcal{P} if elected, but R does at policy 1.

To alleviate notation, recall and denote

$$\begin{aligned}
M(\eta) &:= \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \eta \right) \\
R(\eta) &:= \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi \eta \right) \\
N(\eta) &:= \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta \right) \\
\Delta_2(\eta) &:= V_1^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R)
\end{aligned}$$

The derivative of the difference after rearranging is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta_2'(\eta) &= 2N'(\eta)N(\eta) - q2M'(\eta)N(\eta) - (1 - q)2R'(\eta)R(\eta) + N'(\eta) - qM'(\eta) - (1 - q)R'(\eta) \\
&\quad + \lambda \left(2N'(\eta)(2 - 2qM(\eta)) + qM'(\eta) - (1 - q)2R'(\eta) \right) + qM'(\eta)(c - \lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

Since $N(\eta) > M(\eta) > R(\eta)$, $N'(\eta) > M'(\eta) > R'(\eta)$, and $c > \lambda$, $\Delta_2'(\eta) > 0$ for all $\eta \geq \eta^{**}$. We now show that $\Delta_2(\eta^{**}) > 0$ under the assumption. Using again $\eta^{**} \geq \eta_0^{**}$ so

$1 + \lambda - c + N(\eta^{**}) + (2N(\eta^{**}) - 1)\lambda \geq \frac{3}{2}$ (Proposition 1), we obtain:

$$\Delta_2(\eta^{**}) \geq qk - (1-q)\lambda + N(\eta^{**})^2 - 1 + (2N(\eta^{**}) - 1)\lambda + (1-qM(\eta^{**}))\frac{3}{2} - (1-q)R(\eta^{**})(1+R(\eta^{**})+2\lambda)$$

Consider the function $\widehat{\Delta}_2(\eta) := qk - (1-q)\lambda + N(\eta)^2 - 1 + (2N(\eta) - 1)\lambda + (1-qM(\eta))\frac{3}{2} - (1-q)R(\eta)(1+R(\eta)+2\lambda)$ defined over the interval $[0, 1]$. We obtain:

$$\widehat{\Delta}'_2(\eta) = 2N(\eta)N'(\eta) - q\frac{3}{2}M'(\eta) - (1-q)R'(\eta)(1+2R(\eta)) + 2\lambda(N'(\eta) - (1-q)R'(\eta)).$$

Recall from point 2 that $M'(\eta) = \psi + \psi^2 8\eta$ and $2N'(\eta)N(\eta) = 2\psi + \psi^2 8\eta$. Further, $R'(\eta)(1+2R(\eta)) = 2\psi + 2\psi^2 \eta$. Hence, $\widehat{\Delta}'_2(\eta) > 0$. Observe then that $\widehat{\Delta}_2(0) = qk - 2(1-q)\lambda \geq 0$ under the assumption. Since $\eta^{**} > 0$, $\widehat{\Delta}_2(\eta^{**}) > 0$ and $\Delta_2(\eta^{**}) > 0$. Hence, for all $\eta \in [\eta^{**}, 1]$, politician R prefers authority acquisition to unauthorized intervention at 1 in period 1.

C.2 Pro-intervention bias

Proof of Proposition 3

Point 1. In period 2, if the office-holder does not have de jure authority over \mathcal{P} or de facto authority over his preferred policy, he acquires it (whether L or R). Hence, the voter always gets a payoff of $\eta + \epsilon_2^R$ if R is elected and $-\eta$ if L is elected independent of the first-period choice. As politician R 's reelection chances are unaffected by his first-period choice, R chooses the option which maximizes his first-period policy payoff. Under the assumption $c < \lambda < \frac{q}{1-q}k$, he thus acquires de jure authority over \mathcal{P} .

Point 2. In period 2, if the office-holder does not have de jure authority over \mathcal{P} or de facto authority over his preferred policy, he intervenes without authorization at his preferred policy under the assumption. Unlike point 1, politician R 's first-period choice now affects his reelection chances. By the usual reasoning (see the proof of Lemma 1), the probability R is reelected is:

- $G(\eta) = \frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta 2(1 - q)$ after no intervention ($i_1 = 0$) or unauthorized intervention ($a_1 = 0, i_1 \neq 0$) followed by a successful court challenge ($\tau_1 = 1$);
- $T(\eta) = \frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta(2 - q)$ after unauthorized intervention ($i_1 \neq 0$) and no successful court challenge;
- $N(\eta) = \frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta 2$ after de jure authority acquisition ($a_1 = 1$).

Since R 's re-election probability is the same after unauthorized intervention at 1 and -1 , like in the baseline model, politician R never intervenes without authorization at L 's preferred policy. We are thus left with three choices: (i) no intervention, (ii) unauthorized intervention at 1, (iii) authority acquisition.

R 's expected payoff from no intervention is:

$$V_1^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R) = 1 + G(\eta)(1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk) - (1 - G(\eta))(1 - q)\lambda \quad (\text{C.23})$$

as the office-holder intervenes without authorization in period 2 and his intervention is overturned with probability q .

When politician R chooses his preferred policy without prior authorization ($a_1 = 0, i_1 = 1$), his expected utility is:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) &= 1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk + (1 - q) \left[T(\eta)(1 + \lambda) - (1 - T(\eta))(1 - q)\lambda \right] \\ &\quad + q \left[G(\eta)(1 + (1 - q)\lambda - qk) - (1 - G(\eta))(1 - q)\lambda \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C.24})$$

In case of a court challenge (probability q), R suffers a loss k , and is reelected with probability $G(\eta)$ with the office-holder intervening without authorization at his preferred policy. If there is no successful court challenge, politician R gets a payoff λ , is reelected with probability $T(\eta)$ and intervenes in \mathcal{P} in period 2 without the risk of court challenge. L if he wins the election intervenes without authorization at his preferred policy and faces a probability q of successful court challenge.

When politician R acquires de jure authority, his expected payoff is as in the baseline model and reproduces here for convenience:

$$V_1^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) = 1 + \lambda - c + N(\eta)(1 + \lambda) - (1 - N(\eta))\lambda \quad (\text{C.25})$$

We first compare unauthorized intervention and no intervention. We obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, 0; 0, 0, 0, R) = & (1 - (1 - q)G(\eta))((1 - q)\lambda - qk) + (1 - q)T(\eta)\lambda \\ & + (1 - q)(T(\eta) - G(\eta))(1 + \lambda(1 - q)) := \Delta_3(\eta) \end{aligned}$$

$\Delta_3(0) = \frac{1+q}{2}((1 - q)\lambda - qk) + \frac{1-q}{2}\lambda$ and the derivative with respect to η satisfies:

$$\Delta_3'(\eta) \propto (2 - q)\lambda + q(1 + (1 - q)\lambda) - 2(1 - q)((1 - q)\lambda - qk) > 0$$

Hence there exists a unique $\hat{\eta}^* \in [-1, 0)$ such that R prefers unauthorized intervention to no intervention in period 1 for all $\eta \geq \hat{\eta}^*$.

We now compare unauthorized intervention and authority acquisition. We obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1^R(1, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) = & \lambda - c - (1 + qG(\eta))((1 - q)\lambda - qk) \\ & + \left((N(\eta) - (1 - q)T(\eta) - qG(\eta)) + (N(\eta) - (1 - q)T(\eta))\lambda \right. \\ & \left. + (1 - (1 - q)T(\eta) - qG(\eta))(1 - q)\lambda - (1 - N(\eta))\lambda \right) \\ & := \Delta_4(\eta) \end{aligned}$$

$\Delta_4(0) = \lambda - c - \left(1 + \frac{q}{2}\right)((1 - q)\lambda - qk) + \frac{1+q}{2}\lambda - \frac{1+q}{2}\lambda < 0$ and the derivative with respect to η satisfies:

$$\Delta_4'(\eta) \propto 2 - (1 - q)(2 - q) - q2(1 - q) + q^22(1 - q)k + \lambda[4 - (1 - q)(2 - q)^2 - 2q(1 - q)^2] > 0$$

Hence there exists a unique $\hat{\eta}^{**} \in (0, 1]$ such that R prefers authority acquisition to unauthorized intervention at 1 in period 1 for all $\eta \geq \hat{\eta}^{**}$. \square

Proof of Corollary 3

Suppose the cost of a successful court challenge is $k^h > \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda$, the office-holder intervenes at his preferred policy in period 2 only if he has (de facto or de jure) authority over it. Denote $\Delta^h(\eta) := V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V(0, 0; 0, 0, R) = (1-q)\lambda - qk^h + (1-q)(R(\eta)\lambda + \psi\eta)$, with $R(\eta) = (\frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta)$, the difference between unauthorized intervention and no intervention (see proof of Proposition 1).

In turn, when the cost of a successful court challenge is $k^l < \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda$, the office-holder intervenes without authorization at his preferred policy in period 2 if he does not have (de facto or de jure) authority over it. Denote $\Delta^l(\eta) := V_1^R(0, 1; 0, 0, 0, R) - V(0, 0; 0, 0, R) = (1-q)\lambda - qk^l + (1-q)(T(\eta)\lambda + \psi\eta q(1 + (1-q)\lambda) - G(\eta)((1-q)\lambda - qk^l))$, with $T(\eta) = \frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta(2-q)$ and $G(\eta) = \frac{1}{2} + \psi\eta 2(1-q)$, the difference between unauthorized intervention and no intervention (see proof of Proposition 3).

Taking the limits, we obtain: $\lim_{k^h \downarrow \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda} \Delta^h(\eta) = (1-q)(R(\eta)\lambda + \psi\eta)$ and $\lim_{k^l \uparrow \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda} \Delta^l(\eta) = (1-q)(T(\eta)\lambda + \psi\eta q(1 + (1-q)\lambda))$. Notice that $Z(\eta) = R(\eta)\lambda + \psi\eta - (T(\eta)\lambda + \psi\eta q(1 + (1-q)\lambda) - \psi\eta q(1-q)\lambda)$. Hence, for all $\eta < 0$, $\lim_{k^h \downarrow \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda} \Delta^h(\eta) > \lim_{k^l \uparrow \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda} \Delta^l(\eta) = (1-q)(T(\eta)\lambda + \psi\eta q(1 + (1-q)\lambda))$. Slightly abusing notation and explicitly expressing the dependence of the thresholds η^* and $\hat{\eta}^*$ on k , recall that $\eta^*(k^h)$ is the unique solution to $\Delta^h(\eta) = 0$ and $\hat{\eta}^*(k^l)$ the unique solution to $\Delta^l(\eta) = 0$. Since for all $k < \frac{1-q}{q}\frac{3}{2}\lambda$, $\eta^*(k) < 0$, the reasoning above then implies that $\lim_{k^h \downarrow \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda} \eta^*(k^h) < \lim_{k^l \uparrow \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda} \hat{\eta}^*(k^l)$. This directly implies that there exists $\underline{k} < \frac{1-q}{q}\lambda < \bar{k}$ such that $\eta^*(\bar{k}) < \hat{\eta}^*(\underline{k})$. Since by Propositions 1 and 3, politician R always intervenes at his preferred policy (with or without authorization) when the electorate is not too liberal (i.e., $\eta \geq \eta^*$ or $\eta \geq \hat{\eta}^*$), we have proved the claim. \square

C.3 Relinquishing authority

Proof of Proposition 4

By the usual reasoning (see the proof of Proposition 1), politician R 's expected payoffs after relinquishing authority and keeping authority are, respectively:

$$V_1^R(\emptyset, 0; 1, 0, 0, R) = 1 - r + \frac{1}{2} \quad (\text{C.26})$$

$$V_1^R(0, 1; 1, 0, 0, R) = 1 + \lambda + \left(\frac{1}{2} + \psi 2\eta\right) (1 + \lambda) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \psi 2\eta\right) \lambda \quad (\text{C.27})$$

It can easily be checked that $V_1^R(0, 1; 1, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(\emptyset, 0; 1, 0, 0, R)$ is strictly increasing with η and strictly positive for $\eta = 0$. For $\eta = -1$, we obtain:

$$V_1^R(0, 1; 1, 0, 0, R) - V_1^R(\emptyset, 0; 1, 0, 0, R) = r + \lambda(1 - 4\psi) - 2\psi$$

We need to consider two cases: (i) $\psi \leq \frac{r+\lambda}{2+4\lambda} := \psi^0(r)$ and (ii) $\psi > \psi^0(r)$. In the first case, politician R keeps de jure authority over \mathcal{P} and intervenes at his preferred policy in period 1. This proves point (i). In case (ii), given the properties of the differences, there exists a unique threshold $\eta^r \in (-1, 0)$ such that politician R relinquishes authority over \mathcal{P} ($a_1 = \emptyset$) if and only if $\eta \leq \eta^r$. This proves point 2. \square