

Accountability and Inclusion in Customary Institutions

Automated Tables

Table 1: Comparing Village Chiefs to Traditional Advisers and Other Civil Society Leaders

	Village Chiefs (1)	Traditional Advisers (2)	Civil Society Leaders (3)
<i>Panel A. Demographics, Economic Status and Partisanship</i>			
Female VC	0.0859 (0.281)	0.353 (0.485)	0.663 (0.475)
Age (Years)	63.51 (15.66)	47.59 (11.66)	51.73 (14.12)
Finished Primary Education	0.717 (0.452)	0.941 (0.239)	0.853 (0.356)
Cattle wealth (log)	1.049 (0.717)	0.867 (0.717)	0.904 (0.712)
Born Village	0.805 (0.398)	0.559 (0.504)	0.368 (0.485)
ZANU-PF Sign	0.315 (0.466)	0.235 (0.431)	0.137 (0.346)
Same ethnic identity as Village Chief		0.517 (0.509)	0.397 (0.493)
Related to Village Chief		0.618 (0.493)	0.537 (0.501)
<i>Panel B. Knowledge and Opinions</i>			
Court Should Have More Power (0-1)	0.727 (0.447)	0.765 (0.431)	0.473 (0.502)
Support for Individual Rights (1-4)	2.859 (0.402)	2.912 (0.310)	2.975 (0.408)
Knowledge of Law (0-1)	0.661 (0.231)	0.716 (0.199)	0.693 (0.214)

Notes: This table reports means with standard deviations below in parentheses. The means aggregate data from 128 village chiefs, 35 traditional advisers and 95 other civil society leaders in the control villages.

Table 2: Comparing Selected and Eligible Civil Society Leaders

	Selected Leaders (1)	Eligible Leaders (2)	Existing Advisers (3)	Other Adults (4)
Female		0.582	0.344	0.540
Family Member (Patrilineal)		0.287	0.287	0.252

Notes: Column 1 presents proportions from data collected from the 63 CLs who actually attended the training. Column 2 presents proportions from our random sample of 196 CLs eligible to attend the training in these villages. Column 3 presents proportions from our sample of 61 traditional advisers. Column 4 presents proportions from our household survey.

Table C.1: Comparing Self-Reported Traditional Council Members to Other Adults

	Traditional Council Member (1)	Other Adults (2)
Female	0.235 (0.426)	0.531 (0.499)
Age (Years)	52.74 (16.41)	42.04 (17.36)
Finished Primary Education	0.784 (0.413)	0.813 (0.390)
Cattle Wealth	2.007 (2.014)	1.815 (2.739)
Born Village	0.664 (0.474)	0.464 (0.499)
Same Ethnic Identity as Village Chief	0.371 (0.486)	0.333 (0.472)
Related to Village Chief	0.688 (0.466)	0.512 (0.500)
Different Political View from Village Chief	0.219 (0.417)	0.306 (0.461)

Notes: Table reports means with standard deviations below in parentheses. The mean in column 1 aggregates data from 116 traditional court members and the means in column 2 aggregate data from 969 other household members in the control villages.

Table C.2: Dimensions of Bias in Traditional Political Institutions

<i>Panel A.</i>	Different Political View from VC	Same Political View as VC	Difference
Received Food Aid	0.420 (0.024)	0.466 (0.036)	0.046 (0.043)
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.439 (0.023)	0.634 (0.036)	0.196 (0.043)
Took Case to VC's Court if Had Dispute	0.396 (0.025)	0.472 (0.032)	0.076 (0.042)
<i>Panel B.</i>	Not born in village	Born in village	Difference
Received Food Aid	0.360 (0.021)	0.393 (0.020)	0.033 (0.030)
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.595 (0.021)	0.607 (0.021)	0.012 (0.030)
Took Case to VC's Court if Had Dispute	0.431 (0.022)	0.477 (0.022)	0.046 (0.031)
<i>Panel C.</i>	Non-related	Related	Difference
Received Food Aid	0.360 (0.021)	0.385 (0.022)	0.025 (0.030)
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.550 (0.021)	0.643 (0.023)	0.093 (0.031)
Took Case to VC's Court if Had Dispute	0.431 (0.022)	0.470 (0.022)	0.039 (0.031)
<i>Panel D.</i>	Female	Male	Difference
Received Food Aid	0.405 (0.021)	0.346 (0.021)	-0.059 (0.030)
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.602 (0.021)	0.602 (0.021)	0.000 (0.030)
Took Case to VC's Court if Had Dispute	0.441 (0.021)	0.469 (0.023)	0.028 (0.031)

Notes: The first two columns report means with standard errors below in parentheses. The third column reports the differences between column two and column three, with the standard error of the difference reported in parentheses below. Only control villages are included in the calculations.

Table F.1: Balance Statistics

Variable	Workshop (1)	No Workshop (2)	p-value (3)	VC & CL (4)	VC Only (5)	p-value (6)
<i>Panel A. Village Characteristics</i>						
Communal Land	0.706	0.712	0.917	0.691	0.719	0.742
No. HHs	162.647	171.279	0.608	180.750	147.938	0.185
No. Community Groups	4.466	4.081	0.076	4.593	4.355	0.429
<i>Panel B. VH Characteristics</i>						
Female VC	0.050	0.086	0.272	0.055	0.047	0.850
VC Finished Primary Ed.	0.655	0.717	0.304	0.655	0.656	0.985
Age of VC	64.697	63.512	0.557	64.164	65.156	0.735
Tenure of VC	14.768	13.496	0.461	15.545	14.145	0.592
VC Born Village	0.765	0.805	0.446	0.709	0.813	0.188
Cattle Wealth (Log) of VC	1.101	1.049	0.606	1.245	0.977	0.081
VC with ZANU-PF Sign	0.277	0.315	0.520	0.273	0.281	0.918
<i>Panel C. HH survey respondent characteristics</i>						
Female	0.513	0.500	0.074	0.504	0.521	0.129
Finished Primary Education	0.804	0.810	0.720	0.812	0.796	0.509
Age (Years)	42.592	43.188	0.493	41.545	43.580	0.116
Born Village	0.470	0.486	0.494	0.461	0.478	0.603
Wage Labor	0.306	0.302	0.870	0.309	0.304	0.879
Related to Village Chief	0.505	0.530	0.411	0.507	0.504	0.943
Same Ethnic Identity as Village Chief	0.339	0.337	0.947	0.340	0.338	0.945
Cattle Wealth (Log)	0.784	0.741	0.300	0.756	0.811	0.356
Different Political View from Village Chief	0.273	0.297	0.409	0.270	0.275	0.897

Notes: Table reports means in each group. p-values (two-sided) are calculated from OLS regressions of the variable on the treatment of interest, with standard errors clustered by village for household-level data.

Table H.1: Effects on Village Chief's Decision-Making Processes

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.000 (1.000)	0.106 (0.157)	0.581 (0.168)	0.475 (0.194)	247

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table H.2: Effects on Village Chief's Decision-Making Outcomes

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Impartiality Index	0.426 (0.333)	0.013 (0.044)	0.132 (0.049)	0.120 (0.059)	366
Problem Management Index	0.689 (0.317)	0.032 (0.020)	0.033 (0.018)	0.000 (0.022)	2,151
Legitimacy Index	0.000 (1.000)	-0.070 (0.061)	0.048 (0.057)	0.118 (0.067)	2,154

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table H.3: Effects on Decision-Making Outcomes By Issue Area

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Impartiality Index	0.426 (0.333)	0.013 (0.044)	0.132 (0.049)	0.120 (0.059)	366
Received Food Aid	0.420 (0.495)	0.011 (0.065)	0.145 (0.078)	0.134 (0.089)	363
VC Court Decisions Fair	0.439 (0.498)	0.009 (0.071)	0.114 (0.060)	0.105 (0.076)	360
Problem Management Index	0.689 (0.317)	0.032 (0.020)	0.033 (0.018)	0.000 (0.022)	2,151
Food Secure	0.480 (0.500)	0.071 (0.033)	0.047 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.038)	2,136
No Disputes Unresolved	0.947 (0.224)	-0.015 (0.012)	0.017 (0.011)	0.032 (0.014)	1,913

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table H.4: Effects on Village Chief's Decision-Making Outcomes

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. VC Likely to Pick New Civil Society Leader</i>					
VC's Knowledge Index	0.660 (0.235)	-0.009 (0.037)	0.090 (0.041)	0.099 (0.047)	204
VC's Attitudes Index	2.869 (0.398)	-0.035 (0.068)	0.041 (0.075)	0.076 (0.086)	205
Inclusive Decision-making Index	-0.025 (1.015)	0.035 (0.179)	0.690 (0.198)	0.654 (0.228)	205
Impartiality Index	0.443 (0.337)	-0.050 (0.050)	0.166 (0.058)	0.216 (0.066)	277
Legitimacy Index	0.016 (0.996)	-0.074 (0.076)	0.004 (0.072)	0.079 (0.091)	1,635
<i>Panel B. VC Likely to Pick Existing Adviser</i>					
VC's Knowledge Index	0.690 (0.183)	0.011 (0.093)	0.017 (0.082)	0.006 (0.095)	39
VC's Attitudes Index	2.756 (0.427)	0.513 (0.262)	0.331 (0.211)	-0.182 (0.267)	40
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.257 (0.860)	0.587 (0.600)	0.076 (0.483)	-0.511 (0.611)	40
Impartiality Index	0.455 (0.305)	0.167 (0.094)	-0.168 (0.151)	-0.335 (0.178)	47
Legitimacy Index	0.061 (0.976)	-0.260 (0.206)	0.048 (0.242)	0.308 (0.219)	320

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table I.1: Effects on Village Chief's Decision-Making Processes

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.000 (1.000)	0.106 (0.157)	0.581 (0.168)	0.475 (0.194)	247
Proportion of Women on VC's Council	0.262 (0.190)	0.025 (0.028)	0.053 (0.030)	0.028 (0.034)	236
Consultation of Women's Council	0.226 (0.420)	-0.069 (0.066)	0.151 (0.072)	0.220 (0.082)	238
Consultation of Resource Management Committee	0.389 (0.489)	0.169 (0.077)	0.179 (0.082)	0.010 (0.095)	241
Transparency of Records	0.645 (0.480)	-0.102 (0.071)	0.006 (0.076)	0.108 (0.088)	239
Free Access/No Fees	0.336 (0.474)	0.058 (0.075)	0.160 (0.080)	0.102 (0.092)	233

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table I.2: Alternative Measures of Inclusive Decision-Making

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Inclusive Decision-Making Index, CL Survey	0.000 (1.000)	-0.022 (0.156)	0.284 (0.156)	0.306 (0.182)	257
Diversity of Advisers' Index	0.000 (1.000)	0.183 (0.155)	0.563 (0.165)	0.380 (0.191)	247

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table I.3: Effects on Village Chief's Legitimacy

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Legitimacy Index	0.000 (1.000)	-0.070 (0.061)	0.048 (0.057)	0.118 (0.067)	2,154
Trust in VC	3.547 (0.728)	-0.047 (0.042)	0.037 (0.043)	0.085 (0.049)	2,130
Relationship with VC	8.153 (2.127)	-0.288 (0.138)	-0.085 (0.122)	0.202 (0.152)	1,975
Perceptions of VC's Influence	3.186 (0.817)	0.015 (0.046)	0.050 (0.044)	0.034 (0.051)	2,114
Whether Would Take Dispute to VC First	0.726 (0.446)	0.005 (0.029)	0.020 (0.025)	0.015 (0.032)	2,150

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table I.4: Whether Respondents Report Different Political Views
From VC

	Dependent Variable: Different Political View from Village Chief	
	(1)	(2)
Effect of Workshop on VC	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.21 (0.18)
Effect of CL	-0.01 (0.04)	0.18 (0.21)
Female \times VC		0.13 (0.07)
Female \times CL		-0.09 (0.09)
Finished Primary Education \times VC		0.05 (0.10)
Finished Primary Education \times CL		-0.14 (0.12)
Born Village \times VC		-0.02 (0.07)
Born Village \times CL		0.05 (0.09)
Wage Labor \times VC		0.02 (0.08)
Wage Labor \times CL		0.11 (0.09)
Related to Village Chief \times VC		0.04 (0.06)
Related to Village Chief \times CL		-0.03 (0.08)
Same Ethnic Identity as Village Chief \times VC		-0.05 (0.08)
Same Ethnic Identity as Village Chief \times CL		0.01 (0.08)
Age (Years) \times VC		0.00 (0.00)
Age (Years) \times CL		-0.00 (0.00)
Cattle Wealth (Log) \times VC		0.01 (0.05)
Cattle Wealth (Log) \times CL		0.09 (0.06)
Observations	1285	994
P-value from T-test	0.34	0.25

Notes: Coefficients from OLS models. Standard errors in parentheses below.

Table J.1: Village Chief's Likelihood of Selecting An Existing Adviser

	Dependent Variable: Existing Adviser
	(1)
VC's No. Vehicles	3.91 (1.54)
VC's Income from Non-farm Sources	2.66 (1.38)
VC Finished Primary Ed.	-3.83 (1.74)
VC Born in Village	3.06 (1.12)
Constant	-7.61 (2.48)
Observations	55
PCC (0.35 cutoff)	92.73

Notes: Coefficients from logit model. Standard errors in parentheses below.

Table K.1: Effects on Village Chief's Decision-Making Outcomes

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. Top Down Pressure (VH Survey)</i>					
VC's Belief about Independence from Govt Officials	2.448 (0.996)	0.037 (0.149)	0.081 (0.159)	0.044 (0.182)	244
<i>Panel B. Bottom Up Pressure (HH Survey)</i>					
HH Knowledge Index	0.597 (0.228)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)	0.006 (0.016)	2,151
HH Raised Issue with VC	0.419 (0.494)	0.025 (0.025)	0.001 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.030)	2,154
<i>Panel C. Deliberation with Civil Society Leaders (CL Survey)</i>					
CL Knowledge Index	0.693 (0.214)	-0.018 (0.038)	0.064 (0.039)	0.082 (0.044)	196
CL Exchanged Info with CL (log)	0.836 (0.570)	-0.070 (0.102)	0.145 (0.105)	0.215 (0.118)	189

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table K.2: Effects by Village Chief's Initial Capacity

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. VC Less Than Primary Education</i>					
VC's Knowledge Index	0.633 (0.271)	-0.028 (0.075)	0.053 (0.076)	0.081 (0.081)	76
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.132 (1.054)	0.216 (0.362)	-0.160 (0.364)	-0.376 (0.392)	77
Impartiality Index	0.400 (0.339)	0.082 (0.116)	0.162 (0.114)	0.080 (0.147)	87
Legitimacy Index	-0.025 (0.950)	0.000 (0.101)	0.187 (0.118)	0.187 (0.123)	614
<i>Panel B. VC More Than Primary Education</i>					
VC's Knowledge Index	0.675 (0.212)	-0.021 (0.041)	0.061 (0.045)	0.082 (0.051)	168
Inclusive Decision-making Index	-0.040 (0.979)	0.088 (0.197)	0.907 (0.216)	0.820 (0.247)	169
Impartiality Index	0.466 (0.328)	-0.033 (0.058)	0.153 (0.067)	0.186 (0.081)	239
Legitimacy Index	0.040 (1.011)	-0.084 (0.082)	-0.027 (0.088)	0.058 (0.104)	1,348

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table K.3: Effects by Village Chief's Relationship to Chief

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. VC Related to Chief</i>					
VC's Knowledge Index	0.651 (0.237)	-0.042 (0.043)	0.095 (0.046)	0.137 (0.052)	157
Inclusive Decision-making Index	0.010 (0.973)	0.077 (0.187)	0.919 (0.202)	0.842 (0.231)	159
Impartiality Index	0.442 (0.339)	-0.008 (0.050)	0.165 (0.068)	0.173 (0.076)	251
Legitimacy Index	0.013 (1.019)	-0.104 (0.082)	0.086 (0.084)	0.190 (0.096)	1,268
<i>Panel B. VC Not Related to Chief</i>					
VC's Knowledge Index	0.678 (0.221)	0.019 (0.062)	0.045 (0.070)	0.026 (0.083)	87
Inclusive Decision-making Index	-0.018 (1.056)	0.184 (0.324)	-0.048 (0.368)	-0.232 (0.434)	87
Impartiality Index	0.451 (0.312)	0.049 (0.128)	0.026 (0.106)	-0.022 (0.167)	72
Legitimacy Index	0.034 (0.943)	-0.015 (0.105)	-0.000 (0.100)	0.015 (0.125)	695

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table K.4: Effects by HH's Differences in Views from Village Chief

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A. HH Different Views from VC</i>					
Impartiality Index	0.426 (0.333)	0.013 (0.044)	0.132 (0.049)	0.120 (0.059)	366
Legitimacy Index	-0.560 (1.102)	-0.072 (0.134)	0.099 (0.148)	0.170 (0.167)	366
<i>Panel B. HH Same Views as VC</i>					
Impartiality Index	0.541 (0.358)	0.005 (0.033)	0.019 (0.031)	0.015 (0.038)	918
Legitimacy Index	0.189 (0.873)	-0.165 (0.082)	0.102 (0.075)	0.267 (0.089)	919

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table L.2: Effects on All Pre-Specified Outcomes (VC Survey)

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
A. Knowledge Index	0.000 (1.000)	-0.040 (0.147)	0.331 (0.155)	0.371 (0.176)	245
B. Attitudes Index	0.000 (1.000)	-0.036 (0.146)	0.030 (0.154)	0.065 (0.175)	247
N. Legitimacy of VC	0.000 (1.000)	-0.068 (0.153)	-0.263 (0.161)	-0.195 (0.184)	247

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table L.3: Effects on All Pre-Specified Outcomes (HH Survey)

Dependent variable	Control Mean	Effect of Workshop for VC	Effect of Workshop for VC and CL	CL Effect	Observations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
D. Prop. HHs report food aid bias	0.467 (0.636)	0.055 (0.093)	-0.025 (0.095)	-0.080 (0.109)	270
E. Perceive most court decisions fair	0.601 (0.490)	-0.008 (0.031)	0.003 (0.032)	0.011 (0.037)	2,079
F. Received food aid (diff view)	0.420 (0.495)	0.030 (0.068)	0.127 (0.079)	0.097 (0.088)	363
G. Received any assistance (diff view)	0.640 (0.481)	0.052 (0.066)	0.169 (0.057)	0.117 (0.066)	364
H. Received food aid (diff family)	0.360 (0.480)	0.074 (0.048)	0.032 (0.046)	-0.041 (0.055)	1,005
I. Received any assistance (diff family)	0.638 (0.481)	0.083 (0.045)	0.003 (0.043)	-0.080 (0.050)	1,005
M. Legitimacy of VC	0.000 (1.000)	-0.069 (0.065)	0.058 (0.064)	0.127 (0.072)	2,154

Notes: Column (1) presents control group means with standard deviations in parentheses below. The estimate in column (2) is β_1 from equation (1), the estimate in column (3) is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ and the estimate in column (4) is β_2 . Column (5) indicates the N for the model. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients, with standard errors clustered by village for individual-level outcomes.

Table L4: Effects of Wealth on HH Assistance Receipt

	(1)
	J. Received Assistance
Livestock Wealth (Log)	-0.002 (0.021)
Livestock Wealth (Log) X VC	0.042 (0.030)
Livestock Wealth (Log) X VC & CL	-0.018 (0.037)
Livestock Wealth (Log) X CL	-0.060 (0.037)
N	2135

Notes: Table reports (linear combinations) of coefficients and standard errors from OLS regression.