

Online Appendix: *Gender Quotas and Upward Political Mobility in India*

A.II Supplementary Figures and Tables

Table A.1: Assembly Election Years in Different States

State	Election Years
Andhra Pradesh	1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
Arunachal Pradesh	1978, 1980, 1984, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
Assam	1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016
Bihar	1962, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2005, 2010, 2015
Delhi	1972, 1977, 1983, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2015
Goa	1989, 1994, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2012 textbf2017
Gujarat	1962, 1967, 1972, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017
Haryana	1967, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009, 2014
Himachal Pradesh	1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2007, 2012, 2017
Karnataka	1978, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2008, 2013
Kerala	1965, 1967, 1970, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016
Madhya Pradesh	1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013
Maharashtra	1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
Manipur	1967, 1972, 1974, 1980, 1984, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017
Meghalaya	1972, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013
Mizoram	1972, 1978, 1979, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013
Nagaland	1964, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013
Odisha	1967, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2009, 2014
Punjab	1962, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017
Rajasthan	1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013
Sikkim	1979, 1985, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014
Tamil Nadu	1971, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016
Tripura	1967, 1972, 1977, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013
Uttar Pradesh	1962, 1967, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017
West Bengal	1962, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016

Note: Years **highlighted in bold** indicates those elections that happened after reservations were introduced at the local levels


Table A.2: State Elections after the Implementation of Panchayti Raj

State Name	Latest State Assembly Election	Number of Elections after Panchayti Raj
Andhra Pradesh	2014	5
Arunachal Pradesh	2014	3
Assam	2016	3
Bihar	2015	4
Delhi	2015	3
Goa	2017	4
Gujarat	2017	5
Haryana	2014	5
Himachal Pradesh	2017	5
Karnataka [†]	2013	5
Kerala	2016	5
Madhya Pradesh	2013	4
Maharashtra	2014	4
Manipur	2017	5
Odisha	2014	4
Punjab	2017	4
Rajasthan	2013	4
Sikkim	2014	4
Tamil Nadu	2016	4
Tripura	2013	4
Uttar Pradesh	2017	5
West Bengal	2016	5

Source: Constructed by author based on data by [Jensenius and Verniers \(2017\)](#), [Ghani, Kerr and O'Connell \(2014\)](#), and [Iyer et al. \(2012\)](#)


[†] Karnataka had women's reservations before Panchayti Raj. Number in the table does not include the election for the year 1989 as it predates Panchayti Raj.

Figure A.1: Before and after reservations



Note: The graph shows an event-study plot proportion of women in state assemblies before and after the introduction of gender quotas. The regression includes state and time fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the state assembly level. The date of implementation of quota policy varies across states as shown in table 1, therefore the 'time to treatment' on x-axis represents state assemblies before and after the introduction of quotas. The constitutional term for an assembly is five years. However, due to the parliamentary system of governance, assemblies can be dissolved if the ruling party or coalition loses the confidence of the majority of the legislature. The plot includes all state assemblies available in the data.

Figure A.2: Proportion of Women Legislators across Indian States



Note: The figure shows the proportion of female legislators across Indian states. The dotted line indicates the year when reservations were introduced in local bodies.

Table A.3: First election with women's reservation

Year of first election with women's reservation	State(s)
1987	Karnataka
1991	Andhra Pradesh
1993	West Bengal
1994	Madhya Pradesh [‡] , Tripura
1995	Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Kerala, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh
1996	Tamil Nadu
1997	Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Sikkim
1998	Punjab
2000	Goa
2001	Assam, Bihar [†]
2005	Chattisgarh [‡]
2007	Delhi
2010	Jharkhand [†]

Note: Data for the table comes from multiple sources including Ghani, Kerr and O'Connell (2014) and Iyer et al. (2012).

[†] Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar as a separate state in April 2000.

[‡] Chattisgarh was carved out of Madhya Pradesh as a separate state in November 2000.

Table A.4: Year of amendment of state laws to provide 50% reservation for women

Year	State(s)
2006	Bihar
2008	Chattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh
2009	Gujarat, Kerala
2010	Karnataka, Jharkhand
2011	Maharashtra, Odisha Sikkim, Madhya Pradesh
2012	West Bengal, Assam
2016	Tamil Nadu
2017	Punjab

Note: Data collected by Surabhi Kulkarni and Alok Prasanna Kumar from Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, India.

Table A.5: Matching Regressions Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Proportion of women in all state assemblies	
	(1)	(2)
Reservation	0.045*** (0.015)	0.038*** (0.014)
Effective Number of Parties in the Govt.	0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Legislative Ideology	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)
Sex Ratio	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.0005)
Constant	0.060 (0.499)	0.104 (0.486)
Fixed effects: State and Time	Yes	Yes
State Level Controls?	Yes	Yes
Observations	102	102
R ²	0.848	0.801
Adjusted R ²	0.705	0.614
Residual Std. Error (df = 52)	0.015	0.018
F Statistic (df = 49; 52)	5.932***	4.281***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Models 1 and 2 represents the regression results using the “full match” and “sub-class” matching performed using the R package “MatchIt” (Ho et al., 2011).

Table A.6: Baseline Regression Results - Alternative Clustering

	<i>Dependent variable: Proportion of women in state assemblies</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reservation	0.038*** (0.006)	0.012 (0.009)	0.017** (0.008)	0.028** (0.014)
Effective Number of Parties in the Govt.			-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Legislative Ideology			0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)
Sex Ratio			0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0003 (0.0003)
Constant	0.031*** (0.003)			
Fixed effects: State and Time	-	✓	✓	✓
State Level Controls	-	-	-	✓
Observations	306	306	179	111
R ²	0.255	0.625	0.649	0.794
Adjusted R ²	0.253	0.501	0.479	0.537
Residual Std. Error	0.030 (df = 304)	0.025 (df = 229)	0.024 (df = 120)	0.022 (df = 49)
F Statistic	104.095*** (df = 1; 304)	5.025*** (df = 76; 229)	3.817*** (df = 58; 120)	3.094*** (df = 61; 49)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. The reservation dummy is 1 in years with reservation and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table A.7: Effects of differing levels of quotas

<i>Dependent variable: Proportion of women in all state assemblies</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
fiftypercent	0.104*** (0.016)	0.083*** (0.030)	0.040 (0.025)	0.087** (0.042)
Effective Number of Parties in the Govt.			-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Legislative Ideology			0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)
Sex Ratio			0.0001** (0.0001)	-0.0004 (0.0003)
Constant	0.031*** (0.003)			
Fixed effects: State and Time	-	✓	✓	✓
State Level Controls?	-	-	-	✓
Observations	306	306	179	111
R ²	0.271	0.411	0.643	0.792
Adjusted R ²	0.269	0.295	0.471	0.532
Residual Std. Error	0.030 (df = 304)	0.029 (df = 255)	0.024 (df = 120)	0.023 (df = 49)
F Statistic	112.993*** (df = 1; 304)	3.554*** (df = 50; 255)	3.730*** (df = 58; 120)	3.051*** (df = 61; 49)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. The reservation dummy is 0 for years with no reservation, 1/2 in years with 50% reservation reservation and 1/3 in years with 33.3% reservation Standard errors are clustered at the state level.


Table A.8: Baseline Regression Results (sub-sample)

<i>Dependent variable: Proportion of women in state assemblies</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reservation	0.022*** (0.005)	0.029** (0.012)	0.028** (0.013)	0.029*** (0.011)
Effective Number of Parties in the Govt.			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)
Legislative Ideology			0.007 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)
Sex Ratio			-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0003 (0.0003)
Constant	0.044*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.007)	0.084 (0.305)	0.593 (0.466)
Fixed effects: State and Time	-	✓	✓	✓
State Level Controls?	-	-	-	✓
Observations	105	105	105	105
R ²	0.124	0.721	0.728	0.769
Adjusted R ²	0.115	0.491	0.475	0.478
Residual Std. Error	0.030 (df = 103)	0.022 (df = 57)	0.023 (df = 54)	0.023 (df = 46)
F Statistic	14.576*** (df = 1; 103)	3.138*** (df = 47; 57)	2.885*** (df = 50; 54)	2.641*** (df = 58; 46)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the state assembly level.

Figure A.3



Note: The plot displays treatment (reservation) effect over time. Since the years are serialized to enable the use of R package “PanelMatch” (Kim and Wang, 2019). The program “matches each treated observation from a given unit in a particular time period with control observations from other units in the same time period that have a similar treatment and covariate history.” t+1 on x-axis indicates one election cycle after the implementation of reservations and so on. While this plot indicates results using the “mahalanobis” distance matching method, the results are similar across various refinement methods including “ps.match”, “CBPS.match”, “ps.weight”, “CBPS.weight”.

Table A.9: Effects of differing levels of quotas (sub-sample)

<i>Dependent variable: Proportion of women inl state assemblies</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reservation	0.067*** (0.015)	0.110*** (0.028)	0.069 (0.045)	0.094*** (0.036)
Effective Number of Parties in the Govt.			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.002)
Legislative Ideology			0.008 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)
Sex Ratio			-0.00004 (0.0003)	-0.0004 (0.0004)
Constant	0.044*** (0.003)	0.014 (0.010)	0.062 (0.315)	0.696 (0.488)
Fixed effects: State and Time	-	✓	✓	✓
State Level Controls?	-	-	✓	✓
Observations	105	105	105	105
R ²	0.128	0.363	0.720	0.767
Adjusted R ²	0.120	0.162	0.460	0.473
Residual Std. Error	0.030 (df = 103)	0.029 (df = 79)	0.023 (df = 54)	0.023 (df = 46)
F Statistic	15.165*** (df = 1; 103)	1.803** (df = 25; 79)	2.775*** (df = 50; 54)	2.607*** (df = 58; 46)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. The reservation dummy is 0 for years with no reservation, 1/2 in years with 50% reservation reservation and 1/3 in years with 33.3% reservation Standard errors are clustered at the state assembly level.

Table A.10: Results - Excluding All Early and Late Adopters

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Proportion of women in all state assemblies			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Reservation	0.041*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.022*** (0.007)	0.055*** (0.016)
Effective Number of Parties in the Govt.			-0.001 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)
Legislative Ideology			-0.004 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
Sex Ratio			0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0004)
Constant	0.029*** (0.002)	0.014** (0.006)	-0.104** (0.046)	-0.074 (0.475)
Fixed effects: State and Time	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Level Controls?	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	250	250	150	86
R ²	0.282	0.659	0.650	0.816
Adjusted R ²	0.279	0.528	0.457	0.478
Residual Std. Error	0.029 (df = 248)	0.024 (df = 180)	0.024 (df = 96)	0.023 (df = 30)
F Statistic	97.451*** (df = 1; 248)	5.033*** (df = 69; 180)	3.366*** (df = 53; 96)	2.417*** (df = 55; 30)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. The reservation dummy is 1 in years with reservation and 0 otherwise. Table exclude early adopters states like Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, and late adopter states like Assam, Bihar, and Delhi. Northeastern states of Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland are also excluded as these states do not have reservations. Standard errors are clustered at the state assembly level.

Table A.11: Excluding states - Baseline Regression Results

	<i>Dependent variable: Proportion of women in state assemblies</i>					
	Excluding Assam	Excluding Karnataka	Excluding Andhra Pradesh	Excluding Bihar	Exclude Delhi	Excluding NE States [†]
Reservation	0.038*** (0.014)	0.030** (0.014)	0.032** (0.014)	0.027* (0.015)	0.028** (0.012)	0.028** (0.012)
Fixed effects: State and Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Level Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	101	98	98	100	105	101
R ²	0.739	0.741	0.753	0.738	0.728	0.714
Adjusted R ²	0.488	0.477	0.502	0.481	0.475	0.449
Residual Std. Error	0.023 (df = 51)	0.023 (df = 48)	0.022 (df = 48)	0.023 (df = 50)	0.023 (df = 54)	0.023 (df = 52)
F Statistic	2.942*** (df = 49; 51)	2.802*** (df = 49; 48)	2.993*** (df = 49; 48)	2.874*** (df = 49; 50)	2.885*** (df = 50; 54)	2.699*** (df = 48; 52)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses

[†] Northeastern states of Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland are excluded as these states do not have reservations. Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. The reservation dummy is 1 in years with reservation and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table A.12: Excluding states(the 0, 1/3, 1/2 dummy)

	Dependent variable: Proportion of women in all state assemblies					
	Excluding Assam	Excluding Karnataka	Excluding Andhra Pradesh	Excluding Bihar	Excluding Delhi	Excluding NE States [†]
Reservation	0.103** (0.048)	0.091** (0.041)	0.072* (0.040)	0.065* (0.036)	0.069* (0.040)	0.070* (0.040)
Fixed effects: State and Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Level Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	101	98	98	100	105	101
R ²	0.729	0.741	0.741	0.728	0.720	0.705
Adjusted R ²	0.468	0.477	0.477	0.473	0.460	0.433
Residual Std. Error	0.023 (df = 51)	0.023 (df = 48)	0.023 (df = 48)	0.023 (df = 51)	0.023 (df = 54)	0.023 (df = 52)
F Statistic	2.793*** (df = 49; 51)	2.802*** (df = 49; 48)	2.802*** (df = 49; 48)	2.849*** (df = 48; 51)	2.775*** (df = 50; 54)	2.588*** (df = 48; 52)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses

[†] Northeastern states of Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland are excluded as these states do not have reservations.

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. The reservation dummy is 0 for years with no reservation, 1/2 in years with 50% reservation reservation and 1/3 in years with 33.3% reservation Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table A.13: Summary of Balance for Matched Data - Full Match

Variable	Treated Mean	Control Mean	Std. Mean Diff.	Var. Ratio	eCDF Mean	eCDF Max
distance	0.8840	0.7872	0.4787	0.4304	0.1658	0.7778
nSeats	2.7765	1.9677	0.5574	1.1519	0.3105	0.7109
legIdeology	2.5484	2.9732	-0.4710	2.4913	0.3352	0.6574
i_sexratio	931.8852	969.6470	-0.6010	1.3209	0.3087	0.7298
i_urban	0.2369	0.3324	-0.9514	1.0691	0.3231	0.7204
i_flit	59.4644	56.8643	0.2010	1.6043	0.1713	0.5274
imr	53.4759	53.8793	-0.0202	1.7493	0.1673	0.4426
lnsdp	10.1372	9.9872	0.3245	3.1091	0.2048	0.5294
ph3_sh	1.3796	1.6062	-0.1960	1.7019	0.3037	0.7177
otrev_pop	2134.5143	1371.9329	0.4750	6.4363	0.1551	0.5185
ontrev_pop	1599.5310	225.2055	0.3471	75.3970	0.2901	0.7679
lnSocExp3	8.4720	8.4277	0.0419	3.3382	0.1908	0.5278

Table displays summary of balance after matching on the propensity score based using the R package “MatchIt” (Hothorn et al., 2011). The results above display the summary of balance for “Full” match. The following methods that the package allows for matching were performed for robustness. One, Exact Matching and Coarsened Exact Matching that yielded no matches. Two, Nearest neighbor match performed poorly with 21 treated units not matched at all. Three, “Optimal” method yielded no matches. Four, “Genetic” matching performed poorly with 21 treated units not matched at all. Five, Full Matching and Sub-classification performed relatively better and regression results using the the data matched on these two methods is displayed in table A.5

Table A.14: Summary of Balance for Matched Data - Subclass Match

	Treated means	Control mean	Std. Mean Diff.	Var. Ratio	eDF Mean	eDF Max
distance	0.8840	0.5529	1.6361	0.5973	0.2657	0.7778
nSeats	2.7765	2.6794	0.0670	1.9155	0.0747	0.2102
Legislative Ideology	2.5484	2.4500	0.1091	2.5005	0.0619	0.1843
Se Ratio	931.8852	923.4345	0.1345	2.4133	0.0928	0.2558
Urban Population	0.2369	0.2499	-0.1295	0.9322	0.0704	0.2046
Female Literact Rate	59.4644	54.0205	0.4208	1.5853	0.1253	0.5138
Infant Mortality Rate	53.4759	60.0791	-0.3300	1.2893	0.0957	0.3510
State GDP	10.1372	9.9609	0.3812	1.8995	0.0830	0.3665
Public Health Expenditure	1.3796	1.5636	-0.1592	1.7245	0.1428	0.3686
State Tax Revenue	2134.5143	1207.5285	0.5774	5.8616	0.1257	0.4259
State Non-Tax Revenue	1599.5310	477.4846	0.2834	90.8670	0.0998	0.3101
Social Sector Expenditure	8.4720	8.0508	0.3977	2.2609	0.1290	0.3889

Table displays summary of balance after matching on the propensity score based using the R package “MatchIt” (Ho et al., 2011). The results above display the summary of balance for “subclass” match. The following methods that the package allows for matching were performed for robustness. One, Exact Matching and Coarsened Exact Matching that yielded no matches. Two, Nearest neighbor match performed poorly with 21 treated units not matched at all. Three, “Optimal” method yielded no matches. Four, “Genetic” matching performed poorly with 21 treated units not matched at all. Five, Full Matching and Sub-classification performed relatively better and regression results using the the data matched on these two methods are displayed in table A.5

Table A.15: Total No. of Local Government institutions and Representatives

State	Total Gram Panchayats	Total No. of Elected Representatives	Total Women Representatives	% Women
Andhra_Pradesh	13,111	156,050	78,025	50%
Arunachal_Pradesh	5,205	9,383	3,658	39%
Assam	3,609	26,820	13,410	50%
Bihar	9,872	127,391	57,887	45%
Chhattisgarh	10,997	170,285	93,287	55%
Goa	377	1,564	516	33%
Gujarat	13,658	144,016	71,988	50%
Haryana	6,657	70,035	29,499	42%
Himachal_Pradesh	3,212	28,723	14,398	50%
Jammu_&_Kashmir	5,349	33,847	11,169	33%
Jharkhand	4,628	60,782	30,757	51%
Karnataka	6,164	104,967	50,892	48%
Kerala	1,188	18,372	9,630	52%
Madhya_Pradesh	24,246	392,981	196,490	50%
Maharashtra	28,801	240,122	121,490	51%
Manipur	2,535	1,723	868	50%
Odisha	7,394	107,487	53,551	50%
Punjab	12,217	97,180	32,393	33%
Rajasthan	12,235	124,854	70,527	56%
Sikkim	430	1,096	548	50%
Tamil_Nadu	12,627	117,599	39,975	34%
Tripura	1,622	6,646	3,006	45%
Uttar_Pradesh	75,212	826,458	272,733	33%
Uttarakhand	15,400	64,606	35,957	56%
West_Bengal	3,362	59,402	30,157	51%

The data for this table comes from the 2019 handbook of “Basic Statistics of Panchayati Raj Institutions” published by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India (pp 13, 18-20).

Table A.16: Candidate Political Experience: State-wise

State	Total Female Legislators in the State	Local Winners	Purely Local Experience	Purely Dynastic Experience
Andhra Pradesh	123	24	22	28
Assam	36	0	0	18
Bihar	90	2	1	22
Gujarat	63	19	14	9
Haryana	45	0	0	5
Karnataka	38	3	3	5
Kerala	43	15	13	3
Madhya Pradesh	100	6	6	18
Maharashtra	55	10	6	20
Odisha	42	2	2	15
Punjab	42	0	0	17
Rajasthan	82	7	6	24
Tamil nadu	94	10	6	2
Uttar Pradesh	104	8	6	14
West Bengal	160	22	13	9
Grand Total	1117	128	98	209

Table displays state-wise descriptive statistics for the count of female winners at the local level with purely local experience and purely dynastic experience after the introduction of quota policies. The table shows count of candidates whose local experience and dynastic ties could be credibly traced via disparate sources.

Purely Local Winners are those who won local elections but without documented family ties to politics.

Purely Dynastic Winners are those who with family ties to politics but without documented local government experience.

Table A.17: Party Structure and Upward Mobility: Seat Share > 50%

Panel A			
	Proportion of female legislators with local experience		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged CPI and CPI(M) seat share >50%	0.273*** (0.093)		
Lagged BJP Seat Share > 50%		-0.036 (0.091)	
Lagged INC Seat Share >50%			0.008 (0.061)
proportion of Female egislators	0.193 (0.838)	-0.417 (0.935)	-0.471 (0.936)
Constant	-0.012 (0.149)	0.042 (0.170)	0.048 (0.170)
Fixed effects: State and Time	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Level Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	68	68	68
R ²	0.811	0.751	0.750

Panel B			
	Proportion of purely dynastic female legislators		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged CPI and CPI(M) seat share >50%	0.029 (0.099)		
Lagged BJP Seat Share > 50%		0.059 (0.083)	
Lagged INC Seat Share >50%			0.029 (0.056)
proportion of Female egislators	-0.222 (0.888)	-0.362 (0.855)	-0.335 (0.858)
Constant	-0.080 (0.158)	-0.063 (0.156)	-0.075 (0.156)
Fixed effects: State and Time	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Level Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	68	68	68
R ²	0.861	0.863	0.862

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Panel A: Table shows linear models with proportion of female legislators with local experience and no dynastic ties among the women in state assemblies. Independent variables are dummies that equal to 1 when lagged seat share is greater than 50%.

Panel B: Table shows linear models with proportion of female legislators with dynastic ties and no local experience among the women in state assemblies. Independent variables are dummies that equal to 1 when lagged seat share is greater than 50%

Table A.18: Exposure in Years

Exposure in years	No. of Observations
0 years	236
1-5 years	21
6-10 years	22
11-15 years	18
16-20 years	9
> 20 years	2
Total	308

Note: Author calculations based on data sources described in section III

Table A.19: Lead Treatment Regression

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Proportion of women in all state assemblies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Reservation (lead)	0.005 (0.010)				
Reservation (lead2)		-0.006 (0.009)			
Reservation (lead3)			-0.004 (0.013)		
Reservation (lead4)				-0.017 (0.020)	
Reservation (lead5)					-0.022 (0.018)
Reservation	0.027* (0.015)	0.027* (0.014)	0.027* (0.014)	0.024 (0.016)	0.025* (0.014)
Fixed effects: State and Time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Level Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	111	111	111	111	111
R ²	0.794	0.795	0.794	0.795	0.795
Adjusted R ²	0.529	0.530	0.528	0.529	0.531
Residual Std. Error (df = 48)	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
F Statistic (df = 62; 48)	2.991***	2.997***	2.985***	2.996***	3.005***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. In Model (1) the reservation dummy is 1 one electoral cycle prior to the reservation and 0 otherwise. In Model (2) the reservation dummy is 1 years two electoral cycles prior to the reservation and 0 otherwise, and so on till column 5 where the reservation dummy is 1 5 electoral cycles prior to the reservation. Standard errors are clustered at the state assembly level.

Table A.20: Regression Results With State Specific Time Trends

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Proportion of women in all state assemblies		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reservation	0.038*** (0.005)	0.055*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.006)
Constant	0.011*** (0.002)	0.045*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)
State Fixed Effects	✓	×	×
Time Fixed Effects	×	✓	×
State-specific Time Trends	×	×	✓
Observations	243	243	243
R ²	0.521	0.515	0.530
Adjusted R ²	0.476	0.396	0.483
Residual Std. Error	0.025 (df = 221)	0.027 (df = 194)	0.025 (df = 220)
F Statistic	11.461*** (df = 21; 221)	4.300*** (df = 48; 194)	11.287*** (df = 22; 220)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. All models include state-specific time trends, and Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table A.21: Regression Results with State Specific Time Trends (sub-sample)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Proportion of women in all state assemblies		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reservation	0.018*** (0.003)	0.036** (0.017)	0.029** (0.014)
Constant	0.011* (0.006)	-0.010 (0.016)	3.518*** (1.100)
Fixed effects: State and Time	No	Yes	Yes
State Level Controls?	No	No	Yes
State Specific Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	105	105	105
R ²	0.605	0.857	0.902
Adjusted R ²	0.487	0.562	0.558
Residual Std. Error	0.023 (df = 80)	0.021 (df = 34)	0.021 (df = 23)
F Statistic	5.115*** (df = 24; 80)	2.907*** (df = 70; 34)	2.619*** (df = 81; 23)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Table shows linear models with proportion of women in state assembly as the dependent variable. All models include state-specific time trends, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.