Online Appendix for

"Disfavor or Favor? Assessing the Valence of White Americans' Racial Attitudes"

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A   Racial Resentment Scale

The Racial Resentment Scale (RRS) is a composite measure based on the question asking whether study participants agree or disagree with each of the following four statements.

- "Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors."
- "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
- "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve."
- "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class."

The 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project added the following additional statements to measure the RRS:

- "Even today, government officials usually pay more attention to a complaint from a white person than from a black person."
- "Blacks face real problems, but the way to solve these problems is to stop complaining and get back to work."

In our survey, we asked the six-item form of the RRS. The order of these items was randomized. The four-item form of the RRS is a standard inclusion on the ANES. For thoroughness, however, we added two additional questions that were part of the RRS as it appeared in the 2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project. Below, we analyze the four-item version of the scale, but our results are nearly identical if we substitute the six-item version (the correlation between these two versions is 0.98).

We also note that while the RRS distribution in our sample (as shown in the main text figures) may differ from those in other samples, this by itself cannot distort results. For example, although we may have fewer high RRS individuals than among the general population, if the remaining high RRS individuals in the sample have similar (dis)favoring

behavior as high RRS who are not in the sample—and there's no good reason to believe this does not hold—then our results would not change had we achieved a perfectly representative sample.

B   RRS Interpretations

As discussed in the main text, we collected 19 political science publications that use some form of the Racial Resentment Scale (RRS). Two criteria guided our collection process: 1) recency (restricting our search to papers published in 2010 and onwards to capture contemporary usage) and 2) prominence (recording papers published in *APSR*, *AJPS*, or *JOP*, which capture the most important contributions that involve the RRS and also likely reflect patterns in lower-tiered journals). The 19 papers used the RRS in various ways—as a moderator, a primary independent variable of interest, an outcome, or a control. We organize these papers and relevant information in Table B.1 below.

Table B.1: RRS usage in top 3 journals since 2010

Study	Journal	Usage	Type	Distinguish Ability?
Gerber et al. (2010)	APSR	"Another widely studied attitude is Racial Resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), which measures negative feelings of whites toward blacks" (123).	one-sided disfavor	no
Mo and Conn (2018)	APSR	"Accompanying decreased blaming of poor communities, TFA participants are less likely to blame minority groups. We find that TFA participation results in a decrease of 12.6 percentage points ($p < 0.001$) in our racial resentment index" (734).	one-sided disfavor	no

DeSante (2013)	AJPS	"To that end, this research provides compelling evidence that racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996) captures more racial animus than "principled conservatism" by showing that whites hold different standards for whites and blacks regarding hard work" (343).	one-sided disfavor	yes
Tesler (2012)	AJPS	1. "Much like its closely related predecessor, symbolic racism, racial resentment presumably taps into subtle hostility toward African Americans with four questions..." 2. "...racialization can be brought about not only by racially conservative opposition to policies and candidates, but by racially liberal support as well... These two sides of racialization are particularly noticeable..."	mixed	yes
Banks and Valentino (2012)	AJPS	"A collection of "new racism" theories—including symbolic racism (Sears and Kinder 1971), racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and modern racism (McConahay and Hough 1976; referred to hereafter as SR)—acknowledges that whites' "old-fashioned racism" (OFR) has genuinely receded over time in both prevalence and influence. In its place, a new racial belief system has emerged, rooted in an organic synthesis of antiblack affect and the sense that blacks violate cherished American values such as individualism (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2003)" (286).	one-sided disfavor	no
Kam and Kinder (2012)	AJPS	"Racial resentment presumes the existence of differences between whites and blacks in achievement and status and explains those differences as due to deficiencies in black culture. Racial resentment is especially concerned with black Americans' individualistic shortcomings" (333).	one-sided disfavor	no
Mazumder (2018)	AJPS	"First, I measure a respondent's level of racial resentment—a concept that captures whites' prejudice against African Americans" (5).	one-sided disfavor	no

Banks and Hicks (2019)	AJPS	"Our primary measure to capture whites' racial attitudes is Kinder and Sanders' (1996) four-item racial resentment battery. We take the average of each participant's responses to the four items to create a single scale, where 0 equals the most racially liberal response to all four items and 1 equals the most racially resentful response to all of the questions" (6).	ambiguous	no
Stephens-Dougan (2016)	JOP	"...the influence of antiblack attitudes on whites' opinions grew" (687). "...significantly driven by antiblack attitudes" (687). "...receptive to those whites who hold antiblack attitudes and affect" (688). "...antiblack attitudes are a stronger predictor of candidate choice..." (689).	one-sided disfavor	yes
Tesler (2013)	JOP	"These theories, which are variously described as symbolic racism, modern racism, and racial resentment, suggest that a new form of racial animus best explains the influence of antiblack sentiments in contemporary American politics" (114).	one-sided disfavor	no
Kam and Burge (2018)	JOP	1. "The scale rests upon three pillars: (1) anti-black affect; (2) a belief that African Americans have failed to conform to the Protestant work ethic; and (3) a denial of continuing discrimination against African Americans." 2. "The least racially resentful black and white respondents interpret differences across blacks and whites less by pointing to the character of black Americans and more by identifying structural features of discrimination that undercut the promise of individualism."	mixed	no
DeSante and Smith (2020)	JOP	"The first hypothesis concerns whether changes in aggregate levels of racial resentment can be attributed to less racially prejudiced Whites entering the population. We predict that young Whites will report lower levels of racial animus..." "Across all of the analyses we use the four-question racial resentment battery and, as we did before, scale it to run from 0 (least racially resentful) to 1 (most racially resentful) as our main independent variable."	one-sided disfavor	no

Chudy, Piston, and Shipper (2019)	JOP	"Especially in recent years, these scholars have argued that the racial resentment scale represents not only negative components of white racial attitudes but also positive components" (969).	two-sided	yes
Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016)	JOP	"Kinder and Sears (1981, 416) write that racial resentment (or symbolic racism) "represents a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline"" (625).	one-sided disfavor	no
Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek (2018)	JOP	"...the influence of racial animus for those in the implicit cue condition will be significantly larger than in the explicit race condition" (761). "Furthermore, as these negative attitudes toward racial out-groups [referring to measures like racial resentment] become increasingly tightly tied to parties, polarization increases, and gridlock and a lack of legislative compromise ensue" (769).	one-sided disfavor	no
Velez and Lavine (2017)	JOP	"Racial resentment is measured using a four-item version of the racial resentment scale... All variables are recoded such that larger values indicate greater intolerance."	one-sided disfavor	no
Lupton and McKee (2020)	JOP	"We do the same for racial resentment because whites' anti-black affect and belief that blacks as a social group violate American norms of hard work and individualism unquestionably contributed to the SRR [southern Republican realignment]."	one-sided disfavor	no
Kam and Estes (2016)	JOP	"Racial resentment, as a proxy for individual-level anger (toward blacks; Banks and Valentino 2012)" (489).	one-sided disfavor	no
Piston et al. (2018)	JOP	"All the following results are robust to using a standard racial resentment scale (e.g., Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012) in place of the stereotype index as the measure of prejudice."	one-sided disfavor	no

Our principal interest is how past work conceptualizes the RRS. As illustrated in Fig-

ure 1, scholars might interpret a measure of outgroup prejudice like the RRS as one-sided disfavoring, as one-sided favoring, or as two-sided. We indicate where the 19 RRS papers fall on this dimension in the "Type" column in Table B.1. The "Usage" column provides an illustrative quote or two from the paper that informs our coding decision. Fifteen of the 19 papers receive "one-sided disfavor" coding. Examples include references to the RRS as a measure of negative anti-Black affect; blame towards minority groups; racial animus; prejudice against Blacks; intolerance; and anger towards Blacks. Papers must exclusively refer to the RRS in one-sided disfavoring terms (whether when first introducing the measure or when interpreting results that involve it) in order to receive this coding.

In four of the 19 papers, RRS usage does not fit this "one-sided disfavor" description. One paper labeled the low end of the RRS "racially liberal" and the high end "racially conservative" (Banks and Hicks 2019). Because (dis)favoritism behavior is unclear here (e.g. "racially liberal" could mean favoritism or just indifference), we categorize the paper's RRS interpretation as "ambiguous." Another paper explicitly mentions that the RRS could represent both negative and positive components of white racial attitudes, and thus we categorize its usage as "two-sided" (Chudy, Piston, and Shipper 2019). The last two in this group (Kam and Burge 2018; Tesler 2012) refer to the RRS—at different points in their papers—as both one-sided disfavoring and in two-sided terms (e.g. mentioning sympathetic viewpoints at the lower end of the scale). Given the presence of both interpretations, we classify these papers as "mixed."

Although past work almost unanimously conceptualizes the RRS as measuring one-sided disfavoring, the ability to distinguish favoritism on the RRS was not necessarily out of reach. In a column labelled "Distinguish Ability?" in Table B.1, we indicate whether or not a paper *could* have distinguished between favoring and disfavoring on the RRS based on its study design. Namely, we look for studies that involve 1) a randomized race target treatment, 2) an interaction of that treatment with the RRS, and 3) an outcome centering on judgments about that racial target. Although we cannot capture the magnitude of each component on the

RRS here (like in our main study), this combination can detect the presence of *any* favoring behavior along the scale. We find that four of the 19 papers had the ability to distinguish between positive and negative dimensions in this way.[1] However, although many of these papers focus on the interaction term, they might not discuss whether it arises because of one-sided (dis)favoring or two-sided considerations. The "Type" column codings indicate as much. Moreover, 3 of the 4 papers fail to examine their data in a way that would allow for distinguishing between the different (dis)favoring patterns possibly at play.

C   Pre-Analysis Plan

The Meaning and Measurement of Racial Attitudes in Political and Nonpolitical Contexts

— Pre-Analysis Plan —

Background

An immense literature in the study of American public opinion establishes racial attitudes as indispensable for understanding political behavior. Most people think of themselves as belonging to one racial group and not others. They readily perceive racial groups to have linked (and often conflicting) interests in political contexts. Feelings about specific racial

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[1]Another paper in Table B.1 (Piston et al. 2018) fulfills these criteria. We exclude it for a few reasons: 1) the RRS is used in secondary analysis that only appears in the appendix, 2) replication data does not include the RRS, and 3) the study's experiment appears to be the same one used in another study (Chudy, Piston, and Shipper 2019), the replication data of which we are already reanalyzing.

groups thus become a common way for citizens to simplify and organize their thinking about current events. The influence of racial attitudes reaches into citizens' sense of party loyalty; opinions about specific issues; enthusiasm for specific candidates; and more (Hutchings and Valentino 2004, for a review).

Although measuring racial attitudes is core to the study of public opinion, the task has always been difficult. Scholars have developed an array of survey-based approaches that vary widely in terms of their theoretical motivations and operational details (Kinder 2013). Despite this effort, the proper interpretation of the various measures remains an area of scholarly focus and debate (Carney and Enos 2018; Kam and Burge 2018; Peyton and Huber 2019). This scrutiny is proper, since the significance of race as an animating force in American politics appears only to have increased with time (Tesler 2016; Wood 2017).

Here, we describe a two-wave survey investigation that will address several unresolved questions about the meaning of popular racial attitude measures. Key to the investigation is use of a conjoint experiment to identify how judgments deviate (or fail to deviate) from the baseline of race neutrality, and how this varies along different racial attitude measures like the racial resentment battery. We begin by discussing the specifics of the study. Then, we describe how the evidence it will generate relates to specific research questions.

Proposed Study

We plan a two-wave survey instrument to be conducted on a national sample ($N = 1,800$ in Wave 1) of Americans, recruited to be comparable to U.S. Census statistics for gender and age. Because we are primarily interested in white Americans' attitudes toward racial minorities, we include only white participants. Wave 1 includes standard measurement of four racial attitudes:

- Racial resentment (four questions standardly included on the American National Election Studies since 1986, plus two that appeared on the 2008 Cooperative Campaign

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Analysis Project).

- Racial stereotypes: Eight items measuring stereotypes of Blacks and whites. The four items measured for each group are "determined to succeed," "intelligent at school," "complaining," and "lazy." These items are a shortened version of the stereotype battery that appeared on the 2008 ANES Panel Study.

- Intensity of racial identity: four questions aimed to measure the extent to which one is proud of one's own race and perceives linked fate and commonality with other people of the same race (e.g., Sears and Savalei 2006).

- A three-question measure of white collective guilt developed by Chudy, Piston, and Shipper (2019).

In addition, Wave 1 measures several standard questions on demographics and political identities, including gender, education, race/ethnicity, age, partisanship, and ideology. This wave also includes an attention check question and a manipulation check concerning how much influence various occupations have over political outcomes (its relevance becomes clearer in light of the Wave 2 conjoint design and RQ3 below).

Wave 2, which will be administered approximately three weeks after Wave 1, begins with two conjoint experiments, to be administered in a randomized order. Both experiments ask respondents to evaluate ten pairs of hypothetical applicants for a position in the respondent's state. One experiment focuses on a "biology professor at a state university." The other experiment focuses on a "city manager." For each pair of profiles, we ask, "Which candidate do you think should advance to the next round of consideration for the position of [biology professor at a state university / city manager]? Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you would be most likely to choose."

Both conjoint experiments present the same attributes and attribute levels:

1. Race/ethnicity

   - White

- Black

- Hispanic

- Asian

2. Gender

   - Man

   - Woman

3. Age

   - 40

   - 52

   - 61

4. Graduate degree is from

   - University of Michigan

   - Florida State University

   - Kennesaw State University

   - Capella University

5. Prior years of relevant experience

   - 5

   - 10

   - 15

6. Strength of references

   - Moderate

   - Strong

   - Very Strong

7. Communication skills

   - Moderate

- Strong

- Very Strong

8. Quality of writing sample

    - Moderate

    - Strong

    - Very Strong

Each profile is a random combination of levels across these attributes. There are no cross-attribute constraints. The order of attributes is randomized across respondents, while the order is fixed for each respondent to avoid cognitive burden. The order of the two sets of ten conjoint tasks is also randomized (i.e., whether the biology professor or city manager set appears first).

After completing a total of twenty conjoint tasks, respondents answer racial resentment battery questions again, and then are debriefed.

Research Questions

The primary purpose of this study is to assess properties of racial attitude measures. Here, we note six research questions this study will be poised to answer and how the data gathered will speak to them.

RQ 1 *What does "high" or "low" racial resentment mean? In particular, to what extent are the high and low ends of the scale associated with discrimination for or against Blacks and other minorities?*

The racial resentment measure is interpreted in two distinct ways. In one interpretation – perhaps the more prevalent one – the scale is unipolar: high values represent the presence of racist feelings toward Black, and low values represent their absence. For instance, Wilson and Brewer (2013) characterize the measure as "an explicit feeling or sentiment of

animosity toward African Americans" (966). Under this interpretation, one might expect individuals high in racial resentment to discriminate against Blacks, but individuals low in racial resentment to exhibit race neutrality (or "colorblindness").

An alternative interpretation that has started to gain some notice is that racial resentment is bipolar, with high values representing anti-Black sentiment, low values representing pro-Black sentiment, and a point somewhere in between representing neutrality (Tesler 2016, 18, for a brief mention). In this interpretation, one would expect high-resentment individuals to discriminate against Blacks, but one might also expect low-resentment individuals to discriminate in favor of Blacks.

Although some might consider the distinction between unipolar and bipolar measures pedantic, it has important consequences for characterizing large proportions of the American electorate as being racist, versus not. For example, while a unipolar interpretation would mean anyone above zero on the racial resentment measure is prejudiced, race neutrality shifts to somewhere in the middle of the scale if the measure is interpreted as bipolar.

An obstacle to characterizing what parts of the racial resentment scale signify a penalty against Blacks, versus favoritism for Blacks, is that most research designs lack a principled racially neutral benchmark for comparison. For instance, Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012) show that racial resentment predicts voting for John McCain, rather than Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election. But what proportion of Americans would have voted for Barack Obama in the absence of racial motivations? Because Obama and McCain differed in ways other than their race, it is all but impossible to say. Similar critiques are applicable to research that examines correlations between racial resentment and polices that benefit African Americans (e.g., Karl and Ryan 2016): what proportion of Americans "should" support the death penalty, and is death penalty opinion influenced more by racially hostile Americans supporting it, or racially sympathetic Americans opposing it?

A conjoint experiment provides leverage on these questions because racially neutral behavior is well-defined: participants are behaving in a racially neutral manner if they are

uninfluenced by the racial characteristics of hypothetical job applicants.

To answer RQ1, we plan to examine the "marginal means" (Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi 2019; Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020) of candidate race, broken down by respondents' level of racial resentment. The race neutrality is defined as a case in which the marginal mean is not statistically different from 0.50. We assess this at varying levels of racial resentment using the standard set of four questions (and the expanded set of six questions for robustness).

RQ 2 *Is the meaning of "high" or "low" racial resentment different depending on the age group of the respondent?*

One growing concern about the racial resentment items is that they were written in the early 1980s, and social norms about race have evolved since then. Issues related to prejudice and discrimination have been the focus of numerous television shows and movies, for instance, and discussion of racial issues is often a prominent component of secondary and post-secondary education. For these reasons, it seems plausible that young people interpret the verbiage in the racial resentment questions differently than older people. For instance, although the proposition that "if blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as whites" (part of one of the standard resentment questions) might once have been socially acceptable to consider, we have encountered people (especially young people) who regard contemplating this proposition to be a racist action, and regard the question itself as inappropriate for inclusion on a scientific instrument. To this point, when one of the standard racial resentment questions was included on a South Carolina exit poll in 2014, interviewed voters took to social media to decry the question itself as racist (Ries 2014).

For these reasons, we intend to inspect how relationships between racial resentment and applicant judgments depend on respondents' age. We will examine whether young people provide more or less racially sympathetic answers, and whether the low end of the racial resentment scale reflects more pro-minority favoritism among young respondents than among old respondents.

RQ 3 *Does the predictive power of racial resentment items diminish in non-political settings?*

A long-running debate in the literature on racial resentment concerns the extent to which the measure conflates racial attitudes with ideology. For instance, endorsing a statement such as "Blacks should [work their way up] without any special favors" might reflect an individualistic orientation to politics, rather than racial animus. Similarly, in instances where racial resentment predicts voting against African American candidates, one possible interpretation is that survey respondents have a stereotype that African American politicians are politically liberal, or otherwise likely to advance disliked policies if they take office. In this interpretation, the racial resentment measure could reflect principled policy disagreement, rather than straightforward animus toward African Americans.

One way to assess the extent to which racial resentment is grounded in policy disagreement, rather than simple prejudice, is to examine how the measure predicts judgments in a nonpolitical setting. This is the purpose of asking respondents to evaluate both applications to be a college biology professor (a non-political judgment) or a city manager with control over distributive resources (a political judgment). If the non-political setting attenuates the relationship between racial resentment and preferences for or against Black applicants, we will adduce it as evidence that racial resentment is partly grounded in policy disagreements, rather than a more simplistic form of prejudice. Based on prior related study (Feldman and Huddy 2005), we expect to conduct related analyses in the full sample, but also in subsets delineated by respondents' self-reported ideology.

RQ 4 *In what ways does racial resentment predict biases in favor of or opposed to non-Black minorities?*

An additional long-standing question about the racial resentment measure concerns whether it captures animosity toward Blacks in particular, versus a more general form of hostility toward minority groups. By some accounts, the racial resentment questions are related

to the political history of Blacks in the United States, and therefore are related specifically to that group (Mendelberg 2001). However, some studies find that racial attitudes are highly correlated across racial groups, and that substituting other minorities for "Blacks" in the racial resentment battery does little to change how the questions function (Carney and Enos 2018; Karl and Ryan 2016).

The conjoint experiment we propose can shed new light on how the racial resentment items relate to judgments about other minority groups beyond Blacks. We intend to examine whether they predict discrimination for or against Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, and gender non-binary individuals.[2] For example, it could be that resentment is associated with discrimination against groups that are commonly characterized as being disadvantaged (Blacks and Hispanics), but not minority groups that lack this characterization (Asians). This is somewhat speculative, but gives some basis for motivating this research question.

We expect to segment this analysis by respondent age as well, to test the conjecture older respondents draw more finely-grained distinctions between different racial groups, where younger respondents substantially regard "disadvantaged minorities" as a more or less one unified class.

RQ 5 *How does the predictive power of racial resentment compare to that of other racial attitude measures?*

Finally, although our primary focus is on the racial resentment battery, we include several other standard measures of racial attitudes that have received substantial attention. These measures share some of the limitations of the racial resentment measure. In particular, they are seldom compared to a baseline that represents clearly race-neutral behavior. Thus, just as we intend to examine what level of racial resentment is associated with colorblind judgments (in both political and nonpolitical contexts), we intend to examine the extent to

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[2]Ex-post note: mention of Native Americans and gender non-binary individuals was an error on our part in the original PAP; we do not include these levels, and thus we cannot carry out the analysis for these groups.

which the high and low ends of these measures are associated with sympathy for minorities, versus prejudice against them.

D   Information on Survey Respondents

We recruited study participants via Qualtrics Panels. Because we are specifically interested in whites' racial attitudes, we limited our recruitment to self-described white Americans. The targeted population is white Americans who are over eighteen years old and living in the United States.

Our sample is an opt-in, non-probability sample. To collect respondents with diverse demographic and attitudinal backgrounds, we used quotas in the sampling process. Specifically, we used each respondent's self-reported *age group* (18–24, 24–35, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, over 65), *gender* (man, woman, non-binary), *highest level of education completed* (less than high school, high school diploma, some college/associate's degree, college degree, advance degree), *region* (Northeast, Midwest, South, West), and *partisanship* (Democrat, Republican, Independent). For the distribution of partisanship, we targeted to collect 40% Republicans, 40% Democrats, and 20% independents. For other variables, we used the Census distributions to set the quotas.[3]

Wave 1 was fielded from October 17 to November 5, 2019, and we collected 1,904 responses. All Wave 1 respondents were recontacted about two weeks later and invited to participate in the Wave 2 study. We fielded Wave 2 from November 14 to December 10, 2019 and collected 1,000 responses. We paid $3.37 per complete in each wave. In Wave 1, we screened out respondents who were not in the U.S. (based on IP addresses), failed to correctly answer an attention-check question, were identified as "speeders" (completing the survey within a third of the average time to complete the survey from a soft launch), and

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[3]For respondents' gender, we used the census population by sex for quotas. In addition, we tried to collect respondents who self-identify as gender non-binary by assigning an additional quota category, but all respondents who completed Wave 2 turned out to be self-identified men or women.

were flagged as potentially low-quality responses using Qualtrics's fraud-detection features. In Wave 2, we excluded three duplicated responses (keeping the first response of each respondent), and two strange respondents who did not participate in the Wave 1 (according to the unique IDs). The attrition rate is 48%. We do not have evidence that Wave 2 participants have particular racial attitudes: RRS levels are statistically indistinguishable among respondents who did and did not complete Wave 2.

The table below reports demographic information among respondents who completed both waves.

Table D.1: Distribution of sample demographics

Variable	Subgroup	Share
Education	High school or less	35%
	Some college / Associate's degree	27%
	College degree	24%
	Advanced degree	14%
Gender	Man	45%
	Woman	55%
Age Group	18-24	9%
	25-34	16%
	35-44	18%
	45-54	17%
	55+	40%
Region	Midwest	23%
	Northeast	21%
	South	39%
	West	16%
Partisanship	Democrat	41%
	Pure Independent	11%
	Republican	48%
Ideology	Liberal	30%
	Moderate/Haven't thought much about this	29%
	Conservative	40%

Note: The number of valid respondents for our analysis is 1,000.

E   Questions from the First Wave Survey

The following is a list of questions we use from our first wave survey. The order of questions below is the same as the one in the survey design. There are standard demographic questions at the beginning of this survey, but we do not use them for our analysis. The complete replication package with the codebook will be posted to the Harvard Dataverse once this manuscript is published.

Ideology: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or havent you thought much about this? [Extremely liberal (1) / Liberal (2) / Slightly liberal (3) / Moderate; middle of the road / Slightly conservative (5) / Conservative (6) / Extremely conservative (7) / Haven't thought much about this]

Racial Resentment, Prompt: Next, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the statements presented in the next screens. (*Note:* We asked the questions about racial resentment before other questions for racial attitude measures. Response options were [Strongly agree (1) / Somewhat agree (2) / Neither agree nor disagree / Somewhat disagree (4) / Strongly disagree (5)]. The order of the following six questions was randomized.)

Racial Resentment, 1st Question: Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

Racial Resentment, 2nd Question: Even today, government officials usually pay more attention to a complaint from a white person than from a black person.

Racial Resentment, 3rd Question: It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

Racial Resentment, 4th Question: Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than

they deserve.

Racial Resentment, 5th Question: Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

Racial Resentment, 6th Question: Blacks face real problems, but the way to solve these problems is to stop complaining and get back to work.

Occupations with political outcomes: We'll now ask about characteristics associated with several occupations. (Page break) How much influence do each of the following occupations have over political outcomes? (*Note:* This is a matrix-type question with the following columns: "No influence" (1), "Very little influence" (2), "Some influence" (3), and "A great deal of influence" (4).) [A city manager (the chief executive for a municipality) (1) / A biology professor at a state university (2) / A lawyer (3) / A musician (4) / An upper-level manager at a furniture company (5) / A police detective (6)]

Attention Check: We would like to get a sense of your consumption of political news. (*Note:* Line break here.) To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both every day and never among the alternatives below, no matter how often you watch political news. (*Note:* Line break here.) Based on the text you read above, how often do you watch political news on TV or on the Internet? (*Note:* We filtered out respondents who failed to pass this attention check question.) [Every day (1) / Once a week (2) / Once a month (3) / A few times a year (4) / Never (5)]

Racial Stereotype, First Set: Next we'll ask how well some words describe groups in society. The next four questions are about how well certain words describe (white/black) people. (*Note:* The word "white" or "black" is randomly selected. Response options were [Extremely well (1) / Very well (2) / Moderately well (3) / Slightly well (4) / Not well at all (5)]. The order of the following four questions was randomized.)

Racial Stereotype, 1st Question: How well do the words "determined to succeed" de-

scribe most whites/blacks?

Racial Stereotype, 2nd Question: "How well does the word "lazy" describe most whites/blacks?

Racial Stereotype, 3rd Question: How well do the words "intelligent at school" describe most whites/blacks?

Racial Stereotype, 4th Question: How well does the word "complaining" describe most whites/blacks?

Racial Stereotype, Second Set: The next four questions are about how well certain words describe whites/blacks. (*Note:* If "white" ("black") was randomly selected for the first set, "black" ("white") was assigned. The same set of four questions was asked again (in a random order) for the different racial group with the same response options.)

Group Identity and Collective Guilt, Prompt: We'll conclude by asking a few more questions about your attitudes toward various groups in society. (*Note:* There were two blocks of questions after this prompt, four questions to measure group identity, and three questions to measure collective guilt. The order of these blocks and the order of questions within each block were randomized.)

Group Identity, 1st Question: How important to you is your identity as a white person? [Extremely important (1) / Very important (2) / Moderately important (3) / Slightly important (4) / Not at all important (5)]

Group Identity, 2nd Question: How much do white people in this country have to be proud of? [A great deal (1) / A lot (2) / A moderate amount (3) / A little (4) / Nothing at all (5)]

Group Identity, 3rd Question: How much would you say that whites in this country have in common with one another? [(The same as above)]

Group Identity, 4th Question: How strongly do you identify with other white people? [Extremely strongly (1) / Very strongly (2) / Moderately strongly (3) / Not very strongly (4) / Not at all strongly (5)]

Collective Guilt, 1st Question When you learn about racism, how much guilt do you feel due to your association with the white race? [A great deal (1) / A lot (2) / A moderate amount (3) / A little (4) / None at all (5)]

Collective Guilt, 2nd Question: How guilty do you feel about the privileges and benefits you receive as a white American? [Extremely guilty (1) / Very guilty (2) / Moderately guilty (3) / A little guilty (4) / Not guilty at all]

Collective Guilt, 3rd Question: How guilty do you feel about social inequality between white and black Americans? [(The same as above)]

F   Additional Figures

Figure F.1: Marginal means, the first set of conjoint experiments only.

Figure F.2: Marginal means, both sets of conjoint experiments.

Figure F.3: Marginal means of selecting Black applicants for city manager by the order of conjoint tasks.


Figure F.4: Marginal means of selecting Black applicants for city manager by Racial Resentment Scale (RRS) and by age groups.

Figure F.5: Pairwise correlations between different racial attitude measures.


Figure F.6: Marginal means of selecting Black applicants for city manager by other racial attitude measures.

G Two-Sided Nature of RRS in Past Studies

In this section, we discuss the four studies identified as having a research design suitable for distinguishing favoring from disfavoring on the RRS, and detail the results from reanalyzing the studies in this manner. We obtained data for three of the studies from journal Dataverse pages and in another from the author of the study (Tesler 2012). We conducted a parallel analysis on all four of these studies. We follow the primary approach in the main text, estimating the cubic relationship between the RRS[4] and the relevant outcome separately for whether the target's randomized race is Black or not. Our racial indifference benchmark in our main text study (a 50% probability of choosing a non-white applicant) cannot be applied to these studies. Instead, we examine whether behavior in each experiment varies by Black and non-Black targets. This manifests as equal money allocated to white or Black applicants (DeSante 2013), similar opinions on policy attributed to Obama or not (Tesler 2012), similar support for a candidate who includes Blacks in campaign mailers or not (Stephens-Dougan 2016), or similar vote intention for a Black or white candidate (Chudy, Piston, and Shipper 2019). Two cases show evidence consistent with a two-sided interpretation of the racial resentment scale, another lacks support on the low end of the RRS to render a judgment, and the last case is inconclusive. We briefly discuss each study below.

DeSante (2013)

This paper uses a survey experiment that asks respondents to allocate $1500 in government assistance to two welfare applicants, whose race (white/black/none) and work ethic (excellent/poor/none) are randomized. Respondents can also allocate some or all of that money to offset the states budget deficit. The study records individuals' RRS responses. Comparing allocations to Black applicants vis-à-vis the other two options and how differences vary by

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[4]We use a 0-1 RRS scale rather than a 4-20 range (like in the main text) because some of the replication data only supplies the measure in this form.

Figure G.1: Cubic model results for renanalyses of past studies where an indifference point on the RRS can be identified

individual RRS can help distinguish favoring from disfavoring behavior on the RRS. The top left plot in Figure G.1 offers one example of this kind of test. It plots the predicted amount of money allocated to the applicants (as opposed to offsetting the deficit) against individual RRS by whether there are no Black applicants (0, in black) or the first applicant is Black (1, in red). The predicted money is generally higher when the first applicant is Black among respondents lower on the RRS, while the opposite is true for those higher in RRS. This pattern suggests a two-sided interpretation to the RRS.

Tesler (2012)

This paper uses survey experiments where respondents evaluate health care policy. The health care policy descriptions are randomly associated with either Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, or a control source in one case, and either Obama, Congressional Democrats, or a control source in a second case. The study estimates the correlations between RRS and health care opinions and how those correlations vary by randomized association cues. We reanalyze the experiment in this paper that asks respondents whether they thought a stimulus package—randomly attributed to Obama, Congressional Democrats, or a neutral source— was a good or bad idea. The direction of the correlation between RRS and beliefs by Black or non-Black attribution can clarify favoring vs. disfavoring on the RRS. The top right plot in Figure G.1 shows the predicted probability of thinking the stimulus was a good idea along the RRS by whether the Obama (1, red) or Congressional Democrats (0, black) attribution is present. Individuals lower on the RRS view the stimulus more positively when it's attributed to a Black target (Obama) while the opinions of those higher on the RRS trend more negative in the face of this attribution. This implies two-sidedness on the RRS.

Stephens-Dougan (2016)

This paper uses a survey experiment that exposes respondents to campaign mailers from a white candidate (randomly assigned as either Democratic or Republican). The mailer contains photos of constituent groups, the makeup of which is randomly assigned to depict either five white photos, three white/two Black photos, and five Black photos. Respondents provide RRS responses before the treatment and likelihood of voting for/evaluations of the candidate after it. In order to distinguish favoring and disfavoring on the RRS, we examine the relationship between RRS and vote likelihood by whether a mailer includes Black photos or none at all. The bottom left plot in Figure G.1 demonstrates this analysis, where mailers with Blacks appear in red (1) and those without Blacks in black (0). Although vote likelihood decreases with mailers that include Blacks on the high end of the RRS, very weak support

on the lower end of the RRS distribution makes it hard to discern a clear pattern (and rule out any favoring behavior on this low end). We thus classify this result as inconclusive.

Chudy, Piston, and Shipper (2019)

Although the RRS is not central to its focus, this paper uses the scale as a control variable when 1) estimating the correlation between collective racial guilt and racial opinions and 2) examining how effect of randomized candidate race on vote intention varies by guilt. We use RRS in the second case. Respondents evaluated two fictitious candidate profile, where one (the Democrat) was randomly assigned as either Black or white. Comparing the relationship between RRS and vote choice by candidate race can clarify favoring vs. disfavoring on the RRS scale. The bottom right plot in Figure G.1 shows this relationship for Black (red, 1) and white (0, black) candidate race. There is slight evidence of two-sidedness where lower RRS individuals vote more for the Black candidate while higher RRS ones vote less for the Black candidate. However, the pattern is not especially strong and so we deem this result inconclusive for distinguishing favoring from disfavoring on the RRS.

H   Additional Information about Research Designs

H.1   Choosing occupations

As part of Wave 1 in our study's main panel survey, we asked respondents how much influence various occupations have over political outcomes. Response options encompass "No influence," "Very little influence," "Some influence," and "A great deal of influence," and the order of the six occupations were randomly shown in a grid (see Section E of the Supplementary Materials). Two of these occupations, "A city manager (the chief executive for a municipality)" and "A biology professor at a state university," are the job positions that the same respondents were later asked to evaluate applicants for in Wave 2. This exercise intends to shed light on our research question of whether the association between the selec-

Figure H.1: Perceived influence levels of different occupations over political outcomes.

tion of applicants and the RRS changes across political and non-political contexts. To claim that our conjoint task is an adequate test of this question, the city manager position should be perceived as having more influence over political outcomes than the biology professor position. Figure H.1 shows the response distribution to all six occupation questions, with the aforementioned two occupations.

Results based on this Wave 1 question suggest the validity of choosing the two occupations for our purpose: respondents perceive the city manager position as having greater influence over political outcomes than a position of biology professor does (a chi-squared test shows this difference is significant at $p < 0.001$). For example, a combined 68% consider a city manager to have some or a great deal of influence over political outcomes compared

to 27% for a biology professor. This manipulation check result is particularly important in light of the result in the main text for this research question (RRS predictive power does *not* diminish in non-political settings). The null we uncovered is unlikely to be due to an unsuccessful political vs. non-political context manipulation. At the same time, because perceived influence levels are not overwhelming, it is worth checking results among respondents for whom the manipulation "worked" (i.e. those who rated the city manager as having more influence than the biology professor had). The pattern of results in the main text, however, does not change when running this analysis.

H.2 Context comparability

Prior to fielding the two-wave panel survey that makes up our primary data, we conducted a pilot study to address a concern relevant to our racial resentment and ideology research question—comparing how RRS predicts racial judgments in political (city manager position) and non-political (biology professor position) contexts. Namely, we sought to confirm that secondary (non-racial) conjoint attributes have comparable influence across the two contexts when race of applicant is not included. This is important to assess given how the presence of secondary attributes can alter the effect of an attribute of interest (race) and given the possibility that this might vary by job position. If secondary attributes exert different effects across context when race is absent, comparing effects of applicant race (once it is added) is not valid.

Our subject pool for the pilot study came from Positly, a platform for human research subject recruitment. From May 30 to May 31, 2019, we recruited 600 participants. We randomized them into either 10 conjoint tasks for the political context or 10 for the non-political context. The order of these two sets was randomized. The set of attributes and levels as well as procedure in the conjoint were nearly identical to the ones we used for our primary study described in the main text. In Figure H.2, we display all the marginal means for each job type, as well as the difference in marginal means in the last column.

Figure H.2: Marginal means of selecting biology professor and city manager applicants for secondary attributes when race is absent, as well as the difference in MMs between the two positions (pilot study).

As the figure shows, marginal means for secondary attributes are strikingly similar across job type. The differences in how each trait factors into choices are very small and none are statistically significant. This provides important confirmation for our choice of secondary attributes. Our focus on comparing the effect of the race attribute across context once we

later introduce it (as was done in the main study) is therefore well-grounded and justified.

We note two other results from this pilot study. First, differences for the "Did the candidate grow up locally?" attribute did not attain statistical significance, but were relatively large and consistent in size. In light of this result and how intuitively a local job candidate makes more sense to consider in a city manager selection, we omitted this attribute from the main study. Second, in open-ended comments after the conjoint, participants voiced confusion about the difference between the "Outstanding" and "Exceptional" levels in three of our latter attributes. To resolve this issue, we combined these levels into one that read "Very Strong" (only three levels were used in the main study).

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