

ONLINE APPENDIX

Executive Deference or Legislative Constraint?

Senate Committees and the Exercise of Decentralized Authority over U.S. Executive Nominations

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ONLINE APPENDIX A:

Listing of U.S. Federal Agency Organizations Covered in the Sample (with Total Nominee Count); Descriptive Statistics & Data Sources, & Spike Histogram Plot Committee-Based Confirmation Delay

Online Appendix Table A1.1

**Listing of U.S. Federal Agencies Covered by the Sample
(Total Agencies: 244; Average Nominee Observations Per Agency: 39.67 [9,879 / 244])**

Agency	Count
ACTION Agency	6
Administrative Conference of the United States	6
Administrator of Drug Enforcement	1
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy	1
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation	2
African Development Bank	8
African Development Foundation	43
Agency for International Development	1
Alaska Land Use Council	1
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System	1
Amtrak Reform Board	4
Amtrak Board of Directors	28
Appalachian Regional Commission	8
Architect of the Capitol	1
Asian Development Bank	6
Assassination Records Review Board	5
Barry Goldwater Scholarship & Excellence in Education Foundation	46
Board for International Broadcasting	22
Board of Veterans' Appeals	1
Broadcasting Board of Governors	74
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives	1
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection	3
Bureau of Justice Assistance	1
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services	2
Central Intelligence Agency	37
Chemical Safety and Hazardous Investigation Board	37
Civil Liberties Public Education Fund	45
Coast Guard	4
Commission on National and Community Service	9
Commodity Credit Corporation	3
Commodity Futures Trading Commission	69
Communications Satellite Corporation	15
Community Development Financial Institutions Fund	1
Community Relations Service	1
Conference of the United States	1
Congress of the United States	2
Consumer Product Safety Commission	45
Copyright Royalty Tribunal	7

Corporation for National and Community Service	109
Corporation for Public Broadcasting	6
Council of Economic Advisers	3
Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency	2
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission	47
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board	46
Delta Regional Authority	4
Department of Agriculture	181
Department of Commerce	294
Department of Defense	585
Department of Education	193
Department of Energy	221
Department of Health and Human Services	173
Department of Homeland Security	119
Department of Housing and Urban Development	150
Department of Justice	1,028
Department of Labor	191
Department of State	497
Department of the Interior	168
Department of the Treasury	317
Department of Transportation	249
Department of Veterans Affairs	126
Director of National Intelligence	1
District of Columbia Offender Supervision, Defender, and Courts Services Agency	2
Election Assistance Commission	32
Environmental Protection Agency	145
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	68
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	16
Executive Board of the World Health Organization	1
Executive Office of the President	270
Export-Import Bank of the United States	70
Farm Credit Administration	42
Farm Credit System Assistance Board	1
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation	11
Federal Aviation Administration	2
Federal Aviation Management Advisory Council	2
Federal Communications Commission	59
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation	42
Federal Election Commission	42
Federal Emergency Management Agency	27
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission	54
Federal Home Loan Bank Board	3
Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund	7
Federal Housing Finance Agency	6
Federal Housing Finance Board	30
Federal Insurance Trust Funds	28
Federal Labor Relations Authority	52
Federal Maritime Commission	47
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service	12
Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration	8

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission	43
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration	1
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund	2
Federal Procurement Policy	1
Federal Reserve System	76
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board	37
Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund	6
Federal Trade Commission	42
Financial Stability Oversight Council	2
Fish and Wildlife	1
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission	3
General Accounting Office	1
General Services Administration	16
Government Accountability Office	1
Government Printing Office	6
Harry S Truman Scholarship Foundation	44
Institute of American Indian and Alaska Native Culture and Arts Development	45
Institute of Museum and Library Services	21
Intelligence Community	1
Inter-American Development Bank	15
Inter-American Foundation	74
Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board	1
International Atomic Energy Agency	3
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	24
International Banks	11
International Joint Commission, United States and Canada	23
International Monetary Fund	30
International Trade Commission	1
Interstate Commerce Commission	9
James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation	34
Legal Services Corporation	85
Library of Congress	2
Marine Mammal Commission	13
Merit Systems Protection Board	39
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority	17
Millennium Challenge Corporation	14
Mississippi River Commission	39
Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation	2
Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence In National Environmental Policy Foundation	37
National Advisory Council on Educational Research & Improvement	34
National Advisory Council on Women's Educational Programs	6
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	23
National Archives and Records Administration	5
National Board for Education Sciences	32
National Commission on Libraries and Information Science	69
National Consumer Cooperative Bank	15
National Corporation for Housing Partnerships	11
National Council on Disability	19
National Council on Educational Research and Improvement	1
National Council on the Arts	1

National Council on the Handicapped	19
National Council on the Humanities	8
National Counterterrorism Center	1
National Credit Union Administration	25
National Drug Control Policy	1
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities	329
National Indian Gaming Commission	7
National Institute for Literacy Advisory Board	59
National Institute of Building Sciences	33
National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research	1
National Intelligence	1
National Labor Relations Board	100
National Mediation Board	50
National Museum and Library Services Board	46
National Nuclear Security Administration	1
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	7
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)	15
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) Reform Board	18
National Science Foundation	161
National Security Education Board	27
National Transportation Safety Board	67
Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture	1
Northern Border Regional Commission	4
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	57
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission	35
Office of Government Ethics	4
Office of Management and Budget	1
Office of Minority Economic Impact	1
Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation	3
Office of Personnel Management	37
Office of Science and Technology Policy	2
Office of Special Counsel	8
Office of Special Trustee for American Indians	1
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement	4
Office of the Director of National Intelligence	20
Office of the Federal Coordinator for Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects	2
Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator	2
Overseas Private Investment Corporation	51
Panama Canal Commission	11
Peace Corps	19
Peace Corps National Advisory Council	33
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation	6
Postal Rate Commission	24
Postal Regulatory Commission	5
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board	27
Public Health Service	4
Public Printer	1
Railroad Retirement Board	31
Reconstruction and Stabilization	1
Resolution Trust Corporation	7

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation	10
Securities and Exchange Commission	42
Securities Investor Protection Corporation	51
Selective Service System	7
Small Business Administration	46
Social Security Administration	50
Social Security Advisory Board	3
Special Panel on Appeals	6
State Justice Institute	61
Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy	1
Surface Transportation Board	9
Survivors and Disability Insurance Trust Funds	2
Tennessee Valley Authority	64
Terrorism and Financial Crimes	1
Trade and Development Agency	2
Troubled Asset Relief Program	1
U.S. Institute of Peace	4
U.S. Parole Commission	1
U.S. Postal Service	3
U.S. Sentencing Commission	1
U.S. Trade and Development Agency	1
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences	1
United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy	50
United States Advisory Commission on Public Policy	4
United States Agency for International Development	75
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	33
United States Attorney	13
United States Enrichment Corporation	10
United States Information Agency	31
United States Institute of Peace	66
United States International Development Cooperation Agency	85
United States International Trade Commission	43
United States Parole Commission	15
United States Postal Service	75
United States Sentencing Commission	59
United States Trade and Development Agency	2
Veterans Administration	2
Veterans Affairs (Public and Intergovernmental Affairs)	1
Veterans Affairs for Memorial Affairs	1


Online Appendix Table A1.2: Variable, Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample), and Data Sources

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Source
<i>Committee Delay</i> (legvetdur2plus1)	99.990	110.754	1	730	Calculated by authors from information obtained from congress.gov ¹
PRIMARY COVARIATES					
<i>/Senate Committee Median – President/</i> (committee_pres1)	0.499	0.292	0.032	1.02	DW-NOMINATE ² & Congressional Directory ³
<i>/Senate Committee Chair – President/</i> (Chair_pres1)	0.519	0.413	0.001	1.29	DW-NOMINATE & Congressional Directory ⁴
<i>Divided Partisan Control of Senate and Presidency</i> (sendivide)	0.474	0.499	0	1	Ostrander (2016) ⁵
CONTROL COVARIATES					
<i>Absolute Distance of President and Senate Floor</i> (pressenfloorabsdist)	0.496	0.219	0.18	0.815	DW-NOMINATE
<i>Senate Committee Median Experience</i> (experience_median)	5.977	2.768	0	15	Congressional Directory
<i>Senate Committee Chair Experience</i> chair_experience_1)	20.681	8.977	2	45	Congressional Directory ⁶ , Congress.gov ⁷ , BioGuide ⁸ & Senate.gov ⁹
<i>Senate Committee Confirmation Workload: Including Non-Policy Positions</i> (kv_workload)	3184.174	758.744	1805	5374	DW-NOMINATE
<i>ln(Committee Workload)</i> (ln_combills_workload)	5.538	0.737	1.609	7.403	Calculated by authors from information obtained from congress.gov ¹⁰
<i>Senate Committee Staff Size</i> (committeestaffsize)	68.540	26.953	11	168	Senate.gov ¹¹ , Congressional Directory & DW-NOMINATE https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43946.pdf
<i>Senate Party Polarization</i> (polarization)	0.755	0.074	0.611	0.88	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Average Presidential Approval</i> (pres_app_m)	51.593	11.994	26.5	86.45	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Honeymoon</i> (first90)	0.045	0.208	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Presidential Election Year</i> (preselection)	0.171	0.376	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Second Term Nomination</i> (lameduck)	0.369	0.482	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Senate Legislative Workload</i> (workload)	30.330	18.032	0	97	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Female Nominee</i> (female)	0.271	0.444	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Prior Senate Confirmation</i> (priorconfirm)	0.149	0.357	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Prior Senate Denial</i> (denied)	0.072	0.258	0	1	Calculated by authors from information obtained from congress.gov ¹²

<i>Cabinet Level (_itier_2)</i>	0.259	0.438	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>High Level (_itier_3)</i>	0.061	0.240	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Major Board (_itier_4)</i>	0.498	0.500	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Defense (defense)</i>	0.089	0.285	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Infrastructure (infrastructure)</i>	0.502	0.222	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>Social Program (social)</i>	0.062	0.242	0	1	Ostrander (2016)
<i>FVRA/Federal Vacancy Reform Act, 1998 (fvra)</i>	0.255	0.436	0	1	Congressional Record https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2006-title5/pdf/USCODE-2006-title5-partIII-subpartB-chap33-subchapIII-sec3345.pdf
<i>August Recess (firstrecess)</i>	0.138	0.345	0	1	Generated from other Variables
<i>December Recess (secondrecess)</i>	0.100	0.300	0	1	Generated from other Variables
<i>Policy Agency (policy_majagency)</i>	0.747	0.434	0	1	Calculated by authors from information obtained from congress.gov ¹³
<i>ln(Committee Workload) (ln_combills_workload)</i>	5.538	0.737	1.609	7.403	Calculated by authors from information obtained from congress.gov ¹⁴

Notes: Row entries in each cell are descriptive statistics based on the full sample of observations.

FIGURE 1A: Histogram Plot of the Total Committee-Based Confirmation Delay



ONLINE APPENDIX B:

Alternative Tests of Selective Committee Delay Theory: Replacing Partisan Distinctions with Ideological Distinctions

As an alternative to making partisan alignment distinctions, we consider a more fluid measure based on the absolute ideological distance between the president and Senate filibuster pivot opposite of the president's ideal point: $|Senate\ Filibuster\ Pivot_t - President_t|$ (e.g., see Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018), as well as the ideological distance between the Senate chamber median and president's respective ideal points: $|Senate\ Chamber\ Median_t - President_t|$. What is of interest here is the interaction between the $|Senate\ Committee\ Median\ [Chair]_{j,t} - President_t| \times |Senate\ Filibuster\ Pivot_t [Chamber\ Median_t] - President_t| > 0$. That is, increasing policy divergence between either the Senate committee median or chair and the president will produce slower committee confirmation processes when the Senate chamber and president are most aligned with one another (i.e., $|Senate\ Committee\ Median\ [Chair]_{j,t} - President_t| < 0$); and that this conditional effect will result in greater executive deference, and hence, swifter confirmation processes at the committee stage as policy divergence between the Senate chamber and president grows. This claim is evaluated for **Models 1-4** reported in the manuscript by replacing the *Divided Partisan Control* indicators with the $|Senate\ Filibuster\ Pivot_t [Chamber\ Median_t] - President_t|$.

Online Appendix Table B1 displays the main results (control covariates are omitted for purposes of brevity). Although the positive interaction coefficients (denoted by grey-shading) are consistent with the PSCD predictions based on the ideological measures involving the Senate chamber and president, they are less precise compared to the counterpart estimates reported in the manuscript based on divided partisan control of the Senate and presidency. Not surprisingly, the reported models based on the majority partisan distinctions, offer a better model fit to these data compared to these models employing the $|Senate\ Filibuster\ Pivot_t - President_t|$ for the same identical sample and set of control regressors.

Online Appendix Table B2 estimates a similar set of models, only replacing $|Senate\ Filibuster\ Pivot_t - President_t|$ with $|Senate\ Chamber\ Median_t - President_t|$ in lieu of divided partisan control binary indicator variable employed to test the PSCD hypothesis in the manuscript. These alternative set of selective committee delay models reveal support consistent with those produced from the reported manuscript results based on the divided partisan control binary indicator. That is, ideologically (non-vulnerable) vulnerable Senate committees expedite (protract) the pace of executive nominations through the committee stage of the confirmation process. These ideological-based Senate chamber median – president absolute distance estimates exhibit much greater precision (and superior model fit) than the analogous estimates using the Senate filibuster pivot reported in **Online Appendix Table B1**.

Lastly, **Online Appendix Table B3** reports the comparison of results for the reported manuscript models, plus models that replace the committee-based distance measures with the $|Senate\ Chamber\ Median_t - President_t|$ measure. The results reveal that the reported models based on committee preference distance measures yield both more explanatory power (based on chi-square tests) and better model fit (based on AIC and BIC statistics) for the restricted model specifications (i.e., **Models 1, 2, & B9**). However, the alternative Senate chamber measure outperforms the committee ideological distance measures in terms of explanatory power and model fit criteria when analyzing the unrestricted model specifications including the full set of control covariates (i.e., **Models 3, 4, & B10**).

A limitation of this study is the inability to further parse out these committee-based from both the chamber-based partisan and ideological effects simultaneously due to the strong correlations and limited numerical range among these measures. Specifically, these committee and chamber ideological distance measures are correlated at 0.920 and 0.901 for the $|Senate\ Committee\ Median_t - President_t|$ and $|Senate\ Chair_t - President_t|$ measures, respectively. What leverage that is attainable is derived from the relative dispersion differences among these ideological-based

measures, with the committee ideological distance measures exhibiting significantly greater variation compared to the $|Senate\ Chamber\ Median_t - President_t|$ measure.¹

This limitation falls short of the ideal to definitively tease out the precise causal nature of how Senate committees' policy divergence from president affects confirmation delay at the committee stage of the nomination process. Nonetheless, the robust correlative evidence of committee-based ideological influence on committee delay is compelling given the empirical regularities observed when evaluating the PSCD hypothesis in both the manuscript and various appendices, coupled with the evidence showing that the effect of committees' ideologically distance from the president on committee delay is conditionally affected by the Senate chamber's relative ideological distance from the president (**Online Appendix Table B2**). That is, Senate committee ideological distance from the president is associated with similar effects on committee confirmation delay, whether conditioned by partisan or ideological conflict between the Senate chamber and president.

What cannot be adequately gleaned from these data is how committees impact confirmation delay in conjunction with *both* forms of chamber-induced inter branch policy conflict with presidents. Taken together, these findings suggest that the inability to jointly disentangle committee sources of influence from *both* partisan and ideological chamber sources constitute an effective limitation of this study, and for others seeking to tease out the independent effect for each of these mechanisms. This reveals a clear empirical scope condition when evaluating our evidence consistent with PSCD logic proposed in the manuscript.

¹ F-tests reveal that $|Senate\ Chamber\ Median_t - President_t|$ measure has much lower dispersion (SD = 0.219) compared to both $|Senate\ Committee\ Median_t - President_t|$ (SD = 0.293) and $|Senate\ Chair_t - President_t|$ (SD = 0.413) respective measures at $p < 0.001$.

ONLINE APPENDIX TABLE B1

**Evaluating *Ideological-Based* Selective Committee Delay, I
(Senate Filibuster Pivot: Cox and Weibull Model Hazard Ratio Estimates of Senate Committee Confirmation Delay)**

Variable	Model B1 (Cox)	Model B2 (Cox)	Model B3 (Weibull)	Model B4 (Weibull)
Senate Committee Median – President	0.340** (0.156)	—	0.334* (0.193)	—
Senate Chair Median – President	—	0.222** (0.098)	—	0.158** (0.073)
President – Senate Filibuster Pivot	0.535 (0.288)	0.330** (0.106)	0.563 (0.422)	0.253** (0.091)
Senate Committee Median – President x President – Senate Filibuster Pivot	2.771 (2.447)	—	2.413 (2.886)	—
Senate Chair Median – President x President – Senate Filibuster Pivot	—	13.944** (12.986)	—	28.816** (26.907)
Committee & Administration Unit Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
ln (p)	—	—	0.040** (0.015)	0.048** (0.016)
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	–58,815.61	–58,787.55	–13,136.96	–13,091.21
AIC Statistics	117,699.20	117,613.60	26,311.92	26,220.41
BIC Statistics	117,806.00	117,749.90	26,448.69	26,357.18
Total Observations	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879
Total Uncensored Observations	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076

Notes: Cox semiparametric models (**Models B1 & B2**). Weibull parametric models (**Models B3 & B4**). Control covariates are omitted from table for brevity but can be obtained from authors. Entries are hazard ratio estimates ($H_0: \exp(\beta) = 1.0$). Robust standard errors clustered on committee appear inside parentheses.

* $p \leq 0.10$

** $p \leq 0.05$

*** $p \leq 0.01$.

ONLINE APPENDIX TABLE B2

**Evaluating *Ideological-Based* Selective Committee Delay, II
(Senate Chamber Median: Cox and Weibull Model Hazard Ratio Estimates of Senate Committee Confirmation Delay)**

Variable	Model B5 (Cox)	Model B6 (Cox)	Model B7 (Weibull)	Model B8 (Weibull)
Senate Committee Median – President	0.071*** (0.063)	—	0.039*** (0.037)	—
Senate Chair Median – President	—	0.080*** (0.060)	—	0.045*** (0.034)
President – Senate Chamber Median	0.099*** (0.042)	0.154*** (0.063)	0.050*** (0.020)	0.080*** (0.035)
Senate Committee Median – President x President – Senate Chamber Median	55.567*** (65.850)	—	169.290*** (2.886)	—
Senate Chair Median – President x President – Senate Chamber Median	—	51.864*** (52.666)	—	153.614*** (160.259)
Committee & Administration Unit Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
ln (p)	—	—	0.054*** (0.016)	0.064*** (0.015)
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	–58,767.47	–58,740.13	–13,053.27	–13,008.46
AIC Statistics	117,572.90	117,518.30	26,144.53	26,054.92
BIC Statistics	117,709.70	117,655.00	26,281.30	26,191.68
Total Observations	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879
Total Uncensored Observations	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076

Notes: Cox semiparametric models (**Models B1 & B2**). Weibull parametric models (**Models B3 & B4**). Control covariates are omitted from table for brevity but can be obtained from authors. Entries are hazard ratio estimates ($H_0: \exp(\beta) = 1.0$). Robust standard errors clustered on committee appear inside parentheses.

* $p \leq 0.10$

** $p \leq 0.05$

*** $p \leq 0.01$.

ONLINE APPENDIX TABLE B3

***Non-Nested Evaluation of Committee versus Chamber Median Models of Committee Selective Delay
(Senate Chamber Median: Cox and Weibull Model Hazard Ratio Estimates of Senate Committee Confirmation Delay)***

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model B9	Model 3	Model 4	Model B10
Senate Committee Median – President	0.346* (0.188)	—	—	0.332 (0.238)	—	—
Senate Chair Median – President	—	0.690*** (0.081)	—	—	0.895 (0.276)	0.321** (0.152)
Senate Chamber Median – President	—	—	0.353** (0.109)	—	—	—
Divided Partisan Control]: S & P [Senate Committee Median – President]	0.277*** (0.134)	0.366*** (0.089)	0.055*** (0.034)	0.236** (0.135)	0.380** (0.148)	0.031*** (0.019)
Senate Committee Median – President x Divided Partisan Control]: S & P	5.537*** (3.226)	—	—	7.103*** (4.738)	—	—
Senate Committee Chair – President x Divided Partisan Control]: S & P	—	2.797*** (0.705)	—	—	2.615** (1.113)	—
Senate Chamber Median – President x Divided Partisan Control]: S & P	—	—	73.559*** (60.359)	—	—	195.750*** (151.617)
AIC	117,574.70	117,588.40	117,471.50	26,172.92	26,183.68	26,011.11
BIC	117,711.40	117,725.20	117,608.20	26,309.69	26,320.44	26,147.87
Interaction Chi-Square Differential Test $\chi^2 \sim (1)$ [Interaction Term]	8.63*** [0.000]	16.66*** [0.000]	27.47*** [0.000]	8.64*** [0.003]	5.10** [0.024]	46.41*** [0.000]
Joint Chi-Square Differential Test $\chi^2 \sim (3)$ [Additive & Interaction Terms]	10.83** [0.013]	23.68*** [0.000]	83.71*** [0.000]	16.71*** [0.001]	12.62*** [0.006]	150.16*** [0.000]
Committee & Administration Unit Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Control Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Total Number of Observations	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879
Total Number of Uncensored Observations	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076

Notes: Cox semiparametric models (**Models B1, B2, & B9**). Weibull parametric models (**Models B3, B4, & B10**). Control covariates are omitted from table for brevity but can be obtained from authors. Entries are hazard ratio estimates ($H_0: \exp(\beta) = 1.0$). Robust standard errors clustered on committee appear inside parentheses. Probability values appear inside brackets. **Boldface entries** represent the models with superior overall model fit (AIC and BIC statistics), and also superior explanatory variables of primary inter-chamber covariates of interest (Interaction and Joint Chi-Square Differential tests).

* $p \leq 0.10$


** $p \leq 0.05$

*** $p \leq 0.01$.


ONLINE APPENDIX C:

Sensitivity to Alternative Subsamples of Nomination Observations

A series of additional sensitivity checks are performed omitting executive nominee observations. First, we omit non-policy agency nominees from the sample given that they may potentially bias the findings since these nominees may be slower to confirm given their lower priority to those nominees serving in policymaking agencies. In the manuscript, these differences are accounted for through specification of a binary control covariate (*Policy Agency*). **Models 1-4** are re-analyzed on the subsample of nominee cases where *Policy Agency* equals 1 (where total uncensored confirmed observations = 7,076 [$N_{Policy\ Agency} = 5,469$; 77.29%]). The differential marginal hazard ratio effects appear in **Figure C1** below. One notices that these marginal effect hazard ratio estimates are substantively similar to those presented in **Figure 2** of the manuscript, albeit with slightly smaller hazard ratio numerical marginal effect estimates when restricting the sample to only policy agencies.




Second, we omit executive nominees from the sample that were nominated during the first 90 days of a given presidential administration since these cases represent the ‘initial wave’ of nominees that should benefit from greater executive deference by the Senate. **Models 1-4** are re-analyzed on the subsample of nominee cases where *First 90 Days* equals 0 (where uncensored confirmed observations = 6,643 [93.88% of uncensored confirmed observations from the full sample estimates reported in manuscript]). These set of differential marginal hazard ratio effects appear in **Figure C2** below. This set of marginal effect hazard ratio estimates are substantively consistent with those presented in **Figure 2** of the manuscript, albeit reveal larger numerical marginal effects for the PSCD hypothesis when omitting the flurry of initial executive nominees for a new administration.



Third, we omit Rule 31 renominations that take place in the same Congress since these individuals might not only be less susceptible to legislative constraint predicted by selecting vetting


logic.² **Models 1-4** are re-analyzed on the subsample of nominee cases where *Rule 31* equals 0 (uncensored confirmed observations = 6,821 [96.40% of full sample estimates reported in manuscript]). These set of differential marginal hazard ratio effects appear in **Figure C3** below. Although support for the PSCD hypothesis is evident, the marginal effect hazard ratio estimates are slightly more conservative (i.e., smaller) relative to the comparable set of estimates appearing in **Figure 2** of the manuscript.



Finally, we restrict the sample to the pre-‘nuclear option’ (November 21, 2013) cases which eliminated cloture for confirmation of executive nominees – and omit cases once the ‘nuclear-option’ is in effect. This analysis overcomes a critique that greater obstruction by the opposition party at the committee stage can result in increased confirmation delay with the removal of cloture,



² Only those Rule 31 nominees for the same position within the same agency who are subsequently renominated in the same Congress are omitted in this set of sensitivity analyses since these observations are not censored unlike those who are renominated in a subsequent Congress.

thus biasing the estimates in favor of the PSCD hypothesis. The statistical evidence for re-assessing **Models 1-4** on the subsample of nominee cases under the pre-‘nuclear option’ regime are *Nuclear Option* equals 0 (uncensored confirmed observations = 6,065 [85.71% of full sample estimates reported in manuscript]). These set of differential marginal hazard ratio effects appear in **Figure C4** below. The evidence is consistent with the reported evidence in **Figure 2**, thus suggesting that the removal of cloture to permit simple majority confirmation of executive nominees is not biasing the results based on the full sample of executive nominees.



Finally, we adopt an inductive, data-driven approach to disaggregate these data into subsamples based on a nonparametric trend test evaluating committee delay across presidential administrations. The aim of this exercise is to examine temporal differences between presidential administrations regarding committee confirmation delay. ‘Low committee delay’ executive nominees (Bush41, Clinton, & Trump) appear in **Figure C5**, while ‘high committee delay’ executive nominees (Reagan, Bush43, & Obama) appear in **Figure C6**. The evidence reveals that most of the marginal hazard ratio effects predicted by our theory observed in the full sample can be attributed to committee delay under presidents experiencing ‘low committee delay’ executive nominees



during the Bush41, Clinton, and Trump presidencies. It is worth noting that the 'high committee delay' estimates associated with the Reagan, Bush43, and Obama presidencies are positive and substantively meaningful, albeit estimated with some imprecision for the committee median model specifications [Figure C6: Models C21 & C23] – see Figure C5; cf. Figure C6. These estimates are also estimated with greater relative precision for committee chair model specifications in the “low” committee delay models (Figure C5: Models C18 & C20).




ONLINE APPENDIX D:

Exploring Variation in Partisan Selective Committee Delay Theory Across Different Configurations of Executive Branch Coordination

A more granular analyses of these data is undertaken by variations of executive branch coordination between the president and agency based on the ideological alignment of each entity (Clinton and Lewis 2008). Expectations suggest that executive nominees will be subject to additional selective vetting and deliberation that translates into greater committee-based confirmation delay when the prospects for executive branch coordination are high (*President–Ideologically Aligned Agency*) since it will make legislative oversight more challenging compared to when the prospects for executive branch coordination are low (*President–Ideologically Opposed Agency*). The evidence from disaggregating the sample into three groupings (those noted above, plus *President–Ideologically Neutral Agency*) largely supports this conjecture (see **Models D1.A/D.2A, D1.B/D2.B, and D4.A/D4.B**; cf. minor differences in the opposite hypothesized direction in **Model D3.A/D3.B**). Because the estimates reported in **Figures D1-D3** range from 20% to 40% of the full sample, considerable caution is warranted when interpreting these less precise estimates. Unsurprisingly, the estimates based on the largest of these three subsamples, *President–Ideologically Neutral Agency* (**Figure D3**), tend to most closely mirror the evidence of the full sample presented in **Figure 2**. Although the numerical estimates are more variable for the smaller sub-samples with ideological aligned & opposition agencies (**Figure D1 & D2**), they nonetheless reveal similar patterns to those presented in **Figure 2**.






ONLINE APPENDIX E:

An Alternative Censoring Decision Rule for Executive Nominees Successfully Reported Out of Committee but Unconfirmed at the Senate Floor Stage

Nominee observations are treated as censored in this study if they are not confirmed for the agency position for which the president nominated them for within the current Congress. An alternative censoring decision rule is considered that treats the 147 nominee observations that were considered censored in the preceding analyses as being uncensored since they were successfully reported out of committee within the current Congress, albeit not processed by the full Senate chamber. The results from these sensitivity checks employing this alternative decision rule appear in **Figure E1**. In summary, the results are substantively identical to corresponding estimated presented in the manuscript (**Figure 2**). It is safe to conclude that the core findings relating to selective committee delay logic are unaffected by the censoring decision rule adopted in the manuscript.




ONLINE APPENDIX F:


***Alternative Tests of Partisan Selective Committee Delay Theory:
Evaluating Total Confirmation Delay & Senate Floor Confirmation Delay***

Another alternative test of selective committee delay behavior by Senate committees is performed analyzing total confirmation delay that takes place on both the committee and floor stages of the confirmation process. This is the conventional outcome measure routinely employed of studies focusing on confirmation delay (Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018; McCarty and Razaghian 1999; Ostrander 2016). This test seeks to analyze the extent that partisan selective committee delay hypothesis contains predictive power for explaining time it takes for a successful confirmation process to be attained. In other words, does selective committee delay explain the total time it takes from the president formally introduces the nominee to the Senate until final confirmation passage occurs based on a Senate floor vote? The estimates appearing in **Figure F1** are similar compared to those for the committee stage denoted in **Figure 2** reported in the

manuscript, albeit tend to be somewhat larger for **Models F1** and **F3** based on the absolute committee median distance from the president. These findings suggest that partisan selective delay by committees is correlated with total confirmation delay. This finding is hardly surprising since confirmation delay at the committee stage is substantially larger relative to confirmation delay at the Senate floor stage, as documented in the manuscript on **Pages 1-2**.

Figure F2 displays the marginal hazard ratio effects for the PSCD hypothesis in predicting Senate floor confirmation delay. Although the estimates are comparable for the committee median based measure (**Models F5** and **F7**), these effects are attenuated when analyzing committee chair based measures (**Models F6** and **F8**). One possible explanation for these differences is that the committee median being a more accurate representation of the Senate floor’s preferences than a singular individual such as a committee chair.






ONLINE APPENDIX G:

Evaluating Differences in PSCD Hypothesis Estimates Between Non-Prior Confirmation versus Prior Confirmation Distinctions

We also seek to evaluate differences involving the PSCD estimates regarding whether an executive nominee had recently been successfully confirmed by the Senate or not. The idea being that PSCD-based committee delay may yield swifter confirmation for those executive nominees who had recently been vetted by the Senate during the prior two Congresses compared to those who were not. This analysis was performed based on split subsamples of the database based on whether an executive nominee had not experienced this condition (*Prior Senate Confirmation=0*) versus those who had been successfully confirmed in recent times (*Prior Senate Confirmation=1*).

The marginal hazard ratio effects based on respective within interquartile increases in the absolute ideological distance between the relevant Senate committee and president variables appear below in **Figure G1**. These empirical patterns fail to uncover a statistically discernible difference in the PSCD hypothesis estimates for those executive nominees lacking a recent

successful Senate confirmation versus those who have done so. As noted in the manuscript, some caution is warranted in terms of interpreting this empirical pattern for prior confirmation subsample since it has lower statistical power attributable to comprising only 14.44% (1,022 out of 7,076 executive nominee cases) of the total uncensored confirmed executive nominees in the sample).



ONLINE APPENDIX H:

Evaluating Model Estimates Based on Additive Model Specifications and Alternative Senate Committee Pivots in Terms of Model Fit to Reported Models in Manuscript

We consider the alternative explanation whether committee selective delay is not contingent upon whether the Senate chamber and president are controlled by the same party – and by extension, that such delay is reduced during times of divided partisan control of these political branches. To evaluate this alternative explanation, we re-estimate the models reported in the manuscript (**Models 1-4**) as an additive model, thus evaluating the unconditional relationship between committee ideological divergence from presidents. A graphical summary of the key

estimates of interest appears in **Table I1**. Generally, the inferences conform to what one would expect insofar that greater committee ideological divergence from presidents is associated with greater committee delay of executive nominees. Yet, these alternative additive models are inferior in explaining prediction model fit with respect to confirmation delay compared to the reported multiplicative models employed to evaluate the PSCD hypothesis. In every instance, both the AIC and BIC statistics are appreciably lower for the multiplicative models – yielding anywhere from a –137.14 (**Model 1**, cf. **Model I1**) to –38.27 (**Model 4**, cf. **Model I4**) BIC model statistic point differential between these competing empirical model specifications – well beyond the ‘rule of thumb’ threshold of 10 (e.g., see Kass and Raftery 1995; Fabozzi, et al. 2014).

In addition, alternative Senate committee pivots are analyzed to assess the comparative predictive power of other committee pivots for explaining variation in committee confirmation delay in **Tables H2** (Cox semiparametric models) and **H3** (Weibull parametric models), respectively. These findings show that reported models in the manuscript based on the committee median (**Models 1 & 3**) and committee chair (**Models 2 & 4**) produce a better fit to these data based on both AIC and BIC model fit statistics for alternative models consisting of (a) the ranking committee member’s absolute distance from the president, (b) the distal (i.e., most distant) committee member’s absolute distance from the president, and (c) the minority committee median. Conversely, the model specifications utilizing the majority committee median pivot yields a superior fitting model to these data compared to the reported models based on (overall) committee medians and committee chair pivots. We acknowledge this issue in an explicit manner in the revised manuscript (see Page 25 and Note 18). Disentangling such majority party committee median, overall committee median, and committee chair is extremely difficult since these pivot distance measures are highly correlated with one another.³

³ Correlations among these pivot absolute ideological distance measures range between 0.8891 and 0.9635.

ONLINE APPENDIX TABLE H1

Additive Model Specifications

**Evaluating Partisan-Based (Unconditional) Committee Delay of Executive Nominees by Senate Committees
(Cox and Weibull Model Hazard Ratio Estimates of Senate Committee Confirmation Delay)**

Variable	Model 1 (Cox)	Model H1 (Cox)	Model 2 (Cox)	Model H2 (Cox)	Model 3 (Weibull)	Model H3 (Weibull)	Model 4 (Weibull)	Model H4 (Weibull)
Senate Committee Median – President	0.346* (0.188)	0.922 (0.329)	—	—	0.332 (0.238)	1.026 (0.486)	—	—
Senate Chair Median – President	—	—	0.776 (0.192)	1.224 (0.184)	—	—	0.895 (0.276)	1.447** (0.243)
Divided Partisan Control of Presidency and Senate	0.277*** (0.134)	0.895 (0.124)	0.404*** (0.130)	0.797* (0.102)	0.236** (0.135)	0.894 (0.148)	0.380** (0.148)	0.752** (0.109)
Senate Committee Median – President x Divided Partisan Control of Senate and Presidency	5.537*** (3.225)	—	—	—	7.103*** (4.738)	—	—	—
Senate Committee Chair – President x Divided Partisan Control of Senate and Presidency	—	—	2.538*** (0.883)	—	—	—	2.615** (1.113)	—
AIC: Alternative Additive Model	—	117,647.60	—	117,621.40	—	26,268.61	—	26,221.95
BIC: Alternative Additive Model	—	117,784.30	—	117,758.20	—	26,405.37	—	26,358.71
AIC: Reported PSCD Multiplicative Model	117,574.70	—	117,586.00	—	26,172.92	—	26,183.68	—
BIC: Reported PSCD Multiplicative Model	117,711.40	—	117,722.70	—	26,309.69	—	26,320.44	—
BIC Reported PSCD–Alternative Additive Model Differential	–72.90		–35.50		–95.68		–38.27	
Committee & Administration Unit Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Control Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Total Number of Observations	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879
Total Number of Uncensored Observations	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076

Notes: Control covariates are omitted from table for brevity but can be obtained from authors. Entries are hazard ratio estimates ($H_0: \exp(\beta) = 1.0$). Robust standard errors clustered on committee appear inside parentheses.

* $p \leq 0.10$

** $p \leq 0.05$

*** $p \leq 0.01$.

ONLINE APPENDIX TABLE H2

**Cox Semiparametric Models with Alternative Senate Committee Pivots in Relation to President
(Cox Semiparametric Model Hazard Ratio Estimates of Senate Committee Confirmation Delay)**

Variable	Model 1 (Committee Median)	Model 2 (Committee Chair)	Model H2a (Ranking Committee Member)	Model H2b (Distal Committee Member)	Model H2c (Minority Committee Median)	Model H2d (Majority Committee Median)
Senate Committee – President	0.346* (0.188)	0.776 (0.192)	0.617*** (0.103)	1.749* (0.571)	0.547** (0.137)	1.362 (0.526)
Divided Partisan Control of Presidency and Senate	0.277*** (0.134)	0.404*** (0.130)	0.525*** (0.113)	1.495** (0.285)	0.453*** (0.107)	0.077*** (0.053)
Senate Committee – President x Divided Partisan Control of Senate and Presidency	5.537*** (3.225)	2.538*** (0.883)	2.599*** (0.880)	0.334*** (0.098)	3.490** (1.868)	12.916*** (9.685)
AIC:	117,574.70	117,586.00	117,604.30	117,623.50	117,604.60	117,503.80
BIC:	117,711.40	117,722.70	117,741.10	117,760.20	117,741.30	117,640.50
BIC Reported PSCD–Alternative Additive Model Differential [Model 1]	—	—	–29.70	–48.80	–29.90	70.90
BIC Reported PSCD–Alternative Additive Model Differential [Model 2]	—	—	–18.40	–37.50	–18.60	82.20
Committee & Administration Unit Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Control Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Total Number of Observations	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879
Total Number of Uncensored Observations	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076

Notes: Control covariates are omitted from table for brevity but can be obtained from authors. Entries are hazard ratio estimates ($H_0: \exp(\beta) = 1.0$). Robust standard errors clustered on committee appear inside parentheses. **Red boldface** items indicate that alternative models based on Majority Committee Median yields a better fit to the data than reported models based on (Overall) Committee Median and Committee Chair, respectively.

* $p \leq 0.10$

** $p \leq 0.05$

*** $p \leq 0.01$.

ONLINE APPENDIX TABLE H3

**Weibull Semiparametric Models with Alternative Senate Committee Pivots in Relation to President
(Weibull Parametric Model Hazard Ratio Estimates of Senate Committee Confirmation Delay)**

Variable	Model 3 (Committee Median)	Model 4 (Committee Chair)	Model H3a (Ranking Committee Member)	Model H3b (Distal Committee Member)	Model H3c (Minority Committee Median)	Model H3d (Majority Committee Median)
Senate Committee – President	0.332 (0.238)	0.894 (0.275)	0.461*** (0.101)	2.170** (0.769)	0.369*** (0.111)	1.960 (0.855)
Divided Partisan Control of Presidency and Senate	0.236** (0.134)	0.380** (0.147)	0.423*** (0.099)	1.872*** (0.408)	0.336*** (0.081)	0.048*** (0.035)
Senate Committee – President x Divided Partisan Control of Senate and Presidency	7.102*** (4.737)	2.615** (1.112)	3.245*** (1.125)	0.213*** (0.072)	4.847*** (2.686)	17.877*** (14.381)
AIC:	26,172.92	26,183.68	26,185.70	26,221.89	26,179.72	26,041.23
BIC:	26,309.69	26,320.44	26,322.47	26,358.66	26,316.49	26,178.00
BIC Reported PSCD–Alternative Additive Model Differential [Model 1]	—	—	–12.78	–49.97	–6.80	131.69
BIC Reported PSCD–Alternative Additive Model Differential [Model 2]	—	—	–2.03	–38.22	–3.95	142.44
Committee & Administration Unit Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Control Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Total Number of Observations	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879	9,879
Total Number of Uncensored Observations	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076	7,076

Notes: Control covariates are omitted from table for brevity but can be obtained from authors. Entries are hazard ratio estimates ($H_0: \exp(\beta) = 1.0$). Robust standard errors clustered on committee appear inside parentheses. **Red boldface** items indicate that alternative models based on Majority Committee Median yields a better fit to the data than reported models based on (Overall) Committee Median and Committee Chair, respectively.

* $p \leq 0.10$

** $p \leq 0.05$

*** $p \leq 0.01$.

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¹ These dates were obtained pertaining to Senate action, for each nominee, from congress.gov.

² DW-NOMINATE scores were downloaded from VoteView on May 4, 2020—source: Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet. 2020. *Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database*. <https://voteview.com/>. Retrieved on May 04, 2020. NOMINATE scores for Senators and Presidents between 1987-2021 are employed to construct a measure of the absolute distance between the Senate Committee members and the President.

³ The *Congressional Directory* includes Senate Committee Information for each Congress was used to create a list of all committee members on relevant committees and their experience between 1987-2021. Additionally, information was obtained on any previous experience for committee members listed in the 1987 Directory.

These Congressional Directories were accessed through HeinOnline between June 5, 2020 and August 3, 2020.

⁴ The *Congressional Directory* includes Senate Committee Information for each Congress which we used to create a list of all committee members on relevant committees and their experience between 1987-2021. Additionally, we had to find any previous experience for committee members listed in the 1987 Directory.

⁵ All sources showing as Ostrander (2016) come from Ostrander, Ian. 2016. "The Logic of Collective Inaction: Senatorial Delay in Executive Nominations." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4): 1063-1076. AJPS Data Archive on Dataverse (<http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/ajps>) at doi:10.7910/DVN/29932. Data was Accessed on February 20, 2020.

⁶ The Congressional Directory, which includes Senate Committee Information for each Congress, was employed to create a list of all committee members on relevant committees and their experience between 1987-2021.

⁷ Members full experience in the Senate was calculated from member bios using in Congress.gov. "Members." <https://www.congress.gov>. (For Senate Member Bio Information).

⁸ The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress". <https://bioguideretro.congress.gov>. was employed to assess Senate Member Bio Information on those leaving Congress early or joining a Congress in the middle of a session and understand who was serving on committees.

⁹ Additionally, information from Senate.gov was employed to determine which Senators were appointed during the middle of terms and who they replaced Senate.gov "Appointed Senators (1913-Present)". <https://www.senate.gov/senators/AppointedSenators.htm>. Retrieved on August 04, 2020; and members who changed parties during their tenures: Senate.gov "Senators Who Changed Parties During Senate Service (Since 1890)." https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senators_changed_parties.htm. Retrieved on August 04, 2020. Changes occurring within a Congress were checked the Congressional Directory in the "Notes" section.

¹⁰ The information on the number of bills that were referred to each Senate committee was obtained from congress.gov.

¹¹ To double check who the Chairs of each committee were and to ensure we covered any chair changes within a Congress we used: Senate.gov. “Chairmen of Senate Standing Committees 1789-present” <https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/CommitteeChairs.pdf>. Retrieved on May 29, 2020.

¹² This information was obtained for the agencies, for each nominee, from congress.gov.

¹³ This information was obtained for the agencies, for each nominee, from congress.gov.

¹⁴ The information on the number of bills that were referred to each Senate committee was obtained from congress.gov.