

Online Appendix for “*Reform Reconsidered: The Effect of Form of Government*”

Source	Year	FOG	Data Type	Bicam.	n
Fairlie (1904)	1903	Mayor Council	Snapshot	Y	159
Census Fin. Stat. of Cities	1912, 1917	All Forms	Snapshot	Y	219
Chang (1918)	1918	Commission	Year of adoption	N	343
City Manager Yearbooks	1920-1, 1924-7	Manager	Year of adoption	N	547
Rice (1978)	1922	Commission	Year of adoption	N	522
Detroit Bureau of Gov. Research	1929	All Forms	Snapshot	N	261
ICMA Municipal Yearbook	1934	Manager	Year of adoption	N	429

Table A.2: **Summary of Form of Government Data Sources**

— Commission — Council Manager — Mayor Council




Figure A.2—Form of Government 1900-1934: each row shows a city’s form of government 1900-1934 (n=273). Rows are ordered by city population in 1930. 59% of cities in sample reformed; 39% from MC to Commission, 11% from MC to CM, and 10% from MC to Commission to CM.

Study	Type	Years	n	Measure	Finding
Booms (1966)	Cross-section	1962	73	expenditures	CM spend less
Lineberry and Fowler (1967)	Cross-section	1962	200	expenditures and revenue	CM tax and spend less
Liebert (1974)	Cross-section	1962	294	expenditures	no effect
Dye and Garcia (1978)	Cross-section	1972	583	specialization in policy areas	CM more specialized
Lyons (1978)	Cross-section	1960, 1970	285	expenditures	CM more responsive
Morgan and Pelissero (1980)	Time-series	1945-1978	22	expenditures and revenue	no effect
Deno and Mehay (1987)	Cross-section	1982	73	expenditures	no effect
Hayes and Chang (1990)	Cross-section	1986	191	efficiency in police, fire, garbage	no effect
Nunn (1996)	Time-series	1981-1991	14	expenditures	CM spend more
Feock and Kim (2001)	Cross-section	1984, 1989	420	econ. dev. programs	no effect
Ruhil (2003)	Time-series	1946-1966	222	expenditures	no effect
Jung (2006)	Time-series	1980-2000	504	expenditures	no effect
MacDonald (2008)	Time-series	1981-2001 (x5y)	1,302	expenditures	no effect
Carr and Karuppusamy (2010)	Cross-section	1999	263	expenditures	no effect
Coate and Knight (2011)	CS and TS	1981-2001 (5y)	1,570	expenditures	CM spend more
Hiller (2022)	Time-series	1900-1930	215	expenditures	no effect (Com.)
Carreri, Payson and Thompson (2023)	Time-series	1902-1938	136	expenditures	no effect

Table A.3: Existing studies on effects of form of government




Figure A.3—**Size of Councils and Commissions:** figure shows the size of city councils and commissions in 129 governments from 1903-1940. For bicameral city councils, total seats are calculated as the sum of both houses. Sources: Fairlie (1903), Financial Statistics of Cities (1912), Detroit Bureau of Statistics (1929), ICMA Municipal Yearbook (1940).




Figure A.4—Municipal Expenditures 1905-1934: figure shows average per capita components of expenditures.




Figure A.5—Municipal Revenues 1905-1930: figure shows average revenues per capita by category.




Figure A.6—Municipal Revenue Shares 1905-1934: figure shows average share of revenues by category.




Figure A.7—Municipal Expenditures 1905-1934: figure shows average expenditures per capita by category.




Figure A.8—**Municipal Expenses Shares 1905-1930:** figure shows average share of total expenses by category. All expense categories shown in legend and exclude interests and public service payments.




Figure A.9—Municipal Outlays 1905-1930: figure shows average outlays per capita by category.




Figure A.10—Municipal Outlay Shares 1905-1934: figure shows average share of total outlays by category.






Figure A.11—**Estimates of Switching Form of Government on Revenue Sources:** figure shows point estimates from dynamic difference-in-differences models estimating the effect of switching forms of government on shares of revenues from each source. Group-time ATTs are averaged across all treatment groups and limited to a 5 year window around treatment timing


Figure A.12—Event Studies of Switch from Mayor Council to Commission Form




(a) Revenues per capita



(b) Expenses per capita




(c) Capital Outlays per capita



(d) Revenue to expenditure ratio


Note: plots show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates at $[-4, 5]$ years until Commission adoption. Each point shows ATT by length of exposure to the treatment; line segments show 95% confidence intervals. Estimates in red are time periods following the switch to Commission government; estimates in Black are time periods before. Regressions compare cities that switch to Commission form to never-switching cities. Results are scaled by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Figure A.13—Time-Group Effects of Switch from Mayor Council to Commission Form



(a) Revenues per capita

(b) Expenses per capita




(c) Capital Outlays per capita

(d) Revenue to expenditure ratio


Note: plots show time-group difference-in-differences estimates for each switching year. Each point shows ATT; line segments show 95% confidence intervals. Regressions compare cities that switch to Commission form to never-switching cities. Results are scaled by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Figure A.14—Event Studies of Switch from Mayor Council to Council Manager Form



(a) Revenues per capita

(b) Expenses per capita




(c) Capital Outlays per capita

(d) Revenue to expenditure ratio


Note: plots show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates at [-4, 5] years until CM adoption. Each point shows ATT by length of exposure to the treatment; line segments show 95% confidence intervals. Estimates in red are time periods following the switch to CM government; estimates in Black are time periods before. Regressions compare cities that switch to Commission form to never-switching cities. Results are scaled by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Figure A.15—Time-Group Effects of Switch from Mayor Council to Council Manager Form



(a) Revenues per capita

(b) Expenses per capita




(c) Capital Outlays per capita

(d) Revenue to expenditure ratio


Note: plots show time-group difference-in-differences estimates for each switching year. Each point shows ATT; line segments show 95% confidence intervals. Regressions compare cities that switch to Commission form to never-switching cities. Results are scaled by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Figure A.16—Event Studies of Switch from Commission to Council Manager Form



(a) Revenues per capita

(b) Expenses per capita




(c) Capital Outlays per capita

(d) Revenue to expenditure ratio


Note: plots show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates at $[-4, 5]$ years until CM adoption. Each point shows ATT by length of exposure to the treatment; line segments show 95% confidence intervals. Estimates in red are time periods following the switch to CM government; estimates in Black are time periods before. Regressions compare cities that switch to CM form from Commission form to cities that switch and stay with Commission form. Results are scaled by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Figure A.17—Time-Group Effects of Switch from Commission to Council Manager Form



(a) Revenues per capita

(b) Expenses per capita



(c) Capital Outlays per capita

(d) Revenue to expenditure ratio

Note: plots show time-group difference-in-differences estimates for each switching year. Each point shows ATT; line segments show 95% confidence intervals. Regressions compare cities that switch to Commission form to never-switching cities. Results are scaled by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

	First Stage	Revenue	Expenses	Exp./Rev.	Outlays
State Mandate	0.15 (0.06)				
Commission Adoption		5.47 (10.84)	3.80 (8.37)	0.07 (0.17)	-3.59 (11.46)
R ²	0.07	0.47	0.54	0.07	0.12
Num. obs.	4254	4254	4508	4242	4256
N Clusters	39	39	39	39	39

Table A.4: **No effect of Commission adoption on fiscal policy:** table show results of 2SLS regressions of fiscal policy on Commission adoption, instrument by state enabling legislation. First column show first stage regression of Commission adoption on state mandate; columns 2-5 show 2SLS regressions on revenues per capita, expenses per capita, expenditure to revenue ratio, and outlays. Regression include state and year fixed effects. F statistic on first stage regression is $F = 295$.

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