Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 9 > Issue 1

Designing Checks and Balances

Tiberiu Dragu, New York University, USA, tiberiu.dragu@nyu.edu Xiaochen Fan, New York University, USA, xiaochen.fan@nyu.edu James Kuklinski, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, kuklinsk@illinois.edu
Suggested Citation
Tiberiu Dragu, Xiaochen Fan and James Kuklinski (2014), "Designing Checks and Balances", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 9: No. 1, pp 45-86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00013022

Published: 11 Mar 2014
© 2014 T. Dragu, X. Fan, and J. Kuklinski
Formal modeling,  Game Theory,  Political Economy,  Judiciary,  Lawmaking,  Government
Institutional designChecks and balancesVeto powerConstitutional review

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In this article:
1. The Model
2. The Analysis
3. Application to Constitutional Review
4. Multidimensional Analysis
5. Conclusions
Appendix A
Appendix B


Essential to the Madisonian conception of checks and balances is the division of policy-making authority among multiple actors such that each can veto proposed changes in policy. We use a mechanism design approach to analyze checks and balances institutions. We show that checks and balances institutions in which the most preferred policy of the more moderate player is the unique equilibrium outcome are the only checks and balances institutions that are strategy-proof, efficient, and responsive. Our analysis facilitates a comprehensive evaluation of checks and balances institutions, and our results can serve as a normative benchmark to assess any such institution, regardless of its specific design. We illustrate the applicability of our normative benchmark within the context of constitutional review, a crucial pillar of established democracies, and, increasingly, of developing democracies.


Online Appendix | 100.00013022_app.zip (ZIP).

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/100.00013022_app