Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 12 > Issue 3

Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization

Maria Montero, University of Nottingham, UK, maria.montero@nottingham.ac.uk
 
Suggested Citation
Maria Montero (2017), "Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 12: No. 3, pp 325-346. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00016019

Published: 24 Oct 2017
© 2017 M. Montero
 
Subjects
Formal Modelling,  Game Theory,  Legislatures
 
Keywords
Legislative bargainingWeighted votingProportional payoffs
 

Article Help

Share

Download article
In this article:
Preliminaries
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Proportionality
Predicted Deviations from Proportionality in Applications
Concluding Remarks
References

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.

DOI:10.1561/100.00016019

Online Appendix | 100.00016019_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/100.00016019_app

Replication Data | 100.00016019_supp.zip (ZIP).

This file contains the data that is required to replicate the data on your own system.

DOI: 10.1561/100.00016019_supp