Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 5 > Issue 3–4

Overlapping International Environmental Agreements

Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, Department of Marketing, Business, Economics & Law, University of Alberta, Canada, Xie Zhu, Department of Economics, Oakland University, USA,
Suggested Citation
Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva and Xie Zhu (2015), "Overlapping International Environmental Agreements", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 5: No. 3–4, pp 255-299.

Published: 22 Dec 2015
© 2015 E. C. D. Silva and X. Zhu
Collective action,  Climate Change
Perfectly coalition-proof equilibriumOverlapping coalitionsClimate changeCorrelated pollutantsInternational environmental agreements

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In this article:
1. Introduction
2. Extension of Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium
3. International Environmental Agreements for Correlated Pollutants
4. Relevant International Environmental Agreements (IEAs)
5. Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium
6. Coalition Operation Costs: Dominant Fully Overlapped Structures
7. Larger Economy and Acid-Rain Adaptation R&D
8. Conclusion


The perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (PCPN) concept is extended to allow for the emergence of overlapping coalitions in equilibrium. We study the efficiency and stability properties of environmental agreements to control emissions of correlated continental and global pollutants. We show that set of PCPN equilibria includes perfectly strong Nash (PSN) equilibria if the national damage from continental pollution is sufficiently large relative to the national damage from global pollution. We also show that: (i) continental agreements may be perfectly coalition-proof under much less restrictive circumstances; (ii) perfect Nash equilibria for fully overlapped agreements may be superior to the Grand Coalition's optimal allocation in the presence of coalitional operation costs; and (iii) PSN equilibria may still emerge in a larger world if coalition formation yields R&D spillover benefits.