Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 3 > Issue 1–2

Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea — A Case of Trivial Cooperation?

Soile Kulmala, Marine Research Centre, Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), Finland, soile.kulmala@ymparisto.fi Polina Levontin, Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College, UK, Marko Lindroos, Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki, Finland, Pedro Pintassilgo, Faculty of Economics and Research Centre for Spatial and Organizational Dynamics, University of Algarve, Portugal,
 
Suggested Citation
Soile Kulmala, Polina Levontin, Marko Lindroos and Pedro Pintassilgo (2013), "Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea — A Case of Trivial Cooperation?", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 3: No. 1–2, pp 121-147. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000026

Published: 09 Jan 2013
© 2013 S. Kulmala, P. Levontin, M. Lindroos, and P. Pintassilgo
 
Subjects
Game Theoretic Models/Cooperation/Noncooperation,  Coalitions,  Fisheries
 
Keywords
C72Q22
Atlantic salmonBioeconomic modelCoalition formationCommon Fisheries PolicyPartition functionRelative Stability PrincipleSharing rulesStability analysis
 

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In this article:
Introduction
Bioeconomic Model
Coalition Formation Game
Fishing effort strategies according to RSP
Optimal effort strategies
Implications for salmon stocks
Sensitivity Analysis
Discussion and Conclusion
References
Appendix. Bioeconomic model

Abstract

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four countries with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is full non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies and sharing schemes. The results show that partial cooperation can be sustained and that there are substantial economic benefits to reallocating fishing effort among harvesting countries.

DOI:10.1561/102.00000026