Foundations and Trends® in Accounting > Vol 12 > Issue 1

Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay

Fabrizio Ferri, Columbia University, USA, ff2270@gsb.columbia.edu Robert F. Göx, University of Zurich, robert.goex@business.uzh.ch
 
Suggested Citation
Fabrizio Ferri and Robert F. Göx (2018), "Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay", Foundations and Trends® in Accounting: Vol. 12: No. 1, pp 1-103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1400000043

Published: 24 Apr 2018
© 2018 Fabrizio Ferri and Robert F. Göx
 
Subjects
Corporate governance,  Executive compensation
 
Keywords
JEL Codes: G34 Corporate GovernanceM41 Accounting
Managerial behaviorStakeholdersAccounting research
 

Free Preview:

Article Help

Share

Download article
In this article:
1. Introduction
2. Executive Pay and Corporate Governance
3. The Economics of Say on Pay
4. Empirical Evidence: Fifty Shades of Say on Pay
5. Final Thoughts and Suggestions
Acknowledgements
Appendices
A. Proofs
References

Abstract

This monograph explores the relation between corporate governance and executive compensation and evaluates the conditions under which shareholders can benefit from the right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting on the compensation proposed by the board of directors (Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical literature on the subject.

DOI:10.1561/1400000043
ISBN: 978-1-68083-420-8
117 pp. $80.00
Buy book
 
ISBN: 978-1-68083-421-5
117 pp. $140.00
Buy E-book
Table of contents:
1. Introduction
2. Executive Pay and Corporate Governance
3. The Economics of Say on Pay
4. Empirical Evidence: Fifty Shades of Say on Pay
5. Final Thoughts and Suggestions
Acknowledgements
Appendices
A. Proofs
References

Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay

Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay provides a comprehensive summary and survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on Say on Pay. The first part of the monograph theoretically studies how a poor governance structure affects the level and structure of executive pay and identifies conditions under which Say and Pay could help shareholders to improve it. The second part of this monograph explains the origins and the cross-country differences in Say on Pay regulation and provides a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical evidence on the subject. Finally, the authors discuss potential improvements and point out some fruitful avenues for future empirical and theoretical research.

 
ACC-043