Abstract

This monograph brings together in one place a discussion of 35 instances since the 1940s of the political lobbying of accounting standards in the United States, the United Kingdom, and at the International Accounting Standards Committee and Board. Political lobbying consists of actions, usually by financial statement preparers, trade associations, or government, to pressure the standard-setter not to issue a proposed standard, usually accompanied by explicit or implied threats or intimidation.

The author provides elaborate accounts of the various instruments of pressure marshaled by the lobbyists to use against the standard-setter or regulator, or both. In recent decades, it has been increasingly common in the U.S. for the standard-setter’s fervent critics to appeal to members of Congress to bolster their attack. Typically, the alleged economic consequences of the proposed standard have been at the root of the lobbying.

In footnotes and internal citations, the author supplies many references to more extensive discussions of the political lobbying in books and articles appearing in research and professional journals as well as in the financial and accounting press.