Journal of Historical Political Economy > Vol 2 > Issue 3

Fiscality, Regulation, and Policy Choice: Evidence from Declassified British Cabinet Minutes 1981–1997

Mircea Popa, University of Bristol, UK, mircea.popa@bristol.ac.uk
 
Suggested Citation
Mircea Popa (2022), "Fiscality, Regulation, and Policy Choice: Evidence from Declassified British Cabinet Minutes 1981–1997", Journal of Historical Political Economy: Vol. 2: No. 3, pp 449-476. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/115.00000036

Publication Date: 31 Oct 2022
© 2022 M. Popa
 
Subjects
Political economy,  Executive politics,  Comparative Political Economy,  Regulation,  Public policy
 
Keywords
Cabinetspolicy choiceBritish politicsfiscalityregulation
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
Theory and Literature 
Data and Methods 
Results 
Discussion 
References 

Abstract

This article uses a novel dataset, compiled from declassified records of British cabinet meetings between 1981 and 1997, to examine the motivations associated with adoption and rejection in more than one thousand policy decisions. A wide variety of motivations for policy options were considered, including those related to political calculation, institutional constraints, economic and noneconomic policy objectives, and interest group input. Dimensionality reduction and random forest models show that a narrow set of motivations related to fiscality, economic regulation, and public perceptions, were the most important predictors of the adoption outcome. Fiscal constraints and regulatory objectives were the most important predictors of adoption, and interest group demands related to fiscality and regulation the most important predictors of rejection. These findings provide support for the central role of these two core economic functions in policy adoption in a recent and influential case.

DOI:10.1561/115.00000036

Online Appendix | 115.00000036_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/115.00000036_app