International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics > Vol 16 > Issue 2

Coping with Private Lobbies in Industrial and Product Safety Regulation: A Literature Survey

Julien Jacob, Université de Strasbourg, Université de Lorraine, AgroParisTech, CNRS, INRAE, BETA, France, julienjacob@unistra.fr , Caroline Orset, Université Paris-Saclay, AgroParisTech, INRAE, Paris-Saclay Applied Economics, France, caroline.orset@agroparistech.fr
 
Suggested Citation
Julien Jacob and Caroline Orset (2022), "Coping with Private Lobbies in Industrial and Product Safety Regulation: A Literature Survey", International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics: Vol. 16: No. 2, pp 171-227. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/101.00000144

Publication Date: 23 Nov 2022
© 2022 J. Jacob and C. Orset
 
Subjects
 
Keywords
JEL Codes: D01D72K32Q57
Industry risksinformation acquisitioninnovationliability ruleslobbyscientific uncertaintylaw and economics
 

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In this article:
1 Policy Tools: Authorisation and Liability 
2 A Mix of Ex Ante and Ex Post Policies to Mitigate Risk 
3 Mixing Ex Ante and Ex Post Policies to Avoid Collusion between Industry Lobbies and Decision-makers 
4 Mixing Ex Ante and Ex Post Policies: A Means of Fostering Safer Innovations and Dealing with Imperfectly Known Risks 
5 Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

This literature review sheds light on the role of marketing authorisations and liabilities in controlling industry lobby behaviour aimed at enhancing the lobbyists' private interest to the detriment of the public interest. We present two political tools available to public authorities, marketing authorisation and liabilities (civil and criminal) to regulate firms that market products that could be harmful to society. We draw on the economic literature and contributions that study how these policy tools can be used to achieve three main objectives: providing incentives for risk mitigation, fostering innovation and the acquisition of information on unclear risks, and avoiding collusion between public bodies and the companies being regulated. We conclude with a brief discussion of the areas that require more in-depth research on this topic.

DOI:10.1561/101.00000144