Journal of Forest Economics > Vol 21 > Issue 4

Incentivizing afforestation agreements: Institutional-economic conditions and motivational drivers

Roy Brouwer, Department of Environmental Economics, Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands, r.brouwer@vu.nl Nele Lienhoop, Department of Economics, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Germany, Frans Oosterhuis, Department of Environmental Economics, Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
 
Suggested Citation
Roy Brouwer, Nele Lienhoop and Frans Oosterhuis (2015), "Incentivizing afforestation agreements: Institutional-economic conditions and motivational drivers", Journal of Forest Economics: Vol. 21: No. 4, pp 205-222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfe.2015.09.003

Published: 0/12/2015
© 0 2015 Roy Brouwer, Nele Lienhoop, Frans Oosterhuis
 
Subjects
 
Keywords
JEL Codes:Q23Q51Q57
Contract designAfforestationChoice experimentWillingness to accept compensationMotivation
 

Article Help

Share

Download article
In this article:
Introduction
Methodology
Survey design and data collection
Results
Discussion and conclusions

Abstract

The main objective of this study is to estimate and compare farmer demand for afforestation agreements in the Netherlands and Germany under different institutional-economic contract design conditions. Farmers’ responsiveness to financial and non-financial incentives to convert part of their land into forest is examined in a discrete choice experiment. Besides landowner and contract characteristics, we test the role of motivational drivers in explaining farmers’ willingness to conclude afforestation agreements. These are expected to lower demand for financial compensation. We fix financial compensation levels in contractual agreements relatively low compared to opportunity costs, but comparable to what farmers currently receive for nature conservation measures. Although we find substantial demand for afforestation agreements in both samples, Dutch and German farmers value contract conditions differently. This has important implications for the effectiveness of varying compensation levels on scheme participation rates. Farmers are willing to trade-off financial compensation against non-financial terms and conditions. However, having a positive environmental disposition towards wildlife conservation does not necessarily result in the acceptance of lower levels of financial compensation.

DOI:10.1016/j.jfe.2015.09.003