Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 1 > Issue 4

Health vs. Economy: Politically Optimal Pandemic Policy

Desiree Desierto, George Mason University, USA, ddesiert@gmu.edu Mark Koyama, George Mason University, USA, mkoyama2@gmu.edu
 
Suggested Citation
Desiree Desierto and Mark Koyama (2020), "Health vs. Economy: Politically Optimal Pandemic Policy", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 1: No. 4, pp 645-669. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000026

Publication Date: 18 Nov 2020
© 2020 D. Desierto and M. Koyama
 
Subjects
Political Economy,  Formal Modeling,  Autocracy
 
Keywords
Selectorate theorypandemicspolitical economy of pandemic policyCOVID-19
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
The Model 
Preliminary Case Studies 
Concluding Comments 
References 

Abstract

Pandemics have heterogeneous effects on the health and economic outcomes of members of the population. To stay in power, politician-policymakers have to consider the health vulnerability–economic vulnerability (HV–EV) profiles of their coalition. We show that the politically optimal pandemic policy (POPP) reveals the HV–EV profile of the smallest, rather than the largest, group in the coalition. The logic of political survival dictates that the preferences of the most pivotal members of the coalition determine policy.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000026

Companion

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Volume 1, Issue 4 Special issue - The Political Economy of Pandemics, Part I
See the other articles that are part of this special issue.