Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 4 > Issue 3

Media Censorship Backfire

Xiaoli Guo, Shanghai Institute of International Organization and Global Governance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, P.R. China, guoxiaoli@mail.shufe.edu.cn
 
Suggested Citation
Xiaoli Guo (2023), "Media Censorship Backfire", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 4: No. 3, pp 373-400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000082

Publication Date: 30 Nov 2023
© 2023 X. Guo
 
Subjects
 
Keywords
Censorshipmediapolitical economyformal theory
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
Model Setup 
Media Bias Manipulation 
News Cost Manipulation 
Censorship and Citizen Welfare 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

This paper utilizes a game-theoretical model to present a comprehensive framework for understanding the causes and consequences of media censorship backfire. The model examines two state censorship tactics: manipulating media biases and manipulating the citizens’ cost of accessing news. The findings reveal that the commonly cited factors in existing literature—impaired media credibility, deteriorated citizen beliefs in the state, and decreased citizen responses to the media—only capture one type of censorship backfire. Manipulating media biases can generate conditions diametrically opposed to those mentioned above and backfire. Additionally, manipulating the citizens’ cost of news access can backfire without changing their beliefs. This tactic may also impact the level of media bias, yielding outcomes similar to those resulting from media bias manipulation. Based on my model, these various types of censorship backfire operate on essentially similar mechanisms, and can coexist under specific conditions.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000082

Online Appendix | 113.00000082_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/113.00000082_app