Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 4 > Issue 3

Unemployment Insurance, Risk, and the Acquisition of Specific Skills: An Experimental Approach

John S. Ahlquist, Professor, School of Global Policy & Strategy, UC San Diego, USA, jahlquist@ucsd.edu , Ben Ansell, Professor of Comparative Democratic Institutions, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK, ben.ansell@politics.ox.ac.uk
 
Suggested Citation
John S. Ahlquist and Ben Ansell (2023), "Unemployment Insurance, Risk, and the Acquisition of Specific Skills: An Experimental Approach", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 4: No. 3, pp 401-429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000083

Publication Date: 30 Nov 2023
© 2023 J. S. Ahlquist and B. Ansell
 
Subjects
 
Keywords
Unemployment insuranceskillsvarieties of capitalismbehavioral economics
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
A Model of Specific Skills, Risk, and Insurance 
Experimental Design 
Analysis and Results 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

Educational and skill divisions among workers are an increasingly important political cleavage in advanced democracies. We provide the first experimental analysis of the effects of unemployment risk and unemployment insurance generosity on workers’ investment in job-specific skills. Using both laboratory and online samples, we find that, even in highly permissive contractual environments, more generous unemployment insurance leads to a greater level of investment in task-specific skills that risk obsolescence. Our experiment provides evidence supporting a key part of the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach to political economy while also finding several behavioral deviations from standard human capital theory.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000083

Online Appendix | 113.00000083_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/113.00000083_app