Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 4 > Issue 4

Party and Policy in Lineland: A Theory of Conditional Party Cartels

John H. Aldrich, Political Science, Duke University, USA, aldrich@duke.edu , Gary W. Cox, Political Science, Stanford University, USA, gwcox@stanford.edu , Mathew D. McCubbins, Political Science and Law, Duke University, USA, David W. Rohde, Political Science, Duke University, USA, rohde@duke.edu
 
Suggested Citation
John H. Aldrich, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins and David W. Rohde (2024), "Party and Policy in Lineland: A Theory of Conditional Party Cartels", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 4: No. 4, pp 479-495. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000085

Publication Date: 21 Feb 2024
© 2024 J. H. Aldrich, G. W. Cox, M. D. McCubbins, and D. W. Rohde
 
Subjects
Political parties,  Legislatures,  Elections
 
Keywords
Congresspolitical partieselectionsspecial rulesmedian voter
 

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Abstract

We have two goals in this paper. First, we provide a unified account of several prominent institutional theories of the Congress, but especially present a model that is consistent with both the Cox-McCubbins theory of party cartels (2005; 2007) and the Aldrich-Rohde theory of conditional party government (1997; 2000; Aldrich, 2011; Rohde, 1991). We hope to demonstrate that, while these two theories might have developed independently, together they offer a unified account. Second, we develop a model of elections that includes party provision of campaign resources to provide electoral incentives for Members of Congress to vote on the floor for special rules that reflect positions away from their district median and towards the median of their party in the chamber. In this way we offer a theory that includes specific internal and external accounts to explain a wider array of MC behavior on the floor and in elections.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000085