Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 6 > Issue 2

Central Bank Communication as Public Opinion?

Nicole Baerg, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK, nicole.baerg@essex.ac.uk , Dominik Duell, Department of Political Science, University of Innsbruck, Austria, dominik.duell@uibk.ac.at , Will Lowe, Hertie School, Germany, Lowe@hertie-school.org
 
Suggested Citation
Nicole Baerg, Dominik Duell and Will Lowe (2025), "Central Bank Communication as Public Opinion?", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 6: No. 2, pp 211-247. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000123

Publication Date: 07 Jul 2025
© 2025 N. Baerg, D. Duell, and W. Lowe
 
Subjects
Experimental economics,  European politics,  Political economy,  Public opinion
 
Keywords
ECBinflation expectationsinformationpopulismsurvey experiments
 

Share

Download article
In this article:
Introduction 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Research Design 
Results 
Alternative Mechanisms 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

The legitimacy of central banks is on the decline in many countries yet support for central banks is thought to be essential for the successful conduct of monetary policy. Embedding survey vignette experiments into three panel survey waves of German citizens, we examine how support for the European Central Bank (ECB) and the central banks communication style affects a respondents inflation expectations. Our experiments show that while information effects exist, such effects are heterogeneous across different societal groups. We find that information effects are strongest among those who already support the European project and the ECB. Our findings have important implications for the public outreach strategies of central banks. Further, in the aggregate, our results also suggest that Euroskepticism likely has inflationary effects.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000123

Online Appendix | 113.00000123_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/113.00000123_app