Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 6 > Issue 2

Direct Democracy Backsliding, 1955-2024

John G. Matsusaka, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, USA, matsusak@usc.edu
 
Suggested Citation
John G. Matsusaka (2025), "Direct Democracy Backsliding, 1955-2024", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 6: No. 2, pp 249-276. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000124

Publication Date: 07 Jul 2025
© 2025 J. G. Matsusaka
 
Subjects
Public economics,  Democracy,  Democratization,  Legislatures,  Political economy,  State politics
 
Keywords
Backslidingdirect democracyinitiatives and referendumsinstitutions
 

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In this article:
Terminology and Two Recent Examples 
Data 
Trends and Patterns 
Theory: Strategic Motives and Process Preferences 
Exploratory Evidence on Motives 
Citizens versus Legislators 
Other Applications 
Discussion 
References 

Abstract

Direct democracy backsliding occurs when a government alters its laws to hinder the use of initiatives and referendums. This study develops a measure of direct democracy backsliding, collects the data to calculate it over the last 70 years, and documents several trends and patterns. The data reveal a continuous chipping away at direct democracy throughout the period; legislatures proposed on average 2.2 amendments restricting direct democracy every two-year electoral cycle, and four amendments restricting direct democracy for every one amendment expanding it. The amount of such activity in recent years is high but not at a peak for the period. The strongest predictor of anti-direct-democracy proposals is Republican control of the state legislature. I find little evidence that legislators sought to restrict direct democracy for strategic reasons, either to forestall future adverse policy outcomes, or in reaction to past adverse outcomes.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000124