Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 8 > Issue 3

Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory

Roger B. Myerson, Economics Dept., University of Chicago, USA, myerson@uchicago.edu
Suggested Citation
Roger B. Myerson (2013), "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 8: No. 3, pp 305-337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00013006

Publication Date: 27 Jun 2013
© 2013 R. B. Myerson
electoral institutions


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In this article:
1. An Introductory Model of Political Institutions 
2. A General Impossibility Theorem 
3. Anonymity and Neutrality 
4. Tournaments and Binary Agendas 
5. The Top Cycle 
6. Monotonicity and Learning From Sequential Votes 
7. Two-Party Competition 
8. Median Voter Theorems 
9. Conclusions 


This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topics include Nash implementability, monotonic social choice correspondences, the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, sophisticated solutions of binary agendas, the top cycle of a tournament, the bipartisan set for two-party competition, and median voter theorems. The paper begins with a simple example to illustrate the importance of multiple equilibria in game-theoretic models of political institutions.