Navin Kartik, Columbia University, USA, email@example.com
Richard Van Weelden, University of Pittsburgh, USA, firstname.lastname@example.org
Navin Kartik and Richard Van Weelden (2019), "Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 14: No. 2, pp 131-157. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00016057
Incumbency Effects when Type is Revealed in Office
Proof of Proposition 2
Simultaneous Good and Bad Reputation
Out-of-Office Policy Payoffs
We study dynamic models of electoral accountability. Politicians' policy preferences are their private information, so officeholders act to influence the electorate's beliefs — i.e., to build reputation — and improve their re-election prospects. The resulting behavior may be socially desirable (good reputation effects) or undesirable (bad reputation effects). When newly-elected officeholders face stronger reputation pressures than their established counterparts, good reputation effects give rise to incumbency disadvantage, while bad reputation effects induce incumbency advantage, all else equal. We relate these results to empirical patterns on incumbency effects across democracies.