Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 15 > Issue 4

Quitting in Protest: Presidential Policymaking and Civil Service Response

Charles M. Cameron, Princeton University, USA, ccameron@princeton.edu John M. de Figueiredo, Duke University and NBER, USA, jdefig@duke.edu
 
Suggested Citation
Charles M. Cameron and John M. de Figueiredo (2020), "Quitting in Protest: Presidential Policymaking and Civil Service Response", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 15: No. 4, pp 507-538. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00018015

Publication Date: 08 Oct 2020
© 2020 C. M. Cameron and J. M. de Figueiredo
 
Subjects
Bureaucracy: Public administration,  Bureaucracy,  Formal modelling,  Game theory,  Executive Politics
 

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In this article:
Introduction 
The Rise of the Centralized Presidency 
The Model 
Policy Centralization and Agency Response 
The President's Incentive to Centralize Policymaking 
Extensions 
Conclusion 
References 

Abstract

We formally model the impact of presidential policymaking on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. In the model, centralized policy initiative by the president demotivates policy-oriented bureaucrats and can impel them to quit rather than implicate themselves in presidentially imposed policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an incumbent president in the hope of shaping future policy. As control of the White House alternates between ideologically opposed extreme presidents, policy-minded moderates depart from bureaucratic agencies leaving only policy extremists or poorly performing "slackers." The consequences for policy making are substantial. Despite these adverse consequences, presidents have strong incentives to engage in centralized policymaking.

DOI:10.1561/100.00018015