Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 4 > Issue 1

War Chests for Deterrence and Savings

Jay Goodliffe, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 25545, Associate Professor, Brigham Young University, USA, goodliffe@byu.edu
Suggested Citation
Jay Goodliffe (2007), "War Chests for Deterrence and Savings", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 4: No. 1, pp 129-150. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00007061

Publication Date: 01 Mar 2007
© 2009 J. Goodliffe


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In this article:
Related Models 
The Model 
One Election Cycle 
Two Election Cycles, No Uncertainty 
Discussion and Empirical Predictions 


I present a model of fund-raising in repeated elections where funds are raised to deter the entry of strong challengers, and to increase the probability of winning through campaign spending. The equilibrium relationship between war chests and incumbent strength is non-monotonic, because incumbents of moderate strength have an incentive to raise enough money to deter strong challengers and to save a large fraction of those funds for use in subsequent election, while stronger incumbents have less incentive to save. Thus, the savings behavior can mask the entry deterrence effect.