Review of Corporate Finance > Vol 3 > Issue 1–2

Bank Misconduct, Board Diversity and CEO Turnover

B. Casu, Bayes Business School, City, University of London, UK, b.casu@city.ac.uk , A. Gallo, Bayes Business School, City, University of London, UK, Angela.Gallo.1@city.ac.uk , E. Kalotychou, Faculty of Management and Economics, Cyprus University of Technology, Cyprus, eleni.kalotychou@cut.ac.cy , A. Sarkisyan, Essex Business School, University of Essex, UK, asarkisyan@essex.ac.uk
 
Suggested Citation
B. Casu, A. Gallo, E. Kalotychou and A. Sarkisyan (2023), "Bank Misconduct, Board Diversity and CEO Turnover", Review of Corporate Finance: Vol. 3: No. 1–2, pp 149-174. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/114.00000038

Publication Date: 31 May 2023
© 2023 B. Casu, A. Gallo, E. Kalotychou and A. Sarkisyan
 
Subjects
 
Keywords
JEL Codes: M14, K420
Misconductgender diversityCEO turnoverBoard of Directorsbank
 

Share

Download article
In this article:
Introduction 
Empirical Design and Data 
Main Results and Additional Analyses 
Conclusions 
References 

Abstract

This paper investigates corporate reactions to bank misconduct episodes. We test whether more diverse boards have a stronger disciplining effect and trigger “changes at the top”. We consider misconduct fines issued by US regulators to EU listed banks during the period 2009–2018. We find that CEO dismissals are more likely following regulatory fines, but not during the investigation process. Board gender diversity does not seem to impact on boards’ decision to fire the CEO, nor reinforce boards' disciplining effect in the presence of misconduct. The presence of foreign directors and age diversity increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal following regulatory sanctions.

DOI:10.1561/114.00000038

Companion

Review of Corporate Finance, Volume 3, Issue 1-2 Special Issue on Gender Diversity in Corporate Finance: Articles Overiew
See the other articles that are part of this special issue.