Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 1 > Issue 1

On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark, , Marko Lindroos, Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki, Finland,
Suggested Citation
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak and Marko Lindroos (2010), "On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 1: No. 1, pp 49-70.

Publication Date: 07 Oct 2010
© 2010 L. G. Kronbak and M. Lindroos
Game Theoretic Models/Cooperation/Noncooperation
Species preservationBioeconomic modelingTwo-species fisheriesNon-cooperative game


Login to download a free copy
In this article:
Basic One-Stock Model 
Two Independent Stocks 
Two Biologically Dependent Stocks 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Appendix A 
Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis When Changing Economic Parameters 
Appendix C 


Game-theoretic models of fisheries typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. However, these types of models do not capture many real-world mixed fisheries, where species can be biologically independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting the preservation of biodiversity by setting up a two-species model with the aim of exploring the conditions under which both species can survive exploitation under non-cooperative management. The model starts out as a two-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to also include biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the maximum number of players that can preserve both species while satisfying the model's conditions. For visualization purposes, we simulate a two-species model with different kinds of interrelationships.