Strategic Behavior and the Environment > Vol 7 > Issue 3–4

Stability of Global Climate Cooperation Under Uncertainty

Jan Kersting, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, Germany,
Suggested Citation
Jan Kersting (2018), "Stability of Global Climate Cooperation Under Uncertainty", Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 7: No. 3–4, pp 351-396.

Publication Date: 12 Feb 2018
© 2018 J. Kersting
Environmental Economics:Climate Change,  Public Economics:Public Goods,  Economic Theory:Game Theory,  International relations:International organization,  Game theory,  Intergovernmental relations,  International organization,  International relations,  Uncertainty,  Collective action,  Climate Change
JEL Codes: C71D81H41F53Q54
Climate changeGame theoryInternational climate regimeUncertainty


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In this article:
1. Introduction 
2. Uncertainty in a Model of Climate Cooperation 
3. Technological Uncertainty 
4. Uncertainty in Climate Damages 
5. Discussion 
6. Conclusions 
A. Proofs 
Additional Tables 


International cooperation is needed to substantially reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and avoid dangerous climate change. The possibility of cooperation is influenced by the presence of uncertainty in both damages from climate change and the development of low-carbon technologies. This paper integrates uncertainty into an analysis of the stability of global climate cooperation, using cooperative game theory. I find that the deterministic result does not necessarily carry over to the case including uncertainty, and that the stability of global cooperation crucially depends on the ability of a coalition to redistribute risk between members with different levels of risk aversion. The results suggest that risk redistribution should feature prominently in the international climate regime.



Strategic Behavior and the Environment, Volume 7, Issue 3-4 International Environmental Agreements: Articles Overiew
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