Quarterly Journal of Political Science > Vol 12 > Issue 3

Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization

Maria Montero, University of Nottingham, UK, maria.montero@nottingham.ac.uk
Suggested Citation
Maria Montero (2017), "Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 12: No. 3, pp 325-346. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00016019

Publication Date: 24 Oct 2017
© 2017 M. Montero
Formal Modelling,  Game Theory,  Legislatures
Legislative bargainingWeighted votingProportional payoffs


Download article
In this article:
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Proportionality 
Predicted Deviations from Proportionality in Applications 
Concluding Remarks 


This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games.