Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy > Vol 6 > Issue 2

Executive Deference or Legislative Constraint? Senate Committees and the Exercise of Decentralized Authority over U.S. Executive Nominations

George A. Krause, Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia, USA, gkrause@uga.edu , Jason S. Byers, Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut, USA, jason.byers@uconn.edu
 
Suggested Citation
George A. Krause and Jason S. Byers (2025), "Executive Deference or Legislative Constraint? Senate Committees and the Exercise of Decentralized Authority over U.S. Executive Nominations", Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy: Vol. 6: No. 2, pp 181-209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000122

Publication Date: 07 Jul 2025
© 2025 G. A. Krause and J. S. Byers
 
Subjects
Congress,  Executive politics,  Legislatures,  Presidential politics
 
Keywords
Appointment politicsconfirmation delaySenate committeesexecutive deferencelegislative constraint
 

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In this article:
The Committee Foundations of the Confirmation Process 
A Theory of Selective Committee Delay 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
Empirical Findings 
Discussion 
References 

Abstract

Despite the combination of strong parties and insecure majorities in U.S. legislative institutions, Senate committees play a vital role in confirmation politics. A theory of selective committee delay is proposed that predicts that ideologically-vulnerable Senate committees constitute a primary source of confirmation delay. Evidence supporting this logic is obtained from nearly 10,000 U.S. federal PAS executive nominations between the Reagan and Trump administrations. Unified (divided) partisan alignment between the Senate and president is associated with protracted (swifter) committee confirmation processes when committees' policy interests diverge from those of the presidents. These findings highlight how the confirmation process serves as both a decentralized and variable procedural constraint on the executive branch appointment process within a separation of powers framework. More broadly, presidential nominee selection choices must account for the relative ideological positions of Senate committees, and that chamber-oriented rule changes to the confirmation process are unlikely to affect confirmation delay.

DOI:10.1561/113.00000122

Online Appendix | 113.00000122_app.pdf

This is the article's accompanying appendix.

DOI: 10.1561/113.00000122_app